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Abstract 
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists have collaboratively maintained the Waterborne Disease and Outbreak Surveillance System 
for collecting and reporting data related to waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water. In 
1978, WBDOs associated with recreational water (natural and treated water) were added. This system is the primary 
source of data regarding the scope and effects of disease associated with recreational water in the United States. In 
addition, data are collected on individual cases of recreational water-associated illnesses and infections and health 
events occurring at aquatic facilities but not directly related to water exposure. 
Reporting Period: Data presented summarize WBDOs and case reports associated with recreational water use that occurred 
during January 2005–December 2006 and previously unreported disease reports and outbreaks during 1978–2004. 
Description of the System: Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and the Freely Associated 
States (i.e., the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau, 
formerly parts of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) have primary responsibility for detecting, 
investigating, and voluntarily reporting WBDOs to CDC. Although the surveillance system includes data for WBDOs 
and cases associated with drinking water, recreational water, and water not intended for drinking, only cases and 
outbreaks associated with recreational water and health events at aquatic facilities are summarized in this report. 
Results: During 2005–2006, a total of 78 WBDOs associated with recreational water were reported by 31 states. 
Illness occurred in 4,412 persons, resulting in 116 hospitalizations and five deaths. The median outbreak size was 13 
persons (range: 2–2,307 persons). Of the 78 WBDOs, 48 (61.5%) were outbreaks of gastroenteritis that resulted from 
infectious agents or chemicals; 11 (14.1%) were outbreaks of acute respiratory illness; and 11 (14.1%) were outbreaks 
of dermatitis or other skin conditions. The remaining eight were outbreaks of leptospirosis (n = two), primary amebic 
meningoencephalitis (n = one), and mixed or other illnesses (n = five). WBDOs associated with gastroenteritis resulted 
in 4,015 (91.0%) of 4,412 illnesses. Fifty-eight (74.4%) WBDOs occurred at treated water venues, resulting in 4,167 
(94.4%) cases of illness. The etiologic agent was confirmed in 62 (79.5%) of the 78 WBDOs, suspected in 12 (15.4%), 
and unidentified in four (5.1%). Thirty-four (43.6%) WBDOs had a parasitic etiology; 22 (28.2%), bacterial; four 
(5.1%), viral; and two (2.6%), chemical or toxin. Among 
the 48 gastroenteritis outbreaks, Cryptosporidium was 
Corresponding author: Jonathan S. Yoder, MSW, MPH, Division of Parasitic confirmed as the causal agent in 31 (64.6%), and all
Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, 4770 
except two of these outbreaks occurred in treated water Buford Hwy., NE, MS F-22, Atlanta, GA 30341. Telephone: 770-488-3602; 
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Case reports associated with recreational water exposure that were discussed and analyzed separately from outbreaks 
include three fatal Naegleria cases and 189 Vibrio illnesses reported to the Cholera and Other Vibrio Illness Surveillance 
System. For Vibrio reporting, the most commonly reported species were Vibrio vulnificus, V. alginolyticus, and V. parahaemolyticus. 
V. vulnificus illnesses associated with recreational water exposure had the highest Vibrio illness hospitalization (77.6%) 
and mortality (22.4%) rates. 
In addition, 32 aquatic facility-related health events not associated with recreational water use (e.g., pool chemical 
mixing accidents) that occurred during 1983–2006 were received from New York. These events, which caused illness in 
364 persons, are included in this report but analyzed separately. 
Interpretations: The number of WBDOs summarized in this report and the trends in recreational water-associated 
disease and outbreaks demonstrate a substantial increase in number of reports from previous years. Outbreaks, espe­
cially the largest ones, occurred more frequently in the summer at treated water venues and caused gastrointestinal 
illness. Deficiencies leading to WBDOs included problems with water-quality, venue design, usage, and maintenance. 
Case reports of illness associated with recreational water use expand our understanding of the scope of waterborne 
illness by further underscoring the contribution of less well-recognized swimming venues (e.g., oceans) and illness 
(e.g., nongastrointestinal illness). Aquatic facilities are also a focus for injuries involving chemicals or equipment used 
routinely in the operation of swimming venues, thus illustrating the lack of training of some aquatics staff. 
Public Health Actions: CDC uses WBDO surveillance data to 1) identify the etiologic agents, types of aquatic 
venues, water-treatment systems, and deficiencies associated with outbreaks and case reports; 2) evaluate the adequacy 
of efforts (i.e., regulations and public awareness activities) to provide safe recreational water; 3) expand the scope of 
understanding about waterborne disease and health events associated with swimming and aquatics facilities; and 4) 
establish public health prevention priorities, data, and messaging that might lead to improved regulations, guidelines, 
and prevention measures at the local, state, and federal levels. 
Introduction 
During 1920–1970, statistical data regarding waterborne-
disease outbreaks (WBDOs) in the United States were col-
lected by different researchers and federal agencies (1). Since 
1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiolo­
gists (CSTE) have collaboratively maintained the Waterborne 
Disease and Outbreak Surveillance System (WBDOSS), a 
surveillance system that tracks the occurrences and causes of 
WBDOs and cases of disease associated with drinking water 
(2–11). In 1978, WBDOs associated with recreational water 
were added to the surveillance system. The types of outbreaks 
and disease case reports included in the Surveillance Summa-
ries have expanded multiple times to more accurately reflect 
the scope of waterborne disease in the United States. Out-
breaks of Pontiac fever (PF) were added in 1989 (9), out­
breaks of Legionnaires’ disease (LD)were added in 2001 (3,12), 
and single cases of Vibrio illness reported to the Cholera and 
Other Vibrio Illness Surveillance System that were associated 
with recreational water use were added in 2003. WBDOs 
associated with drinking water and water not intended for 
drinking are presented in a separate report (13). 
WBDO surveillance activities are intended to 1) character­
ize the epidemiology of waterborne disease; 2) identify trends 
in the etiologic agents and other factors associated with
WBDOs; 3) identify major deficiencies in providing safe rec­
reational water; 4) encourage public health personnel to 
detect and investigate WBDOs; 5) foster collaboration among 
local, state, federal, and international agencies on initiatives
to prevent waterborne disease; and 6) collect data needed to 
support future prevention efforts. Additional data on cases of 
waterborne disease related to recreational water are gathered 
from separate disease surveillance systems and through supple­
mentary surveillance activities (Figure 1). Some of these data 
are collected and analyzed in WBDOSS, and some are dis-
cussed in this report. These data are useful for expanding our 
understanding of the scope of waterborne disease, identifying
important factors associated with unsafe or unhealthy recre­
ational water, influencing research priorities, supporting pub-
lic health recommendations, and encouraging improved 
water-quality policies and regulations. However, WBDOs and 
case reports summarized in this report are thought to repre­
sent only a portion of the illness associated with recreational 
water exposure. Reliable estimates of the number of unrecog­
nized WBDOs are not available. In addition, the surveillance 
information described in this report does not include esti­
mates of the number of recreational water illnesses (RWIs). 
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FIGURE 1. Data sources and outputs of the Waterborne Disease and Outbreak Surveillance System 
Waterborne disease outbreaks (WBDOs) 
reported routinely to CDC by jurisdictional 
health authorities (e.g., states and territories) 
Single water-associated cases of 
• Primary Amebic Meningoencephalitis 
(e.g., ) 
• Chemical/toxin poisoning 
• Wound infections (reported sporadically 
by some jurisdictional health authorities) 
Naegleria fowleri 
Aquatic facility-related health events not 
associated with recreational water 
(reported sporadically by jurisdictional 
health authorities) 
Recreational water-associated Vibrio cases 
(reported separately to the Cholera and 
Other Surveillance System) Vibrio 
Periodic reports of waterborne-
disease outbreaks 
Waterborne Disease and Outbreak 
(recreational, drinking, and other 
uses) published biennially in 
Surveillance Summaries 
MMWR 
Analysis of waterborne disease and outbreaks and 
dissemination of waterborne-disease prevention messages 
Waterborne Disease 
and Outbreak Surveillance 
System (WBDOSS) 
Use of surveillance data by public 
health researchers and policy 
makers to understand and reduce 
waterborne disease and outbreaks 
Background EPA sets guidelines for recreational use of natural waters 
(e.g., lakes, rivers, and oceans). In 1986, EPA developed rec­
Regulation of Recreational Water ommended bacterial water-quality criteria for coastal recre­
Quality ation waters (16) and recently established federal standards 
for those states and territories that have not yet adopted 
In the United States, state and local governments establish water-quality criteria that meet or exceed the 1986 criteria 
and enforce regulations for protecting recreational water from (17). For freshwater, full-body contact beaches (e.g., lakes and 
naturally occurring or human-made contaminants. For treated rivers), EPA has recommended that the monthly geometric 
water venues (e.g., swimming pools and water parks), no fed­ mean water-quality indicator concentration be <33 CFU/100 
eral regulatory agency has authority, and no national guide­ mL for enterococci or <126 CFU/100 mL for Escherichia coli. 
lines for standards of design, construction, operation, For marine-water, full-body contact beaches, EPA has recom­
disinfection, or filtration exist, except recent regulation to pre­ mended that the monthly geometric mean water-quality 
vent entrapment injuries (14). Swimming pool codes are indicator concentration be <35 CFU/100 mL for enterococci. 
developed and enforced by state and local health departments; However, state and local authorities have discretionary 
therefore, substantial variation is observed across the country authority to determine which interventions should be used 
in terms of policy, compliance, and enforcement (15). Efforts (e.g., posting signs to alert visitors of water contamination or 
are underway to develop a Model Aquatic Health Code (avail­ closing the beach for swimming) when these limits have been 
able at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/model_code.htm) exceeded. Beach Watch, EPA’s Action Plan for Beaches and 
to be used as a national voluntary guideline. These data-driven Recreational Waters (report available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
and knowledge-based guidelines will be focused on promot­ waterscience/beaches/technical.html), was published in 1999 
ing healthy recreational water experiences by preventing dis­ as part of the Clean Water Action Plan (available at http:// 
ease and injuries. The model code will be available to state www.epa.gov/beaches). The intent of Beach Watch is to assist 
and local health agencies needing guidance in writing, updat­ state, tribal, and local authorities in strengthening and extend­
ing, and implementing state or local pool codes and might ing existing programs to protect users of fresh and marine rec­
help standardize pool codes across the United States. reational waters; as part of the BEACH Act of 2000, the U.S. 
Congress directed EPA to update its guidelines for recreational 
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water use on the basis of improved water-quality indicators and 
testing. As a result, EPA has been collaborating with CDC since 
2002 on the National Epidemiologic and Environmental 
Assessment of Recreational (NEEAR) Water Study at fresh and 
marine water recreational beaches in the United States. Infor­
mation on the NEEAR is available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
nheerl/neear. This study is being conducted to evaluate rapid 
new water-quality methods that are able to produce results in 
<2 hours and to correlate these indicators with health effects 
among beachgoers. Results from freshwater Great Lakes beaches 
have demonstrated an association between an increasing signal 
detected by a quantitative polymerase chain reaction-based test 
method for enterococci and human health effects (18, 19). 
Children aged <10 years were at greater risk for gastrointestinal 




Public health departments in individual states, territories, 
localities, and the Freely Associated States (FAS)* have the 
primary responsibility for detection and investigation of 
WBDOs. The outbreaks are voluntarily reported to CDC 
through a standard form (i.e., CDC form 52.12; available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/cdc_5212_ 
waterborne.pdf ). The form solicits data on WBDO, includ­
ing characteristics of person, place, and time and results of 
epidemiologic studies, disease symptoms, diagnostic testing, 
and water sampling. Information gathered regarding the set­
ting of the outbreak includes the type of aquatic facility, water 
source and treatment, sanitary measures in place, and pos­
sible factors contributing to the contamination of the water. 
Public health professionals in each state or locality are desig­
nated as WBDO surveillance coordinators, and CDC annu­
ally requests reports from coordinators in all states and localities 
and conducts as much follow-up correspondence as needed 
to resolve unaddressed questions. Although national report­
ing only includes WBDOs, single cases of certain waterborne 
diseases (e.g., primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) and 
chemical toxin poisoning) are also solicited from coordina­
tors. Outbreaks, cases, or other health events, where appli­
cable, are assigned to a state on the basis of the location of the 
exposure rather than state of residence of ill persons. Numeric 
and text data from the CDC waterborne disease outbreak form 
and any supporting documentation are entered into a data­
* Composed of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau; formerly parts of the U.S.-administered 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 
base for analysis. Although all WBDOs are collected through 
the same CDC reporting system, the recreational water-
associated outbreaks are analyzed and published separately 
from drinking water-associated outbreaks and other WBDOs 
(13). Information on WBDOs and cases is sometimes solic­
ited from other CDC surveillance systems and confirmed with 
the state or locality for inclusion in WBDOSS or Surveillance 
Summary (Figure 1). Vibrio illnesses associated with recreational 
water exposure were received from the Cholera and Other 
Vibrio Illness Surveillance System. 
Definitions† 
Waterborne Disease Outbreaks 
The unit of analysis for the summary is an outbreak, not an 
individual case of a waterborne disease. To be defined as a 
WBDO associated with recreational water, an event must meet 
two criteria. First, two or more persons must be epidemio­
logically linked by the location of the exposure to recreational 
water, time, and illness. Recreational water settings include 
swimming pools, wading pools, spas, waterslides, interactive 
fountains, wet decks, and fresh and marine bodies of water. 
Second, the epidemiologic evidence must implicate water or 
volatilization of water-associated compounds into the air sur­
rounding an aquatic facility as the probable source of the ill­
ness. For this report, WBDOs are separated by venue as 
untreated (i.e., fresh and marine surface water) or treated (i.e., 
filtered or disinfected [e.g., chlorinated]) water. WBDOs 
associated with ships are not included in this report. 
Case Reports of Waterborne Illness or 
Reports of Aquatic Facility-Associated 
Health Events 
This report also includes 1) individual cases of laboratory-
confirmed PAM associated with recreational water use, 2) 
single cases of wound infections or other Vibrio infections as­
sociated with recreational water use, 3) single cases of chemi­
cal and toxin poisoning if water or air-quality data indicate 
contamination by the chemical or toxin, and 4) outbreaks or 
case reports of health events associated with aquatic facilities 
but not associated with the recreational water but rather con­
taminated aquatic facility air (e.g., mixing of chemicals in the 
pump room might release toxic gas that injures staff or facil­
ity users) (Figure 1). Because these four event categories do 
not meet WBDO definition, they are analyzed separately from 
WBDOs. 
† Additional terms have been defined (Appendix A, Glossary of Definitions). 
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Strength of Evidence Classification for 
Waterborne-Disease Outbreaks 
WBDOs reported to WBDOSS are classified according to 
the strength of evidence that implicates water as the vehicle of 
transmission (Table 1). The classification scheme (i.e., Classes 
I–IV) is based on the epidemiologic and water-quality data 
provided on WBDO report form. Although in certain 
instances WBDOs without water-quality data were included 
in this report, outbreaks that lacked any epidemiologic data 
linking the outbreak to water were excluded. 
Class I indicates that adequate epidemiologic and water-
quality data were reported (Table 1). However, the classifica­
tion does not necessarily imply that an investigation was 
conducted optimally. Likewise, a classification of II, III, or IV 
does not imply that an investigation was inadequate or 
incomplete. Outbreaks and investigations occur under vary­
ing circumstances, and not all outbreaks can or should be rig­
orously investigated. In addition, outbreaks that affect fewer 
persons are more likely to receive classifications of III or IV 
because of the limited sample size available for data analysis. 
Changes in the 2005–2006 Surveillance 
Summary 
The definition of a waterborne outbreak has been modified 
for this report to be consistent with generally accepted public 
health practice (i.e., two or more epidemiologically linked cases 
associated with use of recreational water). Health events at 
aquatic facilities not associated with direct exposures to recre­
ational water are, for the first time, presented and discussed 
but not analyzed as waterborne outbreaks. 
Definition 
Previously, the definition of a recreational waterborne dis­
ease outbreak included certain single cases of waterborne dis­
ease. The definition of a recreational waterborne-disease 
outbreak has been clarified to include two or more persons 
who have been epidemiologically linked to recreational water 
by location of exposure, time, and illness. Exposures include 
contact with or accidental ingestion of water and certain 
inhalation exposures (e.g., exposure to water-associated com­
pounds [e.g., chloramines] volatilizing into the air of the 
aquatic facility). Single cases of PAM, recreational water-
associated Vibrio illness, and illness related to chemical expo­
sure caused by water are included in WBDOSS but are not 
classified or analyzed as outbreaks. These single cases are 
analyzed separately. 
Aquatic Facility-Related Health Events 
not Associated with Recreational Water 
Previous Surveillance Summaries only included outbreaks in 
which the vehicle of transmission was water or airborne chemi­
cal products originating from water (e.g., chloramines). 
Nonwater-related illnesses resulting from chemical inhalation 
or exposure at aquatic facilities have not been discussed in 
previous Surveillance Summaries. This report includes, as a 
separate analysis, chemical injury (e.g., mixing of pool chemi­
cals that release toxic gas) cases and outbreaks at aquatic 
facilities in which direct exposure to water was not the cause 
of illness. Whereas these events are not classified or analyzed 
as waterborne outbreaks, they highlight important public 
health and safety concerns related to the design, operation, 
and maintenance of recreational water venues and are targeted 
to the same audiences who are the focus of the waterborne 
disease and outbreaks already included in this report. 
TABLE 1. Classification of investigations of waterborne-disease outbreaks based on strength of evidence inplicating water as 
the vehicle of transmission — United States 






Data provided about exposed and unexposed persons, 
with relative risk or odds ratio >2 or p-value <0.05 
Adequate 
Provided but limited 
Epidemiologic data provided that did not meet the 
criteria for Class I, or claim made that ill persons 
had no exposures in common, besides water, 
but no data provided 
Provided but limited 
Provided and adequate 
Laboratory data or historical information (e.g., the history that a 
chlorinator or pH acid feed pump malfunctioned, no detectable 
free-chlorine residual, or a breakdown in a recirculation system) 
Not provided or inadequate (e.g., laboratory testing of water not 
conducted and no historical information) 
Provided and adequate 
Not provided or inadequate 
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Results 
Waterborne-Disease Outbreaks 
Excluding Vibrio and PAM cases and aquatic facility-related 
health events, a total of 78 outbreaks (38 in 2005 and 40 in 
2006) associated with recreational water were reported to CDC 
(Tables 2–5). This is the highest number of outbreaks reported 
for a 2-year summary since reporting began in 1978. Of the 
50 states and 10 territories, localities, and FAS participating 
in WBDOSS, 31 states reported WBDOs (Figure 2). Descrip­
tions of selected WBDOs are presented in this report 
(Appendix B, Selected Descriptions of Waterborne Disease 
and Outbreaks [WBDOs] Associated with Recreational 
Water). These 78 outbreaks affected 4,412 persons and 
resulted in five deaths. The median outbreak size was 13 per­
sons (range: 2–2,307 persons). Minnesota reported the high­
est number of WBDOs (nine), New York and Florida each 
reported seven WBDOs, and Wisconsin reported six WBDOs. 
During 2005–2006, treated water venues were associated 
with 58 (74.4%) of the recreational water outbreaks and 4,167 
(94.4%) of the cases (Tables 2 and 3; Figure 3). Untreated 
venues were associated with 20 (25.6%) of WBDOs but only 
245 (5.6%) of the cases (Tables 4 and 5). 
Of the 78 WBDOs, 48 (61.5%) were outbreaks of acute gas­
troenteritis illness (AGI), 11 (14.1%) were outbreaks of dermati­
tis or other skin conditions, and 11 (14.1%) were outbreaks of 
acute respiratory illness (ARI). The remaining WBDOs resulted 
in leptospirosis (n = two), PAM (n = one), and mixed or other 
illnesses (n = five) (Table 6, Figure 3). WBDOs associated with 
gastroenteritis accounted for 4,015 (91.0%) of the cases of ill­
ness. The route of entry implicated for each WBDO was inges­
tion for 48 outbreaks (61.5%), inhalation for 10 (12.8%), contact 
for 8 (10.3%), combined routes for nine (11.5%), and other 
(Naegleria and Leptospira) for three (3.8%) Figure 3). 
WBDOs occurred in every calendar month. However, the 
summer months (June through August) accounted for 51 
(65.4%) WBDOs and 3,890 (88.2%) cases (Figure 4). Gas­
troenteritis was particularly clustered during these months with 
40/48 (83.3%) outbreaks and 3,777/4,015 (94.1%) cases 
being reported. 
TABLE 2. Waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = 24) associated with treated recreational water, by state — United States, 2005 
No. of cases 




(n = 3,376) Type Setting 
Connecticut Apr I Pseudomonas aeruginosa Skin 4 Pool, Spa Hotel 
Florida Jun II Cryptosporidium AGI 47 Pool Hotel 
Iowa Jun II Cryptosporidium AGI 24 Pool Community 
Kansas Jul II Cryptosporidium AGI 84 Pool Water park 
Kentucky Jun IV Cryptosporidium AGI 53 Pools Community 
Kentucky Jun IV Cryptosporidium AGI 9 Pool, wading pool Community 
Louisiana Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 31 Interactive fountain Water park 
Massachusetts Jul III Giardia intestinalis AGI 11 Pool Membership club 
Minnesota May II Unidentified AGI 32 Pool, spa Membership club 
Minnesota Aug IV Legionella pneumophila serogroup 1 ARI 3 Spa Private residence 
Minnesota Apr I Unidentified§ ARI, eye 20 Pool, spa Hotel 
Minnesota Mar IV Unidentified¶ Skin 8 Spa Hotel 
North Carolina Apr III L. pneumophila serogroup 1 ARI 4 (1) Spa Private residence 
New Mexico Apr III P. aeruginosa Skin, ear 7 Pool, spa Hotel 
New York Aug II Cryptosporidium AGI 97 Pool Camp 
New York Oct III Cryptosporidium AGI 22 Pool Membership club 
New York Jun I C. hominis** AGI 2,307 Interactive fountain State park 
Ohio Jul III Chlorine gas†† ARI 19 Pool Community 
Ohio Aug III C. hominis AGI 523 Pools Community 
Oregon Jul II C. parvum AGI 20 Pool Membership club 
South Carolina Oct III L. pneumophila§§ ARI 18 Spa Hotel 
Vermont Feb IV Unidentified¶ Skin 18 Spa Hotel 
Wisconsin Jul I P. aeruginosa Skin 9 Pool, Spa Hotel 
Wyoming Jul IV Campylobacter jejuni AGI 6 Kiddie pool Private residence 
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/ 
cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf) (see Table 1). 
† Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Eye: illness, condition, or symptom 
related to eyes; and Ear: illness, condition, or symptom related to ears.
 
§ Etiology unidentified: contamination from excess chlorine levels or pool disinfection by-products (e.g., chloramines) suspected.
 
¶ Etiology unidentified: P. aeruginosa suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting.
 
** Species determined using molecular technology and current taxonomic guidelines (Source: Xiao L, Ryan UM. 2008: Molecular epidemiology, 
In: Cryptosporidium and cryptosporidiosis. Fayer R, Xiao L, eds. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press; 2008:119-71). 
†† Chlorine gas was released after high levels of liquid chlorine and acid were mixed in the recirculation system and subsequently released into the pool water. 
§§ Fifteen persons were diagnosed with Pontiac fever and three persons were diagnosed with Legionnaires' disease. 
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TABLE 3. Waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = 34) associated with treated recreational water, by state — United States, 2006 
No. of cases 




(n = 791) Type Setting 
Arkansas Jul I Legionella pneumophila§ ARI 37 Pool, spa Hotel 
California Jul II Shigella sonnei AGI 9 Kiddie pool Private residence 
California Jul III Cryptosporidium¶ AGI 16 Interactive fountain Community 
Colorado Aug II Cryptosporidium** AGI 12 Pool Community 
Colorado Oct II L. pneumophila serogroup 1†† ARI 6 Spa Private home 
Florida Jan I L. pneumophila serogroup 1 ARI 11 (1) Spa Hotel 
Florida May III Giardia, Cryptosporidium§§ AGI 55 Interactive fountain Community 
Florida Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 3 Pool Hotel 
Georgia Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 19 Pool Community 
Georgia Feb IV Unidentified ¶¶ Skin 4 Spa Cabin 
Georgia Oct IV Cryptosporidium AGI 4 Pool Community 
Illinois Jan I Legionella*** ARI 43 (1) Pool, spa Hotel 
Illinois Jul I C. hominis** AGI 65 Pool Day camp, water park 
Illinois Jun III Unidentified††† Skin 9 Pool Community 
Illinois Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 4 Pool Water park 
Illinois Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 18 Pool Water park 
Indiana Apr IV Unidentified ARI, ear 12 Pool Membership club 
Kansas Dec IV Pseudomonas aeruginosa Skin 8 Spa Private residence 
Louisiana Jul II Cryptosporidium** AGI 29 Pool, interactive fountain Water park 
Minnesota Sep II C. hominis AGI 47 Pool Schools 
Missouri Jul IV Cryptosporidium AGI 6 Pool Community 
Missouri Jun III Cryptosporidium AGI 116 Pool, interactive fountain Water park 
Montana Jul IV Cryptosporidium AGI 82 Pools Community 
Nebraska Dec III Unidentified§§§ ¶¶¶ ARI, eye 24 Pool Hotel 
New York Oct III L. pneumophila serogroup 1 ARI 2 Spa Water park 
New York Mar IV Unidentified§§§ ARI 9 Pool Water park 
Pennsylvania Jun IV Cryptosporidium AGI 13 Pool Membership club 
South Carolina Jul III C. hominis** AGI 12 Pool Community 
Tennessee Mar IV Unidentified¶¶ Skin 15 Pool, spa Hotel 
Wisconsin Feb III Unidentified ¶¶ Skin 28 Pool, spa Hotel 
Wisconsin May I Norovirus AGI 18 Pool Hotel 
Wisconsin Aug II Cryptosporidium AGI 22 Pool Campground 
Wisconsin Aug IV Cryptosporidium AGI 4 Pool Community 
Wyoming Jun II Cryptosporidium** AGI 29 Pools**** Community 
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/ 
cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf) (see Table 1). 
† ARI: acute respiratory illness; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; Ear: illness, condition, or 
symptom related to ears; and Eye: illness, condition, or symptom related to eyes.
§ Pontiac fever was diagnosed in 34 persons, and Legionnaires’ disease was diagnosed in three persons.
¶ Eleven pulsed-field gel electrophoresis-matched cases of Salmonella stanley were also detected among persons who visited the fountain 
during this outbreak; however, the outbreak investigation did not rule out other possible common exposures among those case-patients. 
** Source: CDC. Cryptosporidiosis outbreaks associated with recreational water use — five states, 2006. MMWR 2007;56:729–32. 
†† All cases were diagnosed as Pontiac fever.
§§ Thirty-five persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Giardia, seven persons had stool specimens that tested positive for 
Cryptosporidium, and two persons had stool specimens that tested positive for both Giardia and Cryptosporidium. 
¶¶ Etiology unidentified: Pseudomonas aeruginosa suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting. 
*** Pontiac fever was diagnosed in 40 persons, and Legionnaires’ disease was diagnosed in three persons. L. pneumophila and L. maceachernii 
were detected in both pool and spa water. 
††† Etiology unidentified: low pH suspected on the basis of water testing and symptoms.

§§§ Etiology unidentified: chemical contamination from pool disinfection by-products (e.g., chloramines) suspected.

¶¶¶ Source: CDC. Ocular and respiratory illness associated with an indoor swimming pool—Nebraska, 2006. MMWR 2007;56:929–32.
 
**** Case-patients identified in this outbreak reported exposure to multiple community pools and to an untreated reservoir.
 
Etiologic Agents	 parasites; 22 (28.2%), bacteria; four (5.1%), viruses; and two 
(2.6%), chemicals (Figure 3). Of the 78 WBDOs associated with recreational water, the 
Of the 47 outbreaks associated with treated water venues etiologic agent was confirmed in 62 (79.5%), suspected in 12 
with an identified etiologic agent: 31 (66.0%) involved para­(15.4%) and unidentified in four (5.1%) (Table 7). Thirty-
sites; 14 (29.8%), bacteria; one (2.1%), a virus; and one (2.1%) four (43.6%) outbreaks were confirmed as being caused by 
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TABLE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = 14) associated with untreated recreational water, by state — United States, 2005 
No. of cases 
Predominant† (deaths) 
State  Month Class*  Etiologic agent illness (n = 171) Type Setting 
California Jul IV Unidentified § Skin 2 Lake Lake 
California Jul IV Leptospira Lep 3 Stream Stream 
Florida Jul I Unidentified ¶ Other 24 Ocean¶ Beach 
Florida Nov II Leptospira Lep 43 Stream Adventure race 
Maine Jul III Unidentified AGI 10 Lake Swimming beach 
Massachusetts Jul IV Shigella sonnei AGI 5 Lake Lake 
Michigan Jun IV Copper sulfate ARI 3 Lake Lake 
Minnesota Jun IV Escherichia coli O157:H7 AGI 4 Lake Swimming beach 
Minnesota Jul IV S. sonnei AGI 12 Lake Swimming beach 
Minnesota Aug IV Norovirus AGI 8 Lake Swimming beach 
New York Jul III Cryptosporidium AGI 27 Lake Swimming beach 
New York Aug III Unidentified** AGI 13 Lake Lake 
Oklahoma Jul IV Naegleria fowleri Neuro 2 (2) Unknown†† Unknown 
Pennsylvania Jul IV S. sonnei AGI 15 Lake Swimming beach 
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/ 
cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf) (see Table 1). 
† Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; Lep: leptospirosis; Other: undefined or mixed illness, condition, or symptom. AGI: acute gastrointes­
tinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; and Neuro: neurologic condition or symptoms (e.g. 
meningitis). 
§ Etiology unidentified: clinical diagnosis of cercarial dermatitis (caused by avian schistosomes). 
¶ Etiology unidentified: whereas certain swimmers had symptoms consistent with seabathers eruption (caused by jellyfish larvae), a majority of persons 
affected in this outbreak experienced systemic, flu-like illnesses which might have been related to another etiology. Swimmers alternated between marine 
and chlorinated swimming venues. 
** Etiology unidentified: Illness was most consistent with norovirus infection on the basis of clinical syndrome. 
†† Whereas an interactive fountain at a water park was a common exposure for both case-patients, other potentially shared and untreated recreational water 
exposures could not be ruled out. 
TABLE 5. Waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = six) associated with untreated recreational water, by state — United States, 2006 
Predominant No. of cases 
State  Month  Class*  Etiologic agent illness † (n = 74) Type Setting 
Florida May II Norovirus G2 AGI 50 Lake Swimming beach 
Massachusetts Aug III Cryptosporidium AGI 6 Pond Camp 
Minnesota May II Norovirus G1 AGI 10 Lake Private beach 
Ohio Aug IV Unidentified§ Skin 2 Pond Pond 
Tennessee Jul IV Escherichia coli O157:H7 AGI 3 Lake Swimming beach 
Wisconsin Jun IV E. coli O157:H7 AGI 3 Lake State park 
* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/ 
cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf) (and Table 1). 
†AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin. 
§Etiology unidentified: clinical diagnosis of cercarial dermatitis (caused by avian schistosomes). 
a chemical (Table 7). Parasites were responsible for approxi­
mately 20 times more cases than bacteria (3,784 versus 167). 
Of the 15 WBDOs associated with untreated water venues 
with an identified etiologic agent, eight (53.3%) involved 
bacteria; three (20.0%) parasites; three (20.0%) viruses; and 
one (6.7%) a chemical. 
Parasites 
Of the 48 outbreaks of gastroenteritis, 33 (68.8%) were 
parasitic in origin, including 31 (93.9%) caused by 
Cryptosporidium, one (3.0%) caused by Giardia intestinalis, 
and one (3.0%) caused by both Cryptosporidium and Giardia 
(Tables 2–7; Figure 5). Of the 13 gastroenteritis outbreaks 
associated with untreated water venues, only two (15.4%) were 
caused by parasites. Two cryptosporidiosis outbreaks occurred; 
one in an untreated lake and the other in an untreated pond, 
causing 27 and six cases of illness, respectively. In contrast, 
parasites were the most common causes of gastroenteritis out­
breaks associated with treated water venues; Cryptosporidium 
was the most common parasitic agent, causing 29 (82.9%) of 
the 35 outbreaks of gastroenteritis. Thirty-one of these para­
sitic gastroenteritis outbreaks occurred in treated water ven­
ues, causing illness in 3,784 persons. Three of these outbreaks 
each caused over 100 (range: 116–2,307 persons) cases of ill­
ness. In June 2005, an outbreak caused by C. hominis trans­
mitted through a New York spray park resulted in 2,307 cases, 
mostly among young children. In August 2005, a C. hominis 
outbreak spread through multiple Ohio pools and resulted 
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in 523 cases; this outbreak subsequently was linked to an 
outbreak in an adjoining state (Kentucky). In June 2006, an 
outbreak caused by Cryptosporidium at a water park in 
Missouri caused gastroenteritis in 116 persons 
The one additional parasitic outbreak was caused by 
Naegleria fowleri and led to the death of two persons in Okla­
homa. Despite an investigation by local public health authori­
ties, the location of suspected common exposure (i.e., exposure 
in which the two persons probably became ill at the same 
time and place) was not identified. 
Bacteria 
Eight reported gastroenteritis outbreaks of confirmed bac­
terial origin were reported (Figure 5), two of which were at 
treated water venues. An outbreak of Campylobacter jejuni 
occurred in a fill-and-drain pool at a Wyoming home in July 
2005, resulting in five children and one adult becoming ill. 
This same type of pool was the setting for a Shigella sonnei 
outbreak at a California home in July 2006, leading to nine 
persons becoming ill, including three 
who were hospitalized. Both of these 
outbreaks were caused by a lack of dis-
infection and heavy use of these pools
 
by young diaper-aged children. The 
other six outbreaks of gastroenteritis,
 
caused by bacteria, were associated with 
swimming in lakes, including three 
additional shigellosis outbreaks and 
three outbreaks of E. coli O157:H7 
infection. All six lake-associated out-
breaks occurred during June and July and 
five were associated with exposure to lake
 
water during holidays or weekends.
 
Four of the bacterial outbreaks 
involved 28 cases of dermatitis caused 
by Pseudomonas aeruginosa; one of these 
outbreaks also resulted in ear infections. 
All four outbreaks of Pseudomonas 
infection occurred at treated water ven-
ues that involved heated spa water 
(some of these outbreaks also involved 
pools). Five additional outbreaks were 
suspected to have been caused by 
Pseudomonas on the basis of the clinical 
symptoms and exposure to a spa. 
Eight outbreaks caused by Legionella 
were associated with treated recreational 
water venues during 2005–2006, causing 
124 cases of legionellosis (i.e., LD and PF) 
and resulted in three deaths. The largest 
FIGURE 2. Number of recreational water-associated outbreaks 
(n = 78) — United States, 2005–2006*
>4 (six states) 
3 (three states) 
2 (nine states) 
1 (13 states) 
0 (19 states) 
* Note: These numbers are largely dependent on reporting and
surveillance activities in individual states and do not necessarily indicate 
the true incidence in a given state.
FIGURE 3. Recreational water-associated outbreaks, by type of exposure, type of
etiologic agent, predominant illness, and route of entry — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of exposure (n = 78) Type of etiologic agent (n = 78)
 

























* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Skin: illness, condition or symptom
related to skin; Mixed: a combination of illnesses, conditions, or symptoms that might also include 
the eyes and ears; and Neuro: neurologic condition or symptoms (e.g., meningitis). 
† Infection with Naegleria was categorized as other because of the nasal, noninhalational route of
infection. Infection with Leptospira was categorized as other because the route of infection is 
typically through contact with mucous membrane or broken or abraded skin. 
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TABLE 6. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = 78) associated with recreational water, by predominant illness and type 
of water — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of water 
Treated Untreated Total 
No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of 
Predominant illness outbreaks cases outbreaks cases outbreaks (%) cases (%) 
AGI 35 3,849 13 166 48 (61.5) 4,015 (91.0) 
ARI 10 152 1 3 11 (14.1) 155 (3.5) 
Ear and Skin 1 7 0 0 1 (1.3) 7 (0.2) 
Ear and ARI 1 12 0 0 1 (1.3) 12 (0.3) 
Eye and ARI 2 44 0 0 2 (2.6) 44 (1.0) 
Leptospirosis 0 0 2 46 2 (2.6) 46 (1.0) 
Neuro 0 0 1 2 1 (1.3) 2 (0.0) 
Skin 9 103 2 4 11 (14.1) 107 (2.4) 
Other 0 0 1 24 1 (1.3) 24 (0.5) 
Total (%) 58 (74.4) 4,167 (94.4) 20 (25.6) 245 (5.6) 78 (100.0) 4,412 (100.0) 
* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Ear: illness, condition, or symptom related to ears; Skin: illness, condition, or symptom 
related to skin; Eye: illness, condition, or symptom related to eyes;. Neuro: neurologic condition or symptoms (e.g. meningitis); and Other: etiology 
unidentified. Whereas certain swimmers had symptoms consistent with seabathers eruption (caused by jellyfish larvae), the majority of persons affected 
in this outbreak experienced systemic, flu-like illnesses which might have been related to another etiology. Swimmers alternated between marine and 
chlorinated swimming venues. 
FIGURE 4. Number of recreational water-associated outbreaks 














Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Month 
* Mixed: a combination of illnesses, conditions or symptoms that also 
might include the eyes and ears; Neuro: neurologic condition or 
symptoms (e.g., meningitis); ARI: acute respiratory illness; Skin: illness, 
condition, or symptom related to skin; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness. 
of these outbreaks was linked to a spa at an Illinois hotel and 
involved 43 persons, including three cases of LD resulting in 
one death. The environmental investigation documented 
inadequate disinfection in the spa and isolated both 
L. pneumophila and L. maceachernii from the spa water. 
Two outbreaks in untreated recreational water were caused 
by Leptospira. Leptospirosis was diagnosed in 43 persons who 
participated in an adventure race in Florida in November 2005. 
A July 2005 outbreak of leptospirosis in California involved 
three persons who had contact with water from a low flowing 
stream at the time of exposure 
Viruses 
Four outbreaks of confirmed viral origin occurred, all of 
which caused gastroenteritis. Norovirus was identified as the 
etiologic agent in each of the outbreaks; three occurred at lake 
swimming beaches, and one occurred in a treated water set­
ting. These four norovirus outbreaks resulted in 86 cases of 
gastroenteritis. For the two outbreaks where lake water fecal 
indicator testing was conducted; no water quality-violations 
were documented. The water might have been contaminated 
by ill swimmers at the time of exposure rather than by ongo­
ing point source water contamination. The treated venue out­
break occurred in a hotel pool and was related to inadequate 
disinfection and continued use by ill swimmers. One addi­
tional outbreak that was suspected to have been caused by 
norovirus resulted in 13 cases. 
Chemicals 
During 2005–2006, two outbreaks associated with chemi­
cals involved 22 persons. In June 2005, a chemical-associated 
outbreak occurred in a Michigan lake causing respiratory 
symptoms in three swimmers. This outbreak was attributed 
to the unapproved addition of excessive amounts of copper 
sulfate to the lake water for aquatic nuisance control. 
The other outbreak occurred in a treated water venue. In 
July 2005, the recirculation pump at a community pool was 
shut down for maintenance; however, the liquid chlorine (i.e., 
NaOCl) and muriatic (i.e., hydrochloric) acid continued to 
feed into the system and probably released chlorine gas in the 
piping. When the pump was restarted, a concentrated bolus 
of these swimming pool chemicals and chlorine gas was sent 
into a small pool where it caused respiratory distress in 19 
 TABLE 7. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks (n = 78) associated with recreational water, by etiologic agent(s) and type of 
water — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of water 













Campylobacter jejuni 1 
Escherichia coli spp. 0 
Leptospira spp. 0 
Legionella spp.* 8 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 4  
Shigella sonnei 1  
Parasites 31 
Cryptosporidium spp. 29 
Giardia intestinalis 1  
Naegleria fowleri 0 




Copper sulfate 0 
Chlorine gas§ 1  
Suspected etiology 9 
Suspected chemical exposure¶ 1 
Suspected chloramines 3 
Suspected norovirus 0 
Suspected P. aeruginosa 5  
Suspected schistosomes 0 
Unidentified 2 










































































































































* Five outbreaks were attributed to Legionella pneumophila, two outbreak investigations did not identify a Legionella species, and one outbreak investigation 
detected L. pneumophila and L. maceachernii in both pool and spa water. 
†Thirty-five persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Giardia, seven persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Cryptosporidium, 
and two persons had stool specimens that tested positive for both Giardia and Cryptosporidium. 
§Chlorine gas was released after high levels of liquid chlorine and acid were mixed in the recirculation system and subsequently released into the pool 
water. 
¶ Low pH suspected on the basis of water testing and symptoms. 
persons. Three additional outbreaks in treated venues were 
suspected of being caused by disinfection by-products (e.g., 
chloramines) on the basis of symptoms and settings (i.e., 
indoor pool). 
Suspected Agents 
Twelve outbreaks were reported in which no etiologic agent 
was confirmed; however, investigation reports indicated a sus­
pected agent on the basis of symptoms, type of water, setting, 
and background information (Table 7). Five of these 12 out­
breaks were suspected to be caused by P. aeruginosa in treated 
spas. One outbreak, which caused rashes in nine children, was 
suspected of being caused by low pH. Three chemical-related 
outbreaks were suspected to be associated with exposure to 
excess chloramines (i.e., disinfection by-products of chlorina­
tion) (20–22) in the indoor pools and surrounding areas (i.e., 
indoor pool air), which resulted in ARI, and eye irritation. 
Norovirus was the suspected pathogen in one gastroenteritis 
outbreak associated with a lake on the basis of epidemiologic and 
clinical evidence. Two outbreaks were suspected to be the result 
of contact with avian schistosomes, causing cercarial dermatitis 
Unidentified Etiologic Agents 
Data collected during investigations of four outbreaks of 
unidentified etiology were not sufficient to suggest an etio­
logic agent. Gastroenteritis was reported as the predominant 
illness in two of these outbreaks, and ARI and ear infections 
were reported for the third one. The AGI outbreak in a treated 
venue (Minnesota 2005) caused illness in 32 persons over the 
course of nearly a month; 15 persons reportedly continued to 
swim while ill. Stool samples tested negative for bacteria, 
viruses, and parasites. A lake-associated AGI outbreak sick­
ened 10 persons and caused five hospitalizations. Environ­
mental testing revealed water-quality violations (e.g., elevated 
E. coli levels). An outbreak of ARI and ear infections among 
lifeguards occurred in a pool that had not officially opened 
for the season. The water was reportedly cloudy and possibly 
contaminated by water leaking from a pipe in the facility. 
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Finally, an outbreak of influenza-like illness linked to an ocean 
beach was associated with marine and pool water; possible 
etiologies might include contact with jellyfish larvae and other 
etiologies may have contributed to some of these illnesses. 
Single Cases of Waterborne Disease 
Vibriosis Cases Associated with Recreational 
Water 
During 2005–2006, a total of 189 vibriosis cases associated 
with recreational water use or exposure to flood water were 
reported from 20 states; representing 14.7% (189/1287) of 
the total number of vibriosis cases reported in 2005–2006 
(62). Eighty-five (45.0%) of 189 patients were hospitalized, 
and 18 (9.5%) died (Table 8). 
The most frequently isolated Vibrio species was Vibrio 
vulnificus, which was isolated from 67 (35.4%) persons; 
52 (77.6%) were hospitalized, and 15 (22.4%) died. 
V. alginolyticus was isolated from 60 (31.7%) persons; seven 
(11.7%) were hospitalized, and none died. V. parahaemolyticus 
was isolated from 33 (17.5%) persons; 12 (36.4%) were 
hospitalized, and one (3.0%) died. Other Vibrio species 
(including V. cholerae non-O1, non-O139, V. damsela, V. fluvialis, 
V. hollisae, V. mimicus, V. alginolyticus/parahaemolyticus coinfec­
tion, V. alginolyticus/fluvialis coinfection, V. parahaemolyticus/ 
vulnificus coinfection, V. vulnificus/unidentified Vibrio species 
coinfection and Vibrio species not identified) were identified in 
FIGURE 5. Recreational water-associated outbreaks of gastroenteritis, by type of 
exposure and etiologic agent — United States, 2005–2006 












Etiologic agent (n = 48) 
Cryptosporidium spp. 
64.6% 
Escherichia coli O157:H7 6.3% 



















spp. 2.1% Campylobacter 
Cryptosporidium Giardia spp. 2.1% and 
Unidentified 6.3% 
Norovirus 8.3% 
G. intestinalis 2.1% 
Shigella sonnei 8.5% 
* For one outbreak (Wyoming 2006) case-patients reported exposure to multiple community pools 
and to a reservoir. This outbreak is being analyzed as exposure to treated water. 
29 (15.3%) persons; 14 (48.3%) were hospitalized, and two 
(6.9%) died. 
Geographic location. Nearly all Vibrio patients reported 
that they were exposed to recreational water in a coastal state 
(Figure 6). The most frequently reported location was the Gulf 
Coast (61.9%); Atlantic Coast states, excluding Florida 
(19.6%); Pacific Coast states (16.9%); and inland states (1.6%) 
(Table 9). Florida and Mississippi reported the highest num­
ber of cases, 55 and 28 cases, respectively (Figure 6; Table 9). 
Seasonality. The temporal distribution of illness in patients 
from whom Vibrio species were isolated displayed a clear 
seasonal peak during the summer (Figure 7). The greatest 
frequency of Vibrio cases occurred during July through 
September. 
Exposures. Activities associated with Vibrio cases included 
swimming, diving, or wading in water (70.9%); walking or 
falling on the shore or rocks (32.8%); and boating, skiing, or 
surfing (19.6%). Twenty-five case-patients reported exposure 
to Hurricane Katrina flood waters. 
Signs/Symptoms. Symptoms associated with Vibrio illnesses 
included cellulitis (56.6%), fever (36.0%), muscle pain 
(21.2%), bullae (15.9%), ear infections (14.3%), nausea 
(13.8%), and shock (10.1%). V. vulnificus accounted for the 
majority of skin infections (e.g., cellulitis, bullae), causing 70 
(50.7%) of 138. V. vulnificus also accounted for the majority 
of severe illnesses, including those with fever (51.5%), bacte­
remia (75.0%), shock (73.7%), and amputations (83.3%). 
V. alginolyticus accounted for the 
majority of ear infections (24 [92.3%] 
of 26). Other symptoms and infections 
were reported in low frequencies (e.g., 
bladder infections, hematuria, eye 
infections, respiratory symptoms, sinus 
infections, diarrhea, and vomiting). 
Naegleria Infections 
In addition to the outbreak of PAM 
(two cases), three individual fatal cases 
of PAM caused by N. fowleri were 
reported in 2005–2006 (Table 10). 
A child in Texas died in September 
2005, 13 days after swimming in a lake. 
In August 2006, a child died of PAM 
associated with N. fowleri after swim­
ming, using a personal watercraft, and 
tubing in an Arizona lake. In August 
2006, a child died after swimming in a 
Georgia pond. 
 TABLE 8. Number of illnesses associated with Vibrio isolation (n = 189) and recreational water, by species and year — United 
States, 2005–2006 
Year 
Total 2005 2006 
Species Cases Hospitalizations Deaths Cases Hospitalizations Deaths Cases Hospitalizations Deaths 
Vibrio alginolyticus 








Vibrio, species not identified 
Total (% of cases) 
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* Includes V. alginolyticus/parahaemolyticus coinfection, V. alginolyticus/fluvialis coinfection, V. parahaemolyticus/vulnificus coinfection, V. vulnificus/ 
unidentified, and Vibrio species coinfection. 
Previously Unreported Outbreaks 
Thirty-one previously unreported recreational water-associated 
outbreaks and one case of waterborne disease during 1978– 
2004 were received and entered into WBDO database 
(Table 11). These outbreaks were summarized but not included 
in analysis for this report. One outbreak of leptospirosis in 
Hawaii was associated with exposure to flood water (48). 
Reports on the remaining 30 events were received from Min­
nesota, New York, and Tennessee. These states participate in 
the Environmental Health Specialist Network Water program 
(EHS-Net Water), which is an EPA and CDC funded initia­
tive that supports a waterborne-disease environmental health 
specialist in each site. These three sites identified outbreaks 
and case reports that were previously unreported to CDC and 
reported them as part of a retrospective review of waterborne 
disease outbreaks in these states. The 31 previously unreported 
outbreaks affected 673 persons; 25 (80.6%) of the outbreaks 
occurred in treated water venues. 
Surveillance Reports Not Classified 
as Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks 
One report from New Hampshire was not included in this 
summary. In February 2005, three children had lesions 
believed to be caused by Molluscum contagiosum. These chil­
dren all swam at the same community pool; however, after 
investigation, it was not clear that these lesions were associ­
ated with waterborne transmission of this organism versus 
other modes of transmission (e.g., person to person or con­
tact with contaminated towels or objects). 
FIGURE 6. Number* of illnesses associated with Vibrio isolation 
and recreational water (n = 189) — United States, 2005–2006 
>10 (six states) 
5–9 (four states) 
2–4 (five states) 
1 (five states) 
0 (30 states) 
* Note: These numbers are largely dependent on reporting and 
surveillance activities in individual states and do not necessarily indicate 
the true incidence in a given state. 
Aquatic Facility-related Health Events 
not Associated with Recreational Water 
Thirty-two reports of nonwater related health events that 
occurred during 1983–2006 and were associated with aquatic 
facilities were reported by New York (Table 12). Although 
they are not counted as waterborne-disease cases or outbreaks 
for analysis purposes, they are included in this report because 
they illustrate important lessons about pool maintenance and 
operation. Most of these events, 90.6% (29/32), were caused 
by improper use of chemicals; incompatible pool chemicals 
(e.g., acid and bleach) were mixed, which resulted in the 
release of chlorine gas. Persons at these aquatic facilities expe­
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TABLE 9. Number of recreational water-associated Vibrio isolations (n = 189) and deaths (n = 18), by region/state and species — 
United States, 2005–2006 
Species 
Total V. alginolyticus V. parahaemolyticus V. vulnificus Other/unknown species* 



































































































































































































































































































* Includes V. cholerae (non-O1, non-O139), V. damsela, V. fluvialis, V. hollisae, V. mimicus, V. alginolyticus/parahaemolyticus coinfection, V. alginolyticus/ 
fluvialis coinfection, V. parahaemolyticus/vulnificus coinfection, V. vulnificus/unidentified Vibrio species coinfection, and Vibrio species not identified. 
†Refers to the reported state of exposure if the exposure did not occur in the reporting state. 
§ Includes 25 cases with reported exposure to Hurricane Katrina flood waters. 
¶ Nine reports from Florida indicate Atlantic coast exposure. 
rienced respiratory distress. Two additional events were caused 
by carbon monoxide in indoor pools, and one event was caused 
by liquid chlorine splashing into the eye of an aquatic facility 
employee. 
Discussion 
Trends in Reporting Outbreaks 
A total of 78 recreational water–associated WBDOs were 
reported to CDC during 2005–2006. This represents an 
increase from the 2003–2004 Surveillance Summary (n = 62) 
and is the largest number of outbreaks ever reported in a 
2-year period (Figure 8). Overall, the number of reported rec­
reational water-associated WBDOs reported annually have 
increased substantially since 1978, when CDC first began 
receiving these reports (Figure 8). These increases probably 
are a result of a combination of factors, such as the emergence 
of pathogens (e.g., Cryptosporidium), increased participation 
in aquatic activities, and increases in the number of aquatic 
venues. Increased recognition, investigation, and reporting of 
recreational water-associated outbreaks also might be contrib­
uting factors. 
An unprecedented number of states reported outbreaks 
during 2005–2006, and WBDOs demonstrate geographic 
variation (Figure 2). Differences in reporting between states 
might be attributable to several factors, including ability to 
detect outbreaks, availability of laboratory testing, variable 
requirements for notifiable diseases, and the surveillance and 
investigation capacity of individual state and local public health 
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FIGURE 7. Number of illnesses associated with Vibrio isolation 
and recreational water (n = 189), by species and month — 
United States, 2005–2006 
50 
Other species* (n = 29) 
V. parahaemolyticus (n = 33)40 
V. alginolyticus (n = 60) 






Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
* Includes V. cholerae (non-O1, non-O139) (eight), V. damsela (two), 
V. fluvialis (three), V. hollisae (one), V. mimicus (one), V. alginolyticus/ 
parahaemolyticus coinfection (one), V. alginolyticus/fluvialis coinfection 
(one), V. parahaemolyticus/vulnificus coinfection (two), V. vulnificus/ 
unidentified Vibrio species coinfection (one), and Vibrio species not 
identified (nine). 
agencies. These differences in the ability to detect, investigate, 
and report WBDOs probably lead to reporting and surveil­
lance bias. Therefore, the states with the majority of outbreaks 
reported for this period might not be the states in which the 
majority of outbreaks actually occurred. An increase or 
decrease in the number of WBDOs reported might reflect 
either an actual change in the incidence of outbreaks or a 
change in the sensitivity of surveillance systems. 
Etiologic agents with shorter incubation periods might be 
more easily linked to water exposures, facilitating the recogni­
tion of outbreaks. Additional factors that might influence 
which WBDOs are reported include the size and location of 
the outbreak, severity of illness, and the geographic disper­
sion of ill persons. Larger outbreaks are more likely to be iden­
tified by public health authorities. In contrast, smaller 
outbreaks (e.g., those associated with private residential pools 
and spas) might go undetected because fewer persons are ill, 
and they might attribute illness to other common exposures. 
In addition, outbreaks of gastroenteritis associated with large 
venues that draw from a wide geographic range (e.g., large 
lakes and marine beaches) might be difficult to detect because 
potentially infected persons disperse widely from the site of 
exposure and, therefore, might be less likely to be identified as 
part of an outbreak. Prospective epidemiology studies, such 
as the EPA’s NEEAR Water Study (18), have revealed elevated 
rates of gastroenteritis in swimmers compared with nonswim­
mers on all beaches studied. Multiple other prospective stud­
ies of gastroenteritis associated with beach swimming have 
also indicated elevated rates of illness associated with swim­
ming in lakes and oceans, though few outbreaks have been 
detected (23,24). Consistent with this finding, no ocean-
associated outbreaks and only one Great Lakes-associated out­
break of gastroenteritis has been reported since 1978 (12). These 
endemic recreational water-associated illnesses are not captured 
by WBDOSS, supporting the need for more studies to esti­
mate the magnitude of risk for illness for routine, nonoutbreak­
associated exposures at recreational water venues. 
WBDOs associated with recreational water use occur year-
round, but the numbers of reported WBDOs and cases are 
highest during the annual summer swim season (Figure 4). 
For public health professionals and swimming venue opera­
tors, the seasonality of waterborne-disease outbreaks can help 
determine the allocation of resources so that health education 
messages are targeted to populations during times of the year 
when the risk for preventable illness is highest. 
Swimming Pools 
Swimming pools are designed to be chemically treated and 
filtered to reduce the risk for illness associated with exposure 
to infectious pathogens. Despite the availability of these 
disinfection measures, pools remain susceptible to contami­
nation because of chlorine-resistant organisms (i.e., 
Cryptosporidium) or inadequate treatment resulting from poor 
operation or maintenance. In addition, an emerging focus of 
concern at swimming pools is the risk for chemical injury 
from improper handling of pool chemicals. 
Infectious Gastroenteritis 
Approximately 87% of all cases reported to WBDOSS 
during 2005–2006 were involved in infectious gastroenteritis 
outbreaks associated with treated recreational water venues. 
TABLE 10. Single cases of non-Vibrio* waterborne disease (n = 3) associated with untreated recreational water, by state — 
United States, 2005–2006 
Predominant No. of cases 
State Date Etiologic agent  illness† (deaths) (n = 3 ) Type Setting 
Arizona Aug 2006 Naegleria fowleri Neuro 1 (1) Lake Lake 
Georgia Aug 2006 N. fowleri Neuro 1 (1) Pond Pond 
Texas Sep 2005 N. fowleri Neuro 1 (1) Lake Lake 
* In addition to these single cases, 189 cases of recreational water-associated Vibrio infection were reported: 118 cases in 2005 and 71 cases in 2006. 
†Neuro: neurologic condition or symptoms (e.g., meningitis). 
 
TABLE 11. Waterborne disease (n = 1) and outbreaks (n = 31) associated with recreational water that were not included in 
previous Surveillance Summaries, by state — United States, 1978–2004 
Predominant No. of cases 
State Date  Class*  Etiologic agent illness † (n = 673) Type Setting 
Disease 
New York Jul 1992 NA Unidentified§ Eye 1 Pool Hotel 
Outbreak 
Hawaii Nov 2004 IV Leptospira interrogans¶ Lep 2 Stream University 
Minnesota Jul 1992 III Unidentified** Skin 6 Pool Hotel 
Minnesota Jan 1998 III Giardia intestinalis AGI 7 Pool Hotel 
Minnesota Apr 1998 II Unidentified** Ear, eye, skin 17 Pool Community 
Minnesota May 1998 III Unidentified** Skin 22 Pool Community 
Minnesota Jul 1998 IV Norovirus†† AGI 15 Lake Swimming beach 
Minnesota Jul 2000 I Legionella§§ ARI 51 Pool, spa Hotel 
New York Oct 1978 IV P. aeruginosa Skin 2 Spa Hotel 
New York Aug 1981 IV Leptospira Lep 6 Stream Swimming area 
New York Aug 1988 III Chlorine gas¶¶ AGI, ARI 21 Pool Community 
New York Mar 1989 III Unidentified§ ARI, skin 3 Pool Hotel 
New York Jul 1989 III Chlorine gas¶¶ ARI 11 Pool College 
New York Jun 1990 III Chlorine gas¶¶ ARI 15 Pool School 
New York Mar 1992 III P. aeruginosa Skin 34 Spa Resort 
New York May 1992 III P. aeruginosa Skin 6 Pool, spa Hotel 
New York Oct 1992 III Unidentified*** Eye, skin, other 20 Pool School 
New York Nov 1994 III Unidentified§ AGI, ARI, eye, skin 51 Pool School 
New York Mar 1995 III Chlorine gas¶¶ ARI 5 Pool Membership club 
New York Nov 1995 III P. aeruginosa Skin 13 Pool Hotel 
New York Dec 1995 III P. aeruginosa Skin 3 Pool School 
New York Jan 1996 IV Unidentified††† ARI, skin 29 Pool, spa Hotel 
New York Mar 1997 III P. aeruginosa Skin 10 Pool Hotel 
New York Mar 1997 IV Unidentified** Skin 19 Pool Hotel 
New York Sep 1997 III Chloramines ARI, eye, skin 51 Pool School 
New York Sep 1998 III Hydrochloric acid ARI 3 Pool School 
New York Jan 1999 III Unidentified§ Eye, skin 2 Pool School 
New York Jun 1999 III Unidentified§§§ AGI 140 Lake Swimming beach 
New York Mar 2000 III Unidentified§ Eye 2 Pool Hotel 
New York Feb 2001 I Chlorine¶¶¶ Skin 58 Pool, spa Hotel 
New York Jul 2002 III Shigella sonnei AGI 20 Lake Swimming beach 
Tennessee Jun 1997 II Cryptosporidium AGI 28 Lake Swimming beach 
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* On the basis of epidemiologic and water-quality data provided on CDC form 52.12 (available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/downloads/ 
cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf). NA: Single cases of waterborne disease are not classified (see Table 1). 
† Eye: illness, condition, or symptom related to eyes; Lep: leptospirosis; Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; AGI: acute gastrointestinal 
illness; Ear: illness, condition, or symptom related to ears; ARI: acute respiratory illness; and Other: undefined illness, condition, or symptom. 
§ Etiology unidentified: chemical contamination from excess chlorine levels or pool disinfection by-products (e.g., chloramines) suspected. 
¶ Source: Gaynor K, Katz AR, Park SY, Nakata M, Clark TA, Effler PV. Leptospirosis on Oahu: an outbreak associated with flooding of a university 
campus. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2007;76:882–5. 
** Etiology unidentified: P. aeruginosa suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting. 
†† Four persons had stool specimens that tested positive for norovirus, and three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for Staphylococcus aureus.
 
§§ All cases were diagnosed as Pontiac fever (PF).
 
¶¶ Chlorine gas was released after high levels of liquid chlorine and acid were mixed in the recirculation system and subsequently released into the pool
 
water. 
*** Etiology unidentified: high chlorine levels, disinfection by-products, and low pH suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome and setting. In addition to 
burning eyes and irritated skin, swimmers experienced teeth staining and loss of body hair. 
†††Etiology unidentified: Legionella and P. aeruginosa suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome (PF and rash) and setting.
 
§§§Etiology unidentified: norovirus suspected on the basis of clinical syndrome.
 
¶¶¶ Injuries occurred after the hand-addition of chlorine into a pool while swimmers were using it.
 
Two outbreaks were caused by chlorine-sensitive agents no documented response existed that indicated that chlorine 
(Giardia in Massachusetts, July 2005, and norovirus in was added or that the pool was closed. Previous outbreak 
Wisconsin, May 2006) and might have been prevented or investigations have demonstrated that the implementation of 
reduced in scale by proper aquatic monitoring, maintenance, appropriate pool operation practices (e.g., adequate disinfec­
and/or operation practices. Investigation of the Massachusetts tion) effectively stops the transmission of chlorine-sensitive 
giardiasis outbreak revealed that although the chlorine levels pathogens (25). 
recorded on the pool log were below the recommended level, 
 TABLE 12. Other aquatic facility-related health events* (n = 32) not associated with recreational water use — New York, 1983–2006 
Predominant No. of cases 
State Date Etiologic agent illness† (n = 364 ) Type Setting 
New York Mar 1983 Chlorine gas§ ARI 3 Pool Housing complex 
New York Aug 1983 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Housing complex 
New York May 1984 Chlorine gas¶ ARI 8 Pool College 
New York Jun 1987 Chlorine gas§ ARI 6 Pool Community 
New York Aug 1987 Chlorine gas§ ARI 41 Pool Membership club 
New York Aug 1988 Chlorine gas§ ARI 10 Pool Membership club 
New York Oct 1988 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool School 
New York Dec 1988 Chlorine gas§ ARI, eye 29 Pool Institution 
New York Feb 1989 Chlorine gas§ ARI 6 Pool School 
New York Jul 1989 Chlorine gas¶ ARI 1 Pool Community 
New York Jul 1989 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Hotel 
New York Jul 1991 Chlorine gas§ ARI 5 Pool School 
New York Jan 1992 Chlorine gas§ ARI 2 Pool Membership club 
New York Jun 1992 Chlorine gas§ ARI, eye 2 Pool School 
New York Feb 1993 Carbon monoxide suspected AGI, ARI 18 Pool School 
New York Sep 1993 Chlorine gas§ ARI 3 Pool Membership club 
New York Jun 1994 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Membership club 
New York Jun 1994 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Institution 
New York Jun 1995 Chlorine gas§ ARI 48 Pool School 
New York Oct 1995 Chlorine gas§ ARI 91 Pool School 
New York Jul 1996 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Membership club 
New York Apr 1997 Chlorine gas§ ARI 14 Pool School 
New York Jun 1997 Chlorine gas§ ARI 15 Pool Membership club 
New York Aug 1997 Chlorine gas§ ARI 18 Pool School 
New York Dec 1997 Chlorine gas§ ARI 17 Pool Membership club 
New York Jul 1998 Chlorine liquid Eye 1 Pool Hotel 
New York Feb 2000 Carbon monoxide ARI 4 Pool Hotel 
New York Jan 2001 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool School 
New York Jun 2002 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Housing complex 
New York Apr 2005 Chlorine gas§ ARI 9 Pool Membership club 
New York Jul 2006 Chlorine gas§ ARI 1 Pool Community 
New York May 2006 Chlorine gas§ ARI 4 Pool Community 
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* These events are not considered waterborne outbreaks because the vehicle of transmission was not water. 
†AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; and Eye: illness, condition or symptom related to eyes. 
§Chlorine gas was generated after inappropriate chemical preparation or mixing (e.g., liquid chlorine bleach and acid). 
¶ Chlorine gas that was used to disinfect pool water was released, causing injury. 
During 2005–2006, Cryptosporidium spp. caused 31 recre­
ational water–associated outbreaks, which involved 3,751 
persons; 99.1% of these cases were associated with treated water 
venues. The number of the cryptosporidiosis outbreaks 
reported annually has substantially increased from nine in 
1997–1998 to 31 in 2005–2006 (Table 7). This increase is 
particularly noticeable in the proportion of AGI outbreaks 
associated with Cryptosporidium in treated recreational water 
venues (Figures 5 and 9). These increases contribute to the 
observed increases in the total number of recreational water– 
associated outbreaks and, more specifically, outbreaks of gas­
troenteritis. Concurrently, cases of cryptosporidiosis reported 
to CDC have nearly doubled since 2004 (26). Although the 
reasons for increased cryptosporidiosis case and outbreak re­
porting are not completely understood, outbreaks associated 
with treated recreational water venues continue to be an im­
portant means of transmitting Cryptosporidium. 
During 1997–2006, Cryptosporidium was infrequently 
attributed to outbreaks associated with lakes and rivers (12.7% 
of outbreaks), although it caused 68.3% of outbreaks associ­
ated with treated venues (Figure 9). This observation is con­
sistent with the finding that Cryptosporidium requires extended 
contact time with chlorine for inactivation; oocysts can sur­
vive for days in the chlorine levels that are typically recom­
mended for swimming pools (1–3 ppm free chlorine; 27). 
The continued reporting of cryptosporidiosis outbreaks asso­
ciated with the use of treated recreational water venues under­
scores the importance of other prevention measures that reach 
beyond conventional pool chlorination and filtration, which 
are the primary barriers to infectious disease transmission (28). 
WBDOs of cryptosporidiosis have stimulated the use of al­
ternative treatment technologies and other potential risk-re­
duction steps to keep swimming venues safe. Ultraviolet light 
(29–31) and ozonation (27,32) disinfection effectively inac­
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FIGURE 8. Number of recreational water-associated outbreaks 
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* Single cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis (n = 60) have been 
removed from this figure; therefore, it is not comparable to figures in 
previous Surveillance Summaries. 
† AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; Skin: illness, condition, or symptom 
related to skin; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Other: includes keratitis, 
conjunctivitis, otitis, bronchitis, meningitis, meningoencephalitis, hepatitis, 
leptospirosis, and combined illnesses. 
§ All outbreaks of legionellosis (i.e., Legionnaires’ disease and Pontiac fever) 
are classified as ARI. 
tivate Cryptosporidium and are available for use at aquatic ven­
ues. Other potential risk-reduction steps include increased cir­
culation flow rates, flocculants, remedial biocidal shock 
treatments [i.e., routine hyperchlorination: 20 ppm free chlo­
rine for 12.75 hours or the equivalent (31,33)], and occu­
pancy-dependent water replacement. In addition, 
cryptosporidiosis outbreaks highlight the need for improved 
operator training and continued education of the general pub­
lic concerning healthy swimming practices to reduce the risk 
for RWI. 
Because Cryptosporidium is resistant to the chlorine levels 
used in pools, outbreaks can occur, even in facilities that are 
well-maintained. Therefore, rapid public health response and 
increased community involvement are needed to prevent the 
expansion of these outbreaks (34). One cryptosporidiosis out­
break (Iowa, June 2005) that occurred in a community swim­
ming pool demonstrates how a rapid community-wide public 
health response during the early stages of an outbreak can 
help control the potential spread of illness into the commu­
nity. In Iowa, detection and investigation started 2 weeks 
after exposure. The response included mitigating actions (e.g., 
ordering hyperchlorination of the implicated pool and all pools 
within a 20-mile radius and then confirming compliance; 
containing the outbreak through collaborative efforts between 
epidemiologists and environmental health specialists; posting 
signs at the implicated pool’s entrance; instructing those with 
diarrhea not to enter the pool; and educating the public about 
good hygiene practices). The investigation indicated that no 
transmission had apparently occurred outside of the single 
implicated community pool, suggesting that these control 
measures might have prevented further spread. An interstate 
cryptosporidiosis outbreak (Kentucky, June 2005; and Ohio, 
August 2005) highlighted the need for additional intra-agency 
collaboration (e.g., between epidemiologists detecting cases 
and environmental health specialists permitting and inspect­
ing pools) and communication between states. 
Modification of swimming behavior is a critical component 
in reducing recreational water-associated outbreaks. Swimming 
is essentially communal bathing, and continued swimming 
during diarrheal illness and the common occurrence of swal­
lowing recreational water pose a public health challenge. 
Multiple findings underscore the relation between human 
behavior and disease transmission at recreational water ven­
ues. First, in multiple outbreaks, fecal accidents were observed 
at the implicated pools on the days when the outbreak expo­
sures were thought to have occurred (Florida, August 2006; 
and Illinois, July 2006). Second, at least five outbreaks (New 
York, June 2005; Ohio, August 2005; Illinois, July 2006; 
Minnesota, September 2006; and South Carolina, July 2006) 
were caused by Cryptosporidium hominis, indicating a human 
source of water contamination. Third, swallowing water at 
the implicated recreational water venue was associated with 
illness in three outbreaks (Colorado, August 2006; Florida, 
June 2005; and New York, June 2005). All of these outbreaks 
highlight how recreational water can amplify transmission of 
fecal-oral pathogens. These findings underscore the need for 
public education about the importance of not swimming dur­
ing diarrheal illness and not swallowing recreational water, 
and the importance of clarifying with the public that recre­
ational water is neither drinking water nor sterile. Aquatic 
facilities should be diligent about informing patrons of these 
public health concerns and emphasizing that persons with 
diarrhea should not swim and all swimmers should practice 
good hygiene. These policies should apply to all patrons, par­
ticularly young children and visitors from high-risk settings 
(e.g., child care centers), which have diarrhea exclusion poli­
cies but might not enforce them routinely. They also should 
apply to all aquatics facility staff. Standardized policies for 
restricting staff who are ill with diarrhea from entering pools, 
similar to restricting ill foodhandlers from food preparation, 
should be established, implemented, and enforced (35). 
Finally, good hygiene is essential to ensure the cleanliness of 
swimmers entering pools. An adequate number of function­
ing, accessible hygiene facilities (i.e., toilets, diaper-
changing areas, and showers) should be located near pools 
and should provide hot water and handwashing access to pro­
mote compliance. Documented fecal contamination of per­
sons (36) suggests that swimmers should be encouraged to 
shower thoroughly (i.e., washing the peri-anal surface in par­
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ticular) before going to or entering the	 
pool. Diaper-changing facilities, with 
handwashing stations, should be 
located close to or at the poolside to 
encourage hygienic diaper-changing 
and handwashing. 
Chemical Toxicity 
During 2005–2006, pool chemicals 
or disinfection by-products were con­
firmed as the etiologic agent in one 
(Ohio, July 2005) and suspected to be 
the etiologic agent in four (Minnesota, 
April 2005; Illinois, June 2006; 
Nebraska, December 2006; and New 
York, March 2006) pool-associated out­
breaks. Chemicals are added to pool 
water to protect against microbial and 
algal growth, improve the water qual­
ity, maximize the efficacy of the disin­
fection process (e.g., pH control), and 
prevent corrosion and scaling of equip­
ment. However, these same chemicals 
can become sources of illness or injury 
FIGURE 9 . Recreational water-associated outbreaks of gastroenteritis, by type of 
exposure and etiologic agent— United States, 1997–2006
if they are not properly handled or if water quality and venti­
lation are poor. In an ARI outbreak in Ohio, a pool 
recirculation pump shut down for unknown reasons, but the 
chemical feed pump continued to feed hypochlorous acid and 
muriatic (hydrochloric) acid into the recirculation system, 
resulting in the release of chlorine gas into the pool that was 
still in use by swimmers when the recirculation pump was 
restarted. Nineteen persons became ill, of whom four of them 
were hospitalized. A dermatitis outbreak (Illinois) was sus­
pected to have resulted from water chemistry deficiencies (pH 
<7 and chlorine level at 0 ppm) that occurred when the auto­
matic chemical-feeding system malfunctioned. These out­
breaks underscore the need for engineering controls (e.g., an 
electrical interlock system that shuts down the chemical feed 
pump when the recirculation pump shuts down), regular sys­
tems checks, and preventive maintenance of equipment. 
Three additional outbreaks of acute respiratory symptoms 
or eye irritation were suspected to have resulted from an accu­
mulation of chloramines in the water and air of indoor pools. 
Chloramines are disinfection by-products that result from 
chlorine oxidation of nitrogenous compounds (e.g., perspira­
tion, saliva, urine, and body oils) commonly shed into pools 
by swimmers (20). Chloramines are produced in the water 
and volatilize into the surrounding air. In indoor pool set­
tings, chloramines can accumulate in the enclosed space if 
ventilation is inadequate (21). The resulting high levels of 
* These include outbreaks of Salmonella, Campylobacter, Plesiomonas, and mixed pathogens. 
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chloramines can cause ocular, respiratory tract, and mucous 
membrane irritation (20); these high levels in indoor pool 
settings are also potentially linked to asthma (37). The inves­
tigation of the Nebraska outbreak, which resulted in one young 
swimmer being admitted to a pediatric intensive-care unit for 
severe chemical epiglottitis and laryngotrach-eobronchitis, 
revealed inadequate facility maintenance that resulted in pro­
longed deterioration of the water chemistry (e.g., 0.8 ppm free 
chlorine, 4.2 ppm combined chlorine, and a pH = 3.95) (38). 
The shortage of laboratories that perform analyses for air­
borne chloramines and the variability in indoor air quality 
from day-to-day impedes investigators’ ability to respond to 
reports of ocular and respiratory distress related to indoor pools 
or to obtain rapid and quantitative air measurements at 
implicated pools. Water-testing data useful for evaluating an 
indoor air-quality problem include the pH level and total (i.e., 
free plus combined chlorine) and free chlorine concentrations, 
which can be used to calculate the level of combined chlorine 
in the water. Levels that exceed test kit capacity should be 
re-measured by making dilutions using distilled water. These 
outbreaks underscore the need to train pool operators and 
aquatic staff so that they routinely monitor and maintain water 
chemistry to protect the health of patrons and staff. 
Air-quality improvements in indoor pools will require tech­
nological improvements in water chemistry and treatment and 
air circulation and ventilation. New studies suggest that 
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installation of ultraviolet treatment devices in pool water 
recirculation systems can reduce pool chloramine levels (39) 
and also can effectively inactivate pathogens (including 
chlorine-resistant Cryptosporidium) (39,40). Plans to improve 
air quality also can be aided by working with the public to 
improve swimmer hygiene. The resulting reduction in urine 
and other nitrogenous waste (e.g., decreased public urination 
in pools and increased showering before entering pools) should 
lead to reductions in chloramine levels in both water and air. 
Such an effort should raise public awareness about the role of 
urine and sweat in creating the irritants associated with 
indoor pool swimming. Operators should encourage shower­
ing before entering any pool or spa and facilitate frequent 
bathroom breaks for swimmers, particularly for young chil­
dren (e.g., instituting adult-only swim times and short 
closures for water-quality testing). 
Multiple challenges are associated with understanding the 
numbers of water-related, chemical illnesses at aquatic ven­
ues. Lack of rapid testing and routine testing for chloramines 
suggests that surveillance for recreational water-associated 
outbreaks of acute chemical poisoning is likely to have mul­
tiple barriers, resulting in underestimation of the true magni­
tude of the problem. Acute chemical-related WBDOs might 
be more likely to involve first responders than the traditional 
epidemiologic or environmental health staff investigating other 
WBDOs and reporting to WBDOSS. As a result, more effi­
cient reporting will require building strong and effective intra-
and interagency communication networks within health 
departments and with other groups (e.g., first responders and 
pool operators) to improve the reporting of WBDOs associ­
ated with recreational water. 
Spas 
Spas are susceptible to human contamination by the same 
pathogens that contaminate swimming and wading pools, but 
outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness from spas might be lim­
ited because spa usage does not involve as much full body 
(e.g., head-to-toe submersion) activities as pools, resulting in 
less water ingestion. However, spa operation is challenging 
because of difficulty with maintaining disinfectant levels at 
higher water temperatures or with aeration and the relatively 
high bather load to water volume typical of spas. As a result, 
these venues are ideal for amplification of naturally occurring 
environmental contaminants (e.g., thermophilic pathogens, 
P. aeruginosa, and Legionella). 
Skin Infections 
Spa-associated outbreaks are commonly associated with 
dermatitis and folliculitis; P. aeruginosa is the most commonly 
reported agent implicated in these settings (41). During 2005– 
2006, four WBDOs caused by Pseudomonas (Connecticut, 
April 2005; New Mexico, April 2005; Wisconsin, July 2005; 
and Kansas, December 2006), and five WBDOs suspected to 
have been caused by Pseudomonas (Minnesota, March 2005; 
Vermont, February 2005; Georgia, February 2006; Tennes­
see, March 2006; and Wisconsin, February 2006) were 
reported; four of these outbreaks involved spas, and five 
involved both spas and pools. The frequent co-location and use 
of both spas and pools by patrons means that it can be epide­
miologically difficult to implicate a particular pool or spa at a 
single venue. However, amplification of Pseudomonas is most 
likely to occur at the higher temperatures in spas (42). 
Nearly all of the Pseudomonas-associated outbreaks occurred 
as a result of spa use at a hotel, motel, or rented cabin, under­
scoring the need for improved recreational water quality in 
these transient visitation, travel-associated settings. Multiple 
outbreaks included large gatherings (e.g., birthday pool party 
[Connecticut] and sports tournament [Minnesota]), which 
can rapidly overwhelm the disinfection capacity of spas and 
lead to bacterial amplification. In addition, these gatherings 
often occurred on weekends (Wisconsin), when hotel staff 
trained in spa maintenance are likely to be off duty. Hotels 
and motels should consider having only trained employees 
operate and maintain pools and spas, particularly on week­
ends when usage is typically highest. Enhanced water-quality 
monitoring and maintenance should be considered when a 
large group or event at a hotel is scheduled. Users should be 
educated about not adding contaminants that might disrupt 
the spa’s water chemistry (e.g., shampoo [Minnesota] and wine 
[Georgia]). 
To prevent spa-associated outbreaks, operators must under­
stand the risk factors and steps that can be taken to limit trans­
mission of pathogens, particularly thermophiles. Proper 
chlorination or bromination effectively kills Pseudomonas and 
other skin-infecting bacteria. A review of 18 Pseudomonas 
outbreaks demonstrated that inadequate disinfection was 
associated with all outbreaks linked to spas (43). Bacterial 
amplification and biofilm build-up can be prevented by prop­
erly maintaining spas, ensuring that chlorine or bromine lev­
els consistently remain >2 ppm, and that pH levels remain in 
a range of 7.2–7.8. Poor maintenance of spas has been well-
documented (44), and studies have demonstrated that 
Pseudomonas and other bacteria can remain protected in spa 
biofilms, even in the presence of adequate disinfectant, then 
rapidly proliferate if the disinfectant level drops (42). 
Legionellosis 
Legionellae, which cause both LD and PF, are ubiquitous in 
freshwater environments (45). Environmental conditions in 
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whirlpool spas (e.g., warm temperatures and water aerosoliza­
tion) promote the amplification and transmission of the bac­
teria when combined with low or erratic disinfectant levels. 
Exposure to Legionella is more likely to occur in the absence 
of adequate levels of disinfectant, underscoring the impor­
tance of maintaining adequate disinfectant levels and pH con­
trol. When lapses in preventive measures result in a legionellosis 
outbreak, morbidity can be reduced by rapid recognition of 
the outbreak, identification of its source, and immediate imple­
mentation of remediation. Remediation methods include 
cleaning and disinfecting the spa to eliminate Legionella colo­
nization and performing follow-up cultures for Legionella to 
ensure that re-colonization does not occur (46). 
All eight legionellosis WBDOs associated with recreational 
water during 2005–2006 were associated with spas. Five of 
these outbreaks occurred at hotels which highlights the role 
of travel in Legionella transmission and illustrates the poten­
tial difficulty of detecting travel-associated illnesses when trav­
elers disperse to their resident state or country. CDC’s 
supplementary reporting system for legionellosis collects 
exposure and travel information. In a 2005 CSTE position 
statement (http://www.cste.org/PS/2005pdf/final2005/05­
ID-01final.pdf ), surveillance and active follow up of poten­
tial travel-associated case reports was recommended position 
statement to improve detection of travel-associated clusters of 
illness and to increase opportunities for disease prevention. 
During 2005–2006, a total of 10 clusters were identified (47) 
although not all met WBDO definition. After CSTE’s rec­
ommendations in 2005, CDC 1) improved communication 
with international, state, and local public health partners con­
cerning travel-associated LD cases; 2) developed a standard­
ized notification and tracking system; and 3) created a dedicated 
e-mail address for case reporting (travellegionella@cdc.gov). In 
addition, CDC’s legionellosis website (http://www.cdc.gov/ 
legionella) has been updated to provide useful tools for investi­
gating legionellosis outbreaks (including sample questionnaires), 
sample letters for hotel management, and protocols for envi­
ronmental assessments of water systems. 
Interactive Fountains/Wet Decks 
and Fill-and-Drain Pools 
Infectious Gastroenteritis 
Certain treated water venues (e.g., interactive fountains, 
which also are called wet decks or spray parks) might be over­
looked as potential sites for transmission of infection or pool 
regulation because they do not have standing water as tradi­
tionally found in swimming pools. These venues are particu­
larly prone to contamination by fecal material, vomit, and 
dirt because of the young users of the small volume of recircu­
lating water. These contaminants can potentially drain into 
the water reservoir and be sprayed back on users, increasing 
the likelihood of contaminated water ingestion. The use of 
interactive fountains has previously been associated with out­
breaks of gastroenteritis (48), and outbreaks reported here 
(Louisiana, August 2005; New York, June 2005; California, 
July, 2006; and Florida, May 2006) demonstrate that trans­
mission continues to occur in these settings. Not all states 
regulate interactive fountains which might increase chance of 
improper design, maintenance, or operation in these venues. 
In one of the largest outbreaks reported to the WBDOSS, 
approximately 2,300 persons developed cryptosporidiosis fol­
lowing exposure to a New York spray park. The environmental 
investigation revealed that recycled water was not adequately 
filtered and disinfected. In response, New York passed emer­
gency legislation requiring that supplementary disinfection (e.g., 
ultraviolet radiation or ozonation) be installed on water return­
ing through the sprayers. Designs that improve water treatment 
for these interactive fountains are needed to reduce the risk for 
RWIs. Reports of investigations from three additional 
cryptosporidiosis outbreaks (California, 2006; Florida, 2006; 
and New York 2005) indicated inadequate disinfection levels 
(<1.0 ppm chlorine) and the use of sand or cartridge filters, 
both of which might not be adequate for Cryptosporidium 
oocyst removal. Filters with diatomaceous earth might be more 
effective at removing oocysts than sand or cartridge filters. 
The use of tap water to fill or operate temporary aquatic 
venues (e.g., fill-and-drain pools) used by young children con­
tinues to be a public health challenge (California, July 2006; 
and Wyoming, July 2005). Lack of disinfection and the tradi­
tional use by toddlers and diaper-aged children have resulted 
in multiple outbreaks being associated with use in both resi­
dential and institutional settings (12,49,50). In the Califor­
nia outbreak, nine persons became ill with AGI after attending 
a pool party where guests swam in a plastic pool filled with 
untreated tap water. Three children were hospitalized; S. sonnei 
was confirmed in stool samples from six ill persons. In Wyo­
ming, an outbreak of campylobacteriosis occurred after two 
families filled a pool with untreated water from a shallow well. 
In addition, a dog known to roll around in cow feces entered 
the pool. The potential risk for infection associated with 
using temporary pools filled with tap water without 
additional disinfection and filtration should be considered 
before they are used in residential settings. To reduce the risk 
for pathogen transmission, persons with gastroenteritis should 
be excluded, and the pool should be drained and cleaned daily. 
On the basis of documented outbreaks, fill-and-drain pools 
should be eliminated from institutional settings or large group 
events (50). 
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Lakes and Rivers 
Infectious Gastroenteritis 
Although the proportion of AGI outbreaks associated with 
untreated venues (e.g., lakes and rivers) relative to treated ven­
ues decreased over the previous decade, the number of out­
breaks associated with untreated venues has remained relatively 
constant (Figure 10). During 2005–2006, a total of 13 out­
breaks of gastroenteritis associated with untreated freshwater 
venues were reported; all of these were linked to swimming in 
lakes or ponds. Freshwater venues have a higher proportion 
of outbreaks caused by bacterial and viral etiologic agents com­
pared with treated water venues (Figure 5). 
Multiple studies have determined the utility of water-quality 
monitoring (16) for assessing the associated risk for swimmer 
illness (18) in large bodies of water (e.g., Great Lakes and the 
ocean). However, the small inland water bodies associated with 
the outbreaks in this report do not have consistent external 
sources of contamination (e.g., sewer overflow), suggesting 
that swimmers might be an important source of water con­
tamination and infection transmission. As with treated ven­
ues, human behavior plays a key role in the spread of pathogens 
in untreated bodies of water. Modification of swimmer 
behavior might be a more critical factor in natural water ven­
ues that lack the benefit of disinfection and filtration barriers 
to transmission. Recommendations for swimmer hygiene in 
natural waters are the same as those previously discussed for 
treated pools. In addition, beach managers and swimmers 
should be aware that shallow, poorly circulated swimming 
areas, although desirable to many swimmers, might pose a 
higher risk of exposure to certain pathogens compared to 
deeper, well circulated swimming areas. Potential methods to 
improve circulation of water through beach areas should be 
explored to reduce the longevity of focal, swimmer-derived 
contamination and waterborne-disease transmission. Reduc­
ing exposure to high fecal indicator bacterial levels at sites 
affected by runoff can be achieved by avoiding swimming 
immediately after heavy rainfall (reducing exposure to any 
increase in contaminated runoff ) and by not swimming near 
storm drains or pipes that might release contamination into 
water bodies (24). 
Primary Amebic Meningoencephalitis 
During 2005–2006, five fatal cases of PAM caused by 
N. fowleri were reported; for two of these cases, there was pos­
sibly a common exposure to either a creek or a small spray 
park. For the remaining three cases, no common exposure 
was identified (Tables 4, 10). This rare disease is of public 
health importance because of the high fatality rate associated 
with infection (>99%) (51) and the public alarm it raises for 
FIGURE 10. Number of recreational water-associated outbreaks 
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use of natural waters in the southern tier states in the United 
States. N. fowleri is a free-living ameba that proliferates in 
warm freshwater and hot springs. Disease occurs when the 
ameba coincidentally enters the nasal passages, travels to the 
olfactory lobe of the brain, and infects brain tissue. The five 
cases all occurred in southern tier states (Arizona, Georgia, 
Oklahoma, and Texas) during warm weather months 
(Tables 4, 10). Three of the five children who died of PAM 
during 2005–2006 had participated in activities in warm 
water before onset of symptoms, similar to other known cases 
of PAM. The source of exposure for the two Oklahoma cases 
could not be determined despite a public health investigation. 
The low number of Naegleria infections makes it difficult 
to determine why certain persons become infected compared 
with the millions of others with the same or similar exposures 
to waters across the United States. As a result, the efficacy of 
existing risk-reduction strategies are uncertain. The finding 
of Naegleria in the majority of lake water surveys conducted 
in southern tier states suggests that this minimal likelihood of 
Naegleria infection always will be associated with swimming 
in warm, freshwater lakes, rivers, and hot springs. While the 
most certain way to prevent infections is to refrain from swim­
ming in these freshwater bodies, swimmers might reduce their 
risk for PAM by not swimming or jumping into bodies of 
warm freshwater, hot springs, and thermally polluted water 
(e.g., water around power plants); not swimming or jumping 
into freshwater during periods of high water temperature and 
low water volume; holding the nose shut or using nose clips 
when jumping or diving into bodies of warm freshwater; and 
refraining from digging in or stirring up sediment while swim­
ming in shallow, warm, freshwater areas. CDC is collaborat­
ing with CSTE to more effectively describe the scope of 
Naegleria infections in the United States, improve surveillance, 
and analyze available exposure and environmental occurrence 
data to develop more evidence-based risk-reduction measures 
and messages (52). 
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Leptospirosis 
Although infections caused by Leptospira are considered to 
be more common in tropical and semitropical areas of the 
world (53), outbreaks reported during 2005–2006 illustrate 
the potential risk for leptospirosis outbreaks associated with 
recreational water contact in the United States. Leptospira can 
be found in the urine of infected wild and domesticated ani­
mals, so contamination of natural waters can occur where 
infected animals live. The route of transmission in humans 
usually is through contaminated water contact with broken 
or abraded skin or through contact with the mucosal surfaces 
of the eye, mouth, nasopharynx, or esophagus. Exposure might 
also occur through inhalation, ingestion, or prolonged 
immersion in water, resulting in increased permeability of the 
skin. Increased skin permeability might play a role in infec­
tions resulting from contact with contaminated surface water 
after flooding (54) or with prolonged use of contaminated 
surface waters as part of sports or other events (e.g., triathlons) 
(55,56). Two outbreaks of leptospirosis involving 46 persons 
were reported for 2005–2006 as well as a previously unre­
ported outbreak in Hawaii in 2004 (57). One outbreak in 
California (July 2005) was associated with persons working 
in a drought-affected stream. The second larger outbreak 
occurred in Florida (November 2005) and was associated with 
participation in an adventure race. This is consistent with pre­
vious outbreaks in other similar competitive venues (55,56). 
To reduce risk for infection, persons should wear protective 
clothing, avoid swimming when they have open wounds or 
abrasions and avoid water contaminated by animal urine. 
Cercarial Dermatitis 
During the 2005–2006 surveillance period, two WBDOs 
of suspected cercarial dermatitis caused by avian schistosomes 
were reported (California, July 2005 Ohio August 2006). 
Although the diagnosis was not confirmed, this self-limited 
disease is known to occur among persons exposed to lakes 
across the United States where infected birds contaminate water 
supporting the intermediate host snail (58). The risk for 
acquiring cercarial dermatitis might be reduced by warning 
swimmers of potentially contaminated lakes, avoiding 
shallow swimming areas where infected snails reside, institut­
ing a snail control program, and by not attracting birds to 
swimming areas (e.g., by not feeding them). 
Marine Water 
No waterborne disease outbreaks associated with marine 
waters were reported to WBDOSS before 2005–2006; how­
ever, evidence from multiple sources demonstrates that con­
tamination of marine waters is common and that swimmers 
in marine waters are at increased risk for acquiring AGI 
(23,59). States and territories report water-quality testing 
results and notification data for their coastal and Great Lakes 
recreational water to EPA. In 2006, 32% of monitored beaches 
were affected at least once by either an advisory or closing as a 
result of the EPA microbial fecal indicator limits being 
exceeded or water-quality standards not being met (17). Mul­
tiple studies have linked these water-quality indicators with 
increased risk for RWIs (23,59,60), although RWIs also can 
occur when water-quality indicators are within established lim­
its (24). The reasons for a lack of reported marine-associated 
outbreaks might include the wide geographic spread of 
beachgoers, the fact that some of the marine-associated ill­
nesses are not enteric illnesses typically linked to waterborne 
causes, and a lack of illness attribution to marine waters. 
Vibrio Illness 
Although WBDOs associated with marine waters might be 
difficult to detect, single cases of Vibrio infections from 
marine water exposure might be more likely to be reported 
because of the severity of the illness associated with infection. 
The number of Vibrio infections associated with water expo­
sures during 2005–2006 (n = 189) was higher than the num­
ber reported in 2003–2004 (n = 142), although recreational 
water exposure constitutes only a small fraction (14.7%) of 
the 1,287 vibriosis cases from all exposures reported in 2005– 
2006 (61). Some of the increase in reported cases for 2005 
might be attributable to flood water exposure in the Gulf Coast 
immediately following Hurricane Katrina (62) when active 
case-finding facilitated identification of Vibrio infections. 
Reported hurricane-related infections were primarily among 
persons with wounds who waded through flood waters. The 
majority of hurricane-related Vibrio infections were caused by 
V. vulnificus, which predominately occurs in the Gulf Coast. 
Wound infections from V. vulnificus can cause severe illness 
and sequelae, including septicemia and the need for amputa­
tion. For nonfoodborne cases of V. vulnificus infection, the 
hospitalization rate is approximately 90% and the case fatal­
ity rate is 17%–24% (63,64), similar to the 22.3% case fatal­
ity rate among cases reported during 2005–2006 (Table 8). 
Disease is more common and severe among persons with pre­
existing wounds and other medical conditions (e.g., diabetes, 
heart disease, or liver disease) (64,65). V. parahaemolyticus and 
nontoxigenic V. cholerae infections were also reported among 
persons with hurricane-related Vibrio infections. The burden 
of wound-related vibriosis is unknown, although an estimated 
8,000 Vibrio infections occur annually, including an estimated 
2,800 annual cases not associated with food exposure (64). 
CSTE added vibriosis to the list of nationally notifiable dis­
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although all other states and territories can report vibriosis 
cases to CDC. Cases are reported to CDC by using the Chol­
era and Other Vibrio Illness Surveillance report form, which 
is available at http://www.cdc.gov/nationalsurveillance/PDFs/ 
CDC5279_COVISvibriosis.pdf. Annual summaries of 
national data on vibriosis are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nationalsurveillance/cholera_vibrio_surveillance.html. 
Improved surveillance and reporting are designed to increase 
understanding of the magnitude and distribution of Vibrio 
illness related to marine water, to better characterize the risk 
and contributing environmental factors, and to guide the 
development of appropriate prevention messages (e.g., per­
sons with wound or certain preexisting conditions not swim 
in warm marine water). 
Seabather’s Eruption 
One outbreak was reported for 2005–2006 in which swim­
mers were exposed to marine water. Certain ill persons had 
symptoms consistent with Seabather’s Eruption, a skin con­
dition caused by contact with toxins from stinging jellyfish 
larvae. However, the majority of persons also exhibited an 
influenza-like illness which, although previously associated 
with Seabather’s Eruption (66), could also indicate another 
water-associated etiology. Seabather’s Eruption occurs prima­
rily in the marine waters off Florida, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the Caribbean Sea particularly during spring and summer 
months. Whereas risk factors associated with developing 
Seabather’s Eruption are not fully understood, swimmers might 
be able to reduce their risk by removing bathing suits and 
thoroughly showering to remove jellyfish larvae after marine 
water exposure (67). Ongoing research is needed to under­
stand the water conditions that lead to increased risk for ill­
ness among swimmers so that appropriate risk-reduction 
messages can be given to ocean beach visitors. 
Previously Unreported Outbreaks 
The retrospective review of waterborne-disease outbreaks 
in Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee by EHS-Net Water 
staff resulted in the reporting of 30 previously unreported rec­
reational water–associated outbreaks and case reports 
(Table 11). The addition of previously unreported outbreaks 
increases understanding about the epidemiology of waterborne 
disease in these jurisdictions. The success of the EHS-Net 
Water surveillance improvement effort underscores the utility 
of acquiring personnel who can focus on waterborne disease 
detection, investigation, and reporting (13). An additional 
outbreak from 2004 was reported by Hawaii (57). 
Aquatic Facility-Related Health Events 
not Associated with Recreational Water 
Use 
All 32 aquatic facility–related health events not associated 
with recreational water use (Table 12) were reported by New 
York, which had captured these events through a system, which 
mandates reporting of chemical injuries. Three events, all of 
which involved mixing of incompatible pool chemicals that 
resulted in the release of chlorine gas, were reported during 
2005–2006. The first outbreak of ARI resulted from a spill of 
50–75 gallons of hypochlorous acid (i.e., bleach), which might 
have interacted with other chemicals in the spill area. The sec­
ond event resulted from using a container that was previously 
used for hypochlorous acid as a container for the acid used to 
adjust pool pH. Subsequent contact of the pool acid with the 
hypochlorous acid residue released a chlorine gas plume. The 
third event involved adding both calcium hypochlorite (chlo­
rine) and trichloro-s-triazinetrione (a chlorinated isocyanurate 
commonly called trichlor) to the pool chlorinator system, which 
resulted in a release of chlorine gas. The material safety data 
sheet for trichloro-s-triazinetrione states that it is not to be 
mixed with other chemicals, especially calcium hypochlorite; 
alkalis; and other swimming pool/spa chemicals in their con­
centrated forms. These events and others (Table 12) highlight 
the need for new or improved 1) pump room and chemical 
storage area design and construction (e.g., improved ventila­
tion, and chemical containment and separation), 2) chemical 
packaging (e.g., to easily differentiate between key pool chemi­
cals), 3) chemical storage (e.g., to prevent mixing accidents), 
4) staff training on how to safely store and handle chemicals 
and maintain and repair chemical-using pool systems, and 5) 
emergency response protocols. 
Prevention 
Prevention of RWIs is likely to be accomplished only through 
a concerted team effort by public health professionals, swim­
ming venue operators, and the general public. Operators at 
treated water venues are equipped with various methods that 
should be employed to prevent outbreaks. The traditional 
reliance on two water-treatment barriers at treated water venues, 
chlorination and filtration, likely needs to be expanded to 
include in-line (i.e., usually installed after filtration and before 
chlorination) supplemental disinfection (e.g., ultraviolet treat­
ment and ozonation) to increase the level of protection against 
pathogens, particularly chlorine-resistant Cryptosporidium. Such 
supplemental disinfection systems will not eliminate waterborne-
disease transmission (because these systems are circulation-
time dependent), so improved monitoring of water-quality and 
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facility-maintenance programs and improved policies to edu­
cate the public and decrease contamination of aquatic facili­
ties with bodily waste also are critical. In response to the lack 
of protective barriers at untreated swimming venues (e.g., lakes 
and oceans), beach managers and public health officials should 
implement water-quality testing programs and educate swim­
mers concerning appropriate prevention measures (e.g., not 
swimming after heavy rainfall). Specific efforts should 
address environmental pathogens unlikely to be prevented by 
current water-quality guidelines (e.g., illnesses caused by Vibrio 
and otitis media infections). 
Public health professionals should 1) improve training for 
pool inspectors, 2) update and improve pool codes to stay 
current with changing designs and needs demonstrated by 
outbreaks summarized in this report, 3) lead and collaborate 
with aquatic staff to educate the general public, and 4) 
develop expertise in detecting and investigating recreational 
water-associated outbreaks, particularly those associated with 
chemicals. Safe handling and use of chemicals at aquatic 
facilities needs to be a standard training element that is regu­
larly reinforced. In addition, to improve overall indoor air 
quality, public health professionals and pool managers need 
to understand the importance of implementing improvements 
in pool water quality, swimmer hygiene, air-turnover rates, 
and ventilation. 
Educating swimmers can play a vital role in reducing RWIs 
by encouraging them to follow basic guidelines for healthy 
swimming. Fecal shedding of pathogens is common (36), so 
reducing the risk for water-related infection is best achieved 
by implementing diarrhea-exclusion policies, using appropri­
ate hygiene measures, and advising the public to avoid swal­
lowing recreational water. In addition, the public can 
inform themselves about RWI prevention. They can 
become activist swimmers (e.g., checking chlorine and pH lev­
els themselves) and advocate for healthy swimming venues. 
Conclusion 
Data collected by WBDOSS are used to characterize the 
epidemiology of waterborne disease and outbreaks associated 
with both recreational and drinking water. Swimming is a 
common activity in the United States (68). Certain disease-
causing agents are transmitted through shared bodies of water, 
and new waterborne pathogens that infect humans (e.g., 
Cryptosporidium and toxigenic E. coli) have emerged in the 
previous 3 decades. RWIs and outbreaks are associated with 
both treated and untreated water and with every type of aquatic 
venue. Common themes derived from the outbreaks in this 
report include 1) low disinfectant levels or poor filtration; 2) 
inadequate water-quality monitoring; 3) high bather loads 
during large events; 4) breakdowns of equipment and delayed 
detection or repair times; 5) not using ultraviolet radiation or 
ozonation to treat for Cryptosporidium in pools and interac­
tive fountains; 6) accumulation of combined chlorines in pools 
accompanied by inadequate indoor air ventilation; 7) inad­
equately trained aquatic staff, particularly on safe chemical 
handling practices, 8) lack of communication within and 
between public health agencies; 9) outbreaks occurring on 
weekends when trained staff might be off duty; 10) lack of 
awareness by the general public of appropriate healthy swim­
ming behaviors; and 11) lack of health department familiar­
ity with chemical-associated RWIs. 
Although no easy solution exists for reducing WBDOs 
associated with recreational water, a sustained effort by the 
swimming public, the aquatic management sector, and pub­
lic health agencies can reduce the associated risk. The mil­
lions of persons in the United States who use recreational water 
every year can best reduce their risk by staying informed 
regarding the health and safety concerns associated with swim­
ming. Public health officials should lead this educational 
effort to promote healthy swimming behaviors. Prevention 
methods discussed in this report should help make swimming 
experiences healthier, safer and more enjoyable. The aquatic 
sector also can benefit from the recommendations, which 
address changes that are needed in operation, maintenance, 
and chemical handling procedures. Large numbers of viola­
tions of state and local pool codes occur each year (15,44), 
indicating that improved pool operation, disinfection poli­
cies, and enforcement are needed to prevent RWIs (33). In 
addition, improvements in indoor air quality monitoring and 
widespread dissemination of validated testing protocols are 
needed to support improved air quality in indoor swimming 
pool settings. As a result of recommendations from a 2005 
national workshop on how to prevent RWIs, CDC is spon­
soring development of a national model aquatic health code 
(MAHC), which involves public health and aquatics sector 
personnel from across the country and is designed to trans­
form the typical health department program into a data-driven, 
knowledge-based, risk-reduction effort to prevent disease and 
injuries and promote healthy recreational water experiences. 
MAHC will provide uniform guidelines for the design, con­
struction, operation, and maintenance of swimming pools and 
other disinfected swimming venues. Although nonregulatory 
in nature, the MAHC should ensure that the best available 
standards and practices for protecting public health are avail­
able for adoption by state and local agencies. Further infor­
mation is available at http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/ 
model_code.htm. 
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Public health professionals at all levels of government should 
lead a multidisciplinary approach to prevent RWI that 
includes surveillance, health education, epidemiologic stud­
ies, laboratory support, and environmental health research. 
Educational resources and campaigns are needed for swim­
mers, parents, aquatic venue operators, and public health staff. 
Improved communications, particularly during outbreak 
investigations, between all areas of the public health system 
(e.g., infectious disease, environmental health, and surveil­
lance staff ) and between agencies in neighboring jurisdictions 
can 1) enhance awareness concerning ongoing occurrences of 
RWIs, 2) facilitate reporting to WBDOSS in a timelier man­
ner, and 3) strengthen WBDO investigations and responses 
to protect the public. The timely collection of clinical speci­
mens and water samples for testing during a WBDO investi­
gation and prompt initiation of an environmental investigation 
will result in more rapid identification of the etiologic agent 
and determination of the conditions leading to the outbreak. 
However, the capacity of public health departments and labo­
ratories to detect and investigate potential WBDOs varies and 
needs to be strengthened to meet these challenges. WBDO 
investigations typically require input from various disciplines, 
including infectious disease epidemiology, environmental 
health, clinical medicine, water and sanitation engineering, 
chemists/toxicologists, and microbiology. Additional cross-
training of existing personnel in these areas or additional staff­
ing and resources are needed to improve WBDO detection, 
investigation, and reporting. Other methods of improving 
surveillance at the local, state, and federal levels include addi­
tional review and follow-up of information gathered through 
other mechanisms (e.g., media reports or emergency responder 
reports of illness associated with recreational water venues). 
CSTE passed a 2006 position statement making waterborne-
disease outbreaks, as a unit of reporting, nationally notifiable 
and reportable to CDC starting in 2007. Adoption of this 
CSTE recommendation at the state level through state-
specific legislative action might improve reporting of water­
borne outbreaks. In addition, to improve timeliness and 
completeness of reporting, CDC and EPA are collaborating 
with public health jurisdictions to implement electronic 
reporting of WBDOs through the National Outbreak Report­
ing System (NORS). NORS will be a more systematic data 
collection tool that will provide public health agencies and 
waterborne-disease researchers with the evidence base they need 
to identify the causes of WBDOs and understand the interre­
lated factors contributing to these outbreaks. 
EHS-Net Water, a collaborative project between EPA, CDC, 
and five state health departments, is an effort to improve 
WBDO identification, investigation, response, and reporting. 
Environmental health specialists initially focused on under­
standing their state-specific surveillance systems, leading to 
the reporting of numerous historical outbreaks to WBDOSS. 
Although this project has focused primarily on improving 
drinking water-associated disease outbreak surveillance, it also 
has markedly improved our understanding of recreational 
water-associated outbreaks in EHS-Net Water states, which 
demonstrates the value of investing water-specific resources 
in certain jurisdictions. 
Focusing on improving awareness, training, resources, and 
communication will improve the quality of the data in 
WBDOSS. These efforts should make public health activities 
related to waterborne disease more efficient and, in turn, 
reduce the burden of recreational water-associated disease and 
injury (Box). 
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aquatic facility-related health Chemical injury cases and outbreaks (e.g., mixing of pool chemicals that release toxic gas) 
events not associated with at aquatic facilities in which exposure to water was not the cause of illness. Although these 
recreational water events are not classified or analyzed as waterborne-disease outbreaks, they highlight 
important public health and safety concerns related to the design, operation, and mainte­
nance of recreational water venues. 
backwash Flow of water through filter element(s) or media in a reverse direction to dislodge accumu­
lated dirt, debris, and/or filter aid, and remove them from the filter tank. 
backwash cycle Time required to thoroughly backwash the filter system. 
bather load The number of bathers using a swimming pool or spa at any one time. The maximum 
bather load is usually determined by a state or local pool code, based on surface area and 
depth of the pool or spa. 
biofilm Microbial cells that adhere to a surface through a matrix of primarily polysaccharide mate­
rials in which they are encapsulated. These can grow on piping and surfaces of aquatic 
venues and can be notoriously difficult to remove. They offer protection to microbes from 
disinfectants (e.g., chlorine) in the water. 
cercarial dermatitis Dermatitis caused by contact with or direct invasion through the skin or a break in the 
skin by the cercariae (larval stage) of certain species of schistosomes, a type of parasite, for 
which the normal hosts are birds and nonhuman mammals. Dermatitis is an allergic 
response to contact with cercariae and does not lead to parasitic infestation in humans and 
produces no long-term disease. 
class Waterborne disease and outbreaks are classified according to the strength of the epidemio­
logic and laboratory data implicating recreational water as the source of the disease or 
outbreak (see Table 1). 
chloramines A group of disinfection by-products or weak disinfectants formed when free chlorine 
combines with nitrogen-containing compounds in the water (e.g., urine or perspiration). 
Tri- and di-chloramine can cause eye, skin, lung, and throat irritation and can accumulate 
in the water and air surrounding treated recreational water venues. In drinking water treat­
ment, monochloramine is used for disinfection to reduce formation of disinfection 
by-products created when using chlorine as a disinfectant (see combined chlorine level). 
coliforms All aerobic and facultative anaerobic, gram-negative, nonspore-forming, rod-shaped 
bacteria that ferment lactose with gas formation within 48 hours at 95ºF (35ºC). 
combined chlorine level See chloramines. Chlorine that has combined with organic compounds in the water and is 
no longer an effective disinfectant for recreational water. This value is derived by subtract­
ing the free chlorine test level from total chlorine test level. The combined chlorine level is 
likely to include combined compounds in addition to chloramines. 
contact time The length of time water (and pathogens) is exposed to a disinfectant, usually measured in 
minutes (e.g., chlorine contact time). 
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Cryptosporidium The taxonomy of Cryptosporidium has evolved as a result of advancements in molecular 
methodology and genotyping. The former C. parvum now refers to a species that is zoonotic 
and infects ruminants and humans. C. hominis refers to the species of Cryptosporidium that 
infects only humans, primates, and monkeys. Both species were referred to previously as 
C. parvum. 
dermatitis Inflammation of the skin. In this Surveillance Summary, the term dermatitis is used to denote 
a broad category of skin-related symptoms (e.g., folliculitis, cellulitis, burns, or rash). 
disinfection by-products Chemicals formed in water through reactions between organic matter and disinfectants. 
Includes chloramines, also known as combined chlorines. 
etiologic agent The pathogen, chemical, or toxin causing a waterborne disease or outbreak. Infectious 
etiologic agents include bacteria, parasites, and viruses. 
fecal coliforms Coliforms that grow and ferment lactose to produce gas at 112.1ºF (44.5ºC) within 24 hours. 
fill-and-drain pools Small pools, often constructed of plastic, which might be inflatable, and filled with tap 
water without any ongoing chemical disinfection or filtration. Sometimes called kiddie pools. 
filtration The process of removing suspended particles from water by passing it through one or more 
permeable membranes or media of limited pore diameter (e.g., sand, anthracite, or diato­
maceous earth). 
folliculitis Inflammation of hair follicles. Spa-associated folliculitis is usually associated with infec­
tion by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. 
free chlorine The chlorine in water not combined with other constituents; therefore, it is able to serve as 
an effective disinfectant (also referred to as free available chlorine or residual chlorine). 
Measuring the free chlorine level is a common water-quality test. 
freshwater (untreated water) Surface water (e.g., water from lakes, rivers, or ponds) that has not been treated in any way 
to enhance its safety for recreational use. 
interactive fountain A fountain or water spray device intended for (or accessible to) recreational use. They 
usually do not have standing water as part of the design. These are sometimes called spray 
pads, splash pads, wet decks, or spray grounds. In contrast, noninteractive (ornamental) 
fountains intended for public display rather than recreational use are often located in front 
of buildings and monuments, and their water is not easily accessible for public use. 
marine water Untreated recreational water at an ocean or estuarine setting. 
microcystin toxin A secondary metabolite of blue-green algae (cyanobacteria) that can have toxic effects on 
humans and animals, potentially causing a wide range of illness or even death when expo­
sure to accumulated toxins in fresh or marine water occurs. 
mixed agent outbreak More than one type of etiologic agent is identified in clinical specimens from affected 
persons, and each etiologic agent is found in >5% of positive clinical specimens (e.g., an 
outbreak with Giardia spp. [parasites] and Salmonella spp. [bacteria], with each agent 
identified in >5% of stool specimens). 
oocyst The infectious stage of Cryptosporidium species and certain other coccidian parasites with 
a protective wall that facilitates survival in water and other environments and renders the 
parasite extremely resistant to chlorine. 
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predominant illness The type of illness most commonly expressed in a substantial proportion (>50%) of 
patients (e.g., gastroenteritis, dermatitis, and acute respiratory illness). When more than 
one illness type seems to define the character of the waterborne disease and outbreak, they 
are listed together as predominant illnesses. 
recreational water venue A body of water used for the purpose of recreation (e.g., swimming, soaking, or athletics), 
including any structure that encloses this water. It can include lakes and ponds, rivers, 
springs, the ocean, and man-made venues (e.g., swimming pools, spas, and water parks) 
that do not necessarily include standing water (e.g., interactive fountains). 
reservoir, impoundment An artificially maintained lake or other body of water created for the collection and storage 
of water. This body of water might be available for recreational use. 
setting Location where exposure to contaminated water occurred (e.g., swimming beach, water 
park, and hotel). 
spa Any structure, basin, chamber, or tank (located either indoors or outdoors) containing a body 
of water intended to be used for recreational or therapeutic purposes that usually contains a 
waterjet or aeration system. It is operated at high temperatures and is usually not drained, 
cleaned, or refilled after each use. It sometimes is referred to as a hot tub or whirlpool. 
spray park A recreational water venue solely consisting of multiple interactive fountains. 
total chlorine A common water-quality test that measures the chlorine in water that is free for disinfec­
tion (free chlorine) plus that combined with other organic materials (combined chlorine). 
The combined chlorine level is derived by subtracting the free chlorine test result from the 
total chlorine test result. 
total coliforms Nonfecal and fecal coliforms that are detected by using a standard test. 
treated water Water that has undergone a disinfection or treatment process (e.g., chlorination and filtra­
tion) for the purpose of making it safe for recreation. Typically, this refers to any recre­
ational water in an enclosed, manufactured structure but might include swimming or 
wading pools, fountains, or spas filled with treated tap water (e.g., small wading kiddie 
pool) or untreated water (e.g., mineral spring water) that receives no further treatment. 
turbidity A measurement of suspended particulate matter in water expressed as nephelometric tur­
bidity units (NTU). 
turnover rate The time required to theoretically recirculate the entire volume of water in a swimming 
pool, spa, or hot tub. 
ultraviolet light The segment of the light spectrum between 100-300 nanometers (nm). 
ultraviolet light disinfection unit A device that produces ultraviolet light between 250-280 nm for the purpose of inactiva­
tion of microorganisms by UV radiation. 
untreated water Surface water that has not been treated or disinfected in any way (i.e., lakes, rivers, oceans, 
and reservoirs). 
user Any person using a pool, spa, or hot tub and adjoining deck area. 
Vibrio species A genus of comma-shaped, gram-negative Proteobacteria that include various human patho­
gens. Certain species are found in salty or brackish water and can cause illness by contami­
nation of a wound or epithelial site (e.g., eardrums or sinus cavities). Sequelae can include 
sepsis and death. 
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waterborne-disease outbreak Water exposure in which two or more persons have been epidemiologically linked to recre­
ational water by location of exposure, time, and illness. 
waterborne disease and outbreak The surveillance system that contains the outbreaks and case reports reported by jurisdictional 
surveillance system (WBDOSS) public health authorities. Inputs into this system are illustrated in Figure 1. 
WBDOSS Surveillance Summary The biennial summaries of waterborne-disease outbreaks and cases associated with recre­
ational water, drinking water and water not intended for drinking are published in the 
MMWR. These publications also discuss waterborne-disease data from other surveillance 
systems (e.g., Vibrio) and disseminate waterborne-disease prevention messages. 
water-quality indicator A microbial, chemical, or physical parameter that indicates the potential risk for infectious 
diseases associated with using the water for drinking, bathing, or recreational purposes. 
The best indicator is one with a density or concentration that correlates best with health 
effects associated with a type of hazard or pollution (e.g., turbidity, coliforms, fecal coliforms, 
Escherichia coli, enterococci, free chlorine level). 
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Appendix B 
Descriptions of Selected Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks Associated 
with Recreational Water Use 
State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Bacteria 
July 2005 Wyoming Campylobacter jejuni 6 Two families celebrated a holiday weekend together at a private 
residence. A small pool was set up for the adults and treated with a 
jug of bleach. A fill-and-drain pool (kiddie pool) was set up for the 
children and filled with untreated well water. A dog known to roll 
around in cow feces might have introduced fecal matter into the 
children’s pool. Five children, ranging from ages 13 months–8 years, 
and one adult developed gastrointestinal illness. Stool specimens from 
two of the children tested positive for Campylobacter. 
July 2005 California Leptospira spp. 3 Three men became ill and were diagnosed with laboratory-confirmed 
leptospirosis after removing brush and picking berries in a stream near 
their homes. The stream was very low and slow-flowing at the time of 
exposure. 
November 2005 Florida Leptospira spp. 43 Racers from approximately 30 U.S. states and two Canadian 
provinces were exposed to surface water from multiple sources, 
including creeks, swamps, and a river during an endurance race. In 
all, 192 (96%) of the racers were interviewed to collect information 
about exposures and signs and symptoms of illness. Mean incubation 
times were similar for suspected cases (12.8 days) and confirmed 
cases (13.5 days). The most common symptoms reported were fever 
(100%), headache (91%), chills (69%), sweats (68%), and muscle/joint 
pain (68%). Swallowing river and swamp water and being submerged 
were significantly associated with developing illness. 
January 2006 Florida Legionella 11 (1) Eleven persons became ill (3 confirmed Legionnaires’ disease and 
pneumophila serogroup 1 eight atypical pneumonia cases) after staying at a hotel. A case-
control study was conducted and revealed that only exposure to the 
hotel’s indoor spa was a significant risk factor for developing illness. 
Environmental samples did not yield Legionella. However, several 
deficiencies were noted during the investigation, including suboptimal 
water temperatures and stagnation and sediment within the hot-water 
system. Bromine levels in the indoor spa were measured at 0.5 ppm at 
the time of investigation. 
January 2006 Illinois Legionella spp. 43 (1) Forty-three persons became ill (three confirmed Legionnaires’ disease 
and 40 Pontiac fever cases) following a hotel stay. A retrospective 
cohort study was conducted; exposure to the pool area was a 
significant risk factor for developing illness. L. pneumophila and L. 
maceachernii were isolated from water samples of both the pool and 
spa. No disinfectant residual was found in the pool or spa water. 
July 2006 California Shigella sonnei 9 Five families attended a party at a private residence. A fill-and-drain 
pool was filled with tap water with no additional treatment. Shigella 
sonnei was isolated from stool samples submitted by six attendees. 
A retrospective cohort study revealed a significant association 
between pool use and subsequent illness. 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Viruses 
May 2006 Wisconsin Norovirus 18 A total of 18 persons developed gastrointestinal illness after using a 
hotel swimming pool and spa; three patients’ stool specimens tested 
positive for norovirus. A case-control study showed a significant 
association between spa and/or pool use and illness. The pool had a 
high bather load, and an ill person had used the pool. Water testing 
records revealed inadequate disinfection during the time of suspected 
exposure. The hotel was advised to close the facilities and either 
hyperchlorinate or drain and refill them. 
Parasites 
June 2005 Florida Cryptosporidium spp. 47 This outbreak affected persons who played in or attended a youth 
sports tournament. Two teams with players who had gastrointestinal 
illness stayed in the same hotel. Although no pool water was tested for 
Cryptosporidium, swimming was the only risk factor significantly 
associated with illness. As a result of the investigation, the hotel was 
advised to keep daily maintenance logs for the swimming area. 
June 2005 New York C. hominis 2,307 An outbreak of gastrointestinal illness was traced to a water park with 
an interactive fountain. Stool samples for 495 of 572 people were 
positive for Cryptosporidium spp. Typing of 147 isolates identified 
them as C. hominis, indicating human contamination. The venue used 
chlorine and rapid sand filtration. Water samples collected from two 
tanks on three dates in mid-August contained C. hominis oocysts. 
C. hominis oocysts were also identified in a water filter and effluent 
from a sewer pump station. Polymerase chain-reaction tests were 
conducted on one water sample from each tank. The samples both 
contained 150 oocysts/L. Investigators determined that multiple factors 
contributed to the outbreak, including an inadequate recirculation 
design in which some water bypassed treatment and filtration as a 
result of the demand of the fountain. 
July 2005 Oregon C. parvum 20 A cohort study was conducted after two confirmed and 15 suspected 
cases of cryptosporidiosis were reported to a local health department. 
Gastrointestinal illness was epidemiologically linked with swimming in 
a pool at a membership club. A child with laboratory-confirmed 
cryptosporidiosis swam in the pool during the days that water 
contamination was suspected to have occurred. Control measures 
were quickly implemented and included hyperchlorination at the 
membership club pool, hyperchlorination of area public pools, and 
posting of signs at multiple pools to discourage swimming by ill 
individuals; prevention messages were disseminated by local media. 
July 2005 Massachusetts Giardia intestinalis 11 An outbreak at an athletic club implicated three outdoor pools (one 
adult pool and two children’s pools) with a shared filtration system. 
All 11 cases were laboratory confirmed. Although not observed, the 
occurrence of a fecal accident was strongly suspected. Records did 
not indicate that disinfectant levels were adjusted or that the pools 
were closed when chlorine readings were below recommended levels 
in early August. A water sample taken during the investigation 
revealed indicator bacteria (coliforms and E. coli) levels above 
allowable limits. 
July 2005 Oklahoma Naegleria fowleri 2 (2) Postmortem clinical specimens from two boys who died several days 
after they became ill indicated that they were infected with N. fowleri. 
Although both of the boys had spent time at a local water park before 
becoming ill, at least one child went swimming in untreated, stagnant 
water near his home before becoming ill. The boys’ homes were not 
far apart from each other. Water samples from a local creek and the 
water park’s spray deck were collected in July and August, respec­
tively. Testing of cultures from both locations did not detect N. fowleri. 
PCR testing of the creek water was also negative. Water testing 
revealed temperatures >95°F (35°C) at both locations. 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
August 2005 Ohio C. hominis 523 A large, communitywide cryptosporidiosis outbreak affected 747 
persons in Ohio. Recreational water exposure was associated with 
70% (523/747) of the cases. This outbreak was linked by time and 
proximity to a cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Kentucky. Six pools were 
implicated as a source of exposure to contaminated water. More than 
300 stool samples tested positive for Cryptosporidium. CDC per­
formed additional molecular characterization of the Cryptosporidium 
isolates from one pool filter sand sample from the water park and 
seven clinical stool specimens; the subtype of the isolates of six of the 
stool specimens matched the pool filter sample’s isolate. 
July 2006 California Cryptosporidium spp. 16 This outbreak was initially detected by a laboratory-based active 
cryptosporidiosis surveillance system. Some of the case-patients 
shared a common exposure at a public park with an interactive 
fountain. A 10 L sample from the fountain system contained 137 
oocysts/L and had a chlorine residual of 0.9 ppm. The fountain used a 
sand filtration system that was not designed to remove 
Cryptosporidium spp. and did not have an automated disinfection 
system. Similar public fountains in the area were closed if they had 
inadequate filtration and disinfection. Ill children were restricted from 
attending school and daycare to limit possible person-to-person 
transmission. 
July 2006 Illinois C. hominis 65 Attendees of a private day camp developed gastrointestinal illness that 
was epidemiologically linked to recreational swimming at a private day 
camp pool and at a public outdoor water park. A total of seven 
laboratory-confirmed cases and 58 probable cases were identified. 
PCR detected C. hominis in stool specimens from three patients. An 
inspection of the day camp pool revealed poor water quality, unsani­
tary pool facilities and an absence of policies intended to prevent 
disease transmission; however, Cryptosporidium was not detected in a 
sample of pool water. Pool water from the water park met state 
guidelines for water quality but tested positive for C. parvum. Fecal 
accidents were reported in both pools. All areas of the water park 
shared one filtration and treatment system; outbreak prevention 
recommendations for the water park included installation of ultraviolet 
(UV) disinfection, as well as education for the staff and the public. 
(Source: CDC. Cryptosporidiosis outbreaks associated with recre­
ational water use—five states, 2006. MMWR 2007; 56:729–32). 
August 2006 Colorado Cryptosporidium spp. 12 Certain persons developed cryptosporidiosis after attending a party at 
a community recreational center with a pool that had UV disinfection in 
addition to chlorination and rapid sand filtration. Swimming, swallowing 
water, and getting water in the mouth were significant risk factors. 
Pool use by diaper-aged children and the use of combined filtration 
systems for the adult and child pools were suspected to have been 
contributing factors in the outbreak. (Source: CDC. Cryptosporidiosis 
outbreaks associated with recreational water use—five states, 2006. 
MMWR 2007;56:729–32). 
Chemicals/Toxins 
June 2005 Michigan Copper sulfate 3 A local resident treated a state lake with copper sulfate to prevent 
swimmer’s itch by controlling snail populations. The pesticide was 
applied without a permit; the quantity was 30 times the label-
recommended amount for algae treatment and three times the label-
recommended amount for snail control. Subsequently, three children 
who spent time near or in the lake developed respiratory symptoms, 
and one was hospitalized. A water test conducted within 1–2 months 
of the pesticide application did not find hazardous levels of copper 
sulfate in the water. 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
July 2005 Ohio Chlorine gas 19 A chlorine surge at a community pool caused illness in 19 persons. 
The majority of swimmers were children. The predominant symptoms 
were breathing difficulties, cough, sore throat, and eye irritation. The 
recirculation pump failed, but chemical feed pumps continued to feed 
chlorine and acid. When the mechanical pump was restarted, a 
concentrated surge of chlorine gas created by the mixing of the 
concentrated hypochlorous acid and chlorine was introduced into the 
pool. The facility responded to the event by installing an electrical 
interlock that would automatically stop the flow of chemicals if the 
recirculation pump failed. 
Unidentified 
April 2005 Minnesota Suspected chloramines 20 A case-control study was conducted after reports of respiratory and 
ocular symptoms among attendees at a birthday party at a hotel pool. 
Multiple other symptoms were documented, including burning nose 
and throat, nausea, and headache; 12 case-patients sought medical 
care within 1 day of attending the party. Water contact and entering 
the pool enclosure were significantly associated with illness. The 
outbreak investigation determined that the chlorine levels in the pool 
might not have been properly maintained, record-keeping was 
inadequate, showering facilities in the pool area were inadequate, no 
pool operator was on duty, and official bather load was exceeded for 
the pool during the party. 
July 2005 Florida Suspected jellyfish larvae 24 Attendees of a conference reported symptoms such as fever, fatigue, 
headache, chills, and muscle ache. Illness was significantly associ­
ated with swimming in the ocean and chlorinated resort pools. No 
clinical specimens were collected because symptoms had resolved 
before the investigation was initiated. Multiple symptoms were 
consistent with exposure to toxins released by minute jellyfish larvae 
(seabather’s eruption). Although weather patterns at the time, as well 
as the month of the outbreak, supported the hypothesis of seabather’s 
eruption, investigators concluded that certain illnesses might have 
occurred as a result of other etiologies. Interview data described poor 
pool water quality and high bather loads. An inspection of the pool 
facilities was conducted as part of the investigation and led to pool 
closure. 
June 2006 Illinois Suspected low pH 9 Swimmers from two classes at a neighborhood swimming pool had 
burning rashes on their bodies after they left the pool. The swimmers 
were ages 4–8 years. The instructor, who was in the water for a total 
of 80 minutes, reported a similar rash on his arms. Testing indicated 
that the pool water had a low pH. The exact pH could not be deter­
mined; the lower limit for the test strip was seven. The problem was 
traced back to the automatic sensing unit for feeding acid, which was 
not working correctly. 
December 2006 Nebraska Suspected chloramines 24 A child attending a family event at a motel swam for 3 hours in the 
indoor pool, during which time he developed respiratory symptoms. He 
was hospitalized overnight with severe chemical epiglottitis and 
laryngotracheobronchitis. A follow-up investigation identified 24 case-
patients who had developed ocular and/or respiratory symptoms after 
being in or near the pool. The state health department inspected the 
pool and closed it as a result of multiple state health code violations. 
Pool water pH was 3.95 (acceptable range: 7.2–7.8); the free chlorine 
level was 0.8 ppm (acceptable range: 2–10 ppm) and the combined 
chlorine level was 4.2 ppm (acceptable limit: <0.5 ppm). Pool records 
indicated that water quality violations had occurred frequently during a 
26-day period before the outbreak. Chloramine levels might have been 
higher on the day that the child became ill because of inadequate 
ventilation; the only ceiling exhaust fan was turned off, and all of the 
nearby windows were closed. Although the motel was licensed by the 
state of Nebraska, it was a nonmunicipal public pool and, therefore, 
pool operators were not required to undergo training and certification. 
(Source: CDC. Ocular and respiratory illness associated with an 
indoor swimming pool—Nebraska, 2006. MMWR 2007;56:929–32). 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Vibrio infections 
August 2005 Louisiana Vibrio vulnificus 1 (1) A man aged 60 years waded for 3 days in flood waters after Hurricane 
Katrina in New Orleans, Louisiana, and arrived in Texas during the 
end of August 2005. His medical history included stroke, hypertension, 
and alcohol abuse. The day after he arrived in Texas, he went to an 
emergency department; he had ankle wounds and diarrhea. He was 
released after treatment but was admitted to the hospital 1 day later 
when Vibrio vulnificus was positively identified from a blood culture. 
He died in the hospital the next day. (Source: CDC. Vibrio illnesses 
after Hurricane Katrina—multiple states, August–September 2005. 
MMWR 2005;54:928–31). 
August 2005 Mississippi V. parahaemolyticus 1 (1) A man aged 61 years died shortly after seeking medical treatment for 
V. parahaemolyticus infection; he had hypothermia and multiple 
second-and third–degree abrasions on his body after exposure to 
Hurricane Katrina flood waters. The patient was also known to have 
human immunodeficiency virus infection, coronary artery disease, and 
hyperlipidemia. (Source: CDC. Vibrio illnesses after Hurricane 
Katrina—multiple states, August–September 2005. MMWR 
2005;54:928–31). 
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Abstract 
Problem/Condition: Since 1971, CDC, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Council of State 
and Territorial Epidemiologists have maintained a collaborative Waterborne Disease and Outbreak Surveillance Sys­
tem (WBDOSS) for collecting and reporting data related to occurrences and causes of waterborne-disease outbreaks 
(WBDOs) and cases of waterborne disease. This surveillance system is the primary source of data concerning the scope 
and effects of waterborne disease in the United States. 
Reporting Period: Data presented summarize 28 WBDOs that occurred during January 2005–December 2006 and 
four previously unreported WBDOs that occurred during 1979–2002. 
Description of System: The surveillance system includes data on WBDOs associated with recreational water, drinking 
water, water not intended for drinking (WNID) (excluding recreational water), and water use of unknown intent. 
Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, and Freely Associated States (FAS) (i.e., the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau, formerly parts of the U.S.-admin­
istered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) are primarily responsible for detecting and investigating WBDOs and 
voluntarily reporting them to CDC by a standard form. Only cases and outbreaks associated with drinking water, 
WNID (excluding recreational water), and water of unknown intent (WUI) are summarized in this report. Cases and 
outbreaks associated with recreational water are reported in a separate Surveillance Summary. 
Results: Fourteen states reported 28 WBDOs that occurred during 2005–2006: a total of 20 were associated with 
drinking water, six were associated with WNID, and two were associated with WUI. The 20 drinking water-associated 
WBDOs caused illness among an estimated 612 persons and were linked to four deaths. Etiologic agents were identi­
fied in 18 (90.0%) of the drinking water-associated WBDOs. 
Among the 18 WBDOs with identified pathogens, 12 (66.7%) were associated with bacteria, three (16.7%) with 
viruses, two (11.1%) with parasites, and one (5.6%) mixed WBDO with both bacteria and viruses. In both WBDOs 
where the etiology was not determined, norovirus was the suspected etiology. 
Of the 20 drinking water WBDOs, 10 (50) were outbreaks of acute respiratory illness (ARI), nine (45%) were 
outbreaks of acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI), and one (5.0%) was an outbreak of hepatitis. All WBDOs of ARI 
were caused by Legionella, and this is the first reporting 
period in which the proportion of ARI WBDOs has sur-
Corresponding author: Jonathan S. Yoder, MSW, MPH, Division of Parasitic passed that of AGI WBDOs since the reporting of Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases,
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A total of 23 deficiencies were cited in the 20 WBDOs associated with drinking water: 12 (52.2%) deficiencies fell 
under the classification NWU/POU (deficiencies occurred at points not under the jurisdiction of a water utility or at 
the point-of-use), 10 (43.5%) deficiencies fell under the classification SWTDs (contamination at or in the source 
water, treatment facility, or distribution system), and for one (4.3%) deficiency, classification was unknown. Among 
the 12 NWU/POU deficiencies, 10 (83.3%) involved Legionella spp. in the drinking water system. The most fre­
quently cited SWTD deficiencies were associated with a treatment deficiency (n = four [40.0%]) and untreated ground 
water (n = four [40.0%]). Three of the four WBDOs with treatment deficiencies used ground water sources. 
Interpretation: Approximately half (52.2%) of the drinking water deficiencies occurred outside the jurisdiction of a 
water utility. The majority of these WBDOs were associated with Legionella spp, which suggests that increased atten­
tion should be targeted towards reducing illness risks associated with Legionella spp. Nearly all of WBDOs associated 
with SWTD deficiencies occurred in systems using ground water. EPA’s new Ground Water Rule might prevent similar 
outbreaks in the future in public water systems. 
Public Health Actions: CDC and EPA use surveillance data to identify the types of water systems, deficiencies, and 
etiologic agents associated with WBDOs and to evaluate the adequacy of current technologies and practices for provid­
ing safe drinking water. Surveillance data also are used to establish research priorities, which can lead to improved 
water-quality regulation development. The majority of drinking water deficiencies are now associated with contamina­
tion at points outside the jurisdiction of public water systems (e.g., regrowth of Legionella spp. in hot water systems) 
and water contamination that might not be regulated by EPA (e.g., contamination of tap water at the POU). Improved 
education of consumers and plumbers might help address these risk factors. 
Introduction	 
Statistical data on waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) 
in the United States have been collected since 1920. Researchers 
reported these statistics during 1920–36 (1), 1938–1945 (2),
 
1946–1960 (3), and 1961–1970 (4). Since 1971, CDC, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Coun-
cil of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) have main-
tained a collaborative Waterborne Disease and Outbreak 
Surveillance System (WBDOSS), which tracks the occurrences 
and causes of WBDOs and cases of disease associated with 
drinking water. The history of WBDO surveillance in the 
United States is summarized in the 2003–2004 WBDOSS 
Surveillance Summary (5). The 2005–2006 Surveillance Sum-
mary presents data on 28 WBDOs reported by public health 
departments in the states, territories, and localities that 
occurred during January 2005–December 2006, and four pre-
viously unreported WBDOs that occurred during 1979–2002. 
However, the statistics in this report represent only a portion 
of the burden of illness associated with water exposure. They 
do not include endemic waterborne-disease cases (sporadic 
cases not known to be associated with a WBDO), WBDOs 
associated with recreational water use, or reliable estimates of 
the number of unrecognized WBDOs.	 
Background 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
Drinking Water Regulations 
The majority of WBDOs reported in this Surveillance
 
Summary occurred in public drinking water systems. The Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and its subsequent 1986 
and 1996 amendments (Table 1) authorize EPA to set 
national standards to protect public drinking water and its 
sources against naturally occurring or man-made contaminants 
(6–8). EPA has set health-based standards for approximately 
90 chemical, microbiologic, radiologic, and physical contami-
nants in drinking water. Standards include a maximum con­
taminant level* (amount of a contaminant allowed in water 
delivered to the consumer) or treatment technique (required 
procedure or level of technological performance) that apply 
to systems providing water to at least 15 service connections 
or 25 persons for at least 60 days in a year (Public Water Sys­
tems). EPA also has recommended guidelines (Secondary 
Drinking Water Regulations), for water contaminants that 
primarily affect the aesthetic qualities of drinking water (e.g., 
taste, odor, and staining of laundry) that states may choose to 
adopt and enforce. EPA regulations and guidelines do not 
apply to private, individual water supplies (Figure 1); how­
ever, certain states set standards for individual water supplies. 
* Additional terms have been defined (Appendix A, Glossary of Definitions). 
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TABLE 1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations 
regarding drinking water, by year enacted — United States, 
1974–2006 
Regulation Year 
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 1974 
Interim Primary Drinking Water Standards 1975 
National Primary Drinking Water Standards 1985 
SDWA Amendments 1986 
Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) 1989 
Total Coliform Rule 1989 
Lead and Copper Regulations 1990 
SDWA Amendments 1996 
Information Collection Rule 1996 
Interim Enhanced SWTR 1998 
Disinfectants and Disinfection By-Products (D-DBPs) Regulation 1998 
Contaminant Candidate List 1998 
Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulations 1999 
Lead and Copper Rule — action levels 2000 
Filter Backwash Recycling Rule 2001 
Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR 2002 
Unregulated Contaminant Monitoring Regulations 2002 
Drinking Water Contaminant Candidate List 2 2005 
Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR 2006 
Stage 2 D-DBP Rule 2006 
Ground Water Rule 2006 
Public and individual water system types and subtypes have 
been defined (Appendix A, Glossary of Definitions). 
Standards by which microbial contamination is regulated 
include the Total Coliform Rule (TCR) (9,10), Ground 
Water Rule (GWR) (11,12), Wellhead Protection Program 
(11), Surface Water Treatment Rule (SWTR) (13), Interim 
Enhanced SWTR (14), Long Term 1 Enhanced SWTR (15), 
Long Term 2 Enhanced SWTR (16–18), Stage 2 Disinfec­
tants and Disinfection By-products Rule (16, 17), and Filter 
Backwash Recycling Rule (19). EPA’s lead, copper, and 
arsenic rules prescribe action levels at which a system operator 
must take corrective steps (20,21). In addition, EPA is 
required to publish periodically a list of contaminants that 
might need to be regulated (22,23) and establish criteria for a 
program to monitor unregulated contaminants (24–27). EPA 
decides whether or not to regulate contaminants on the list 
based on projected adverse health effects from the contami­
nant, an assessment of the extent of occurrence of the con­
taminant in drinking water, and the potential for reducing 
risks to health. Instead of a regulation, EPA can issue guid­
ance or a health advisory. All of these requirements have been 
described in previous Surveillance Summaries (5,28). In 2007, 
EPA established an advisory committee to provide recommen­
dations on revisions to the TCR and on information needed 
to better understand the public health risks associated with 
the degradation of water quality in pipes, storage tanks, and 




Public health departments in the states, territories, localities, 
and FAS have primary responsibility for detecting and investi­
gating WBDOs, which they report voluntarily to CDC using a 
standard form (CDC form 52.12, available at http://www. 
cdc.gov/hea l thyswimming/downloads/cdc_5212_ 
waterborne.pdf ). The form solicits data on characteristics of 
WBDO (e.g., number of cases, time, and location); results 
from epidemiologic studies; results from clinical specimen and 
water sample testing; and other factors potentially contribut­
ing to WBDO (e.g., environmental conditions, disinfection 
deficiencies, and filtration problems). CDC annually requests 
reports of WBDOs and single cases of certain waterborne dis­
eases, as specified in the definitions in the next section, from 
state, territorial, and FAS epidemiologists or persons desig­
nated as WBDO surveillance coordinators and obtains addi­
tional information regarding water quality and water treatment 
as needed. In certain instances, information on WBDOs and 
cases is solicited from other CDC surveillance systems and 
confirmed with the state or locality for inclusion in WBDOSS 
and/or Surveillance Summary, which is illustrated in more 
detail in a separate Surveillance Summary (30). Numerical and 
text data are abstracted from WBDO report form and sup­
porting documents and entered into a database for analysis. 
Although reports of WBDOs are collected through WBDOSS, 
the cases and outbreaks associated with drinking water, water 
not intended for drinking (WNID), and water of unknown 
intent (WUI) are analyzed and published separately from the 
cases and outbreaks associated with recreational water (30). 
Definitions 
WBDOSS collects data on both outbreaks and individual 
cases of waterborne disease. Two criteria must be met for an 
event to be defined as a waterborne-disease outbreak associ­
ated with drinking water, WNID (excluding recreational 
water), or WUI. First, two or more persons must be epide­
miologically linked by location of exposure to water, and by 
time, and characteristics of illness. Second, the epidemiologic 
evidence must implicate water as the probable source of illness. 
In addition to WBDOs, single cases of laboratory-confirmed 
primary amebic meningoencephalitis (PAM) as a result of 
Naegleria fowleri infection with a known water exposure and single 
cases of chemical/toxin poisoning, if water-quality data indicate 
contamination by the chemical/toxin, are also reported in 
WBDOSS. All single cases are discussed separately from WBDOs. 
Single cases of legionellosis are reported elsewhere (31). 
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FIGURE 1. Types of drinking water systems — United States 
Drinking Water Systems 
Public Water Systems 
Public or private ownership 
(subject to EPA* regulations) 
Individual Water Systems 
(if regulated, state or local regulations) 
Noncommunity Community Use of nonpublic sources 
Transient (e.g., gas stations, parks, resorts, 
campgrounds, restaurants, and motels 
with their own water systems) 
Nontransient (e.g., schools, factories, 
office buildings, and hospitals 
with their own water systems) 
Privately owned home or farm wells, 
springs, or surface water sources 
Streams, ponds, or shallow wells 
not intended for drinking 
Bottled water (commercially bottled water is 
regulated by FDA† ; persons might also 
fill their own containers) § 
* U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
†Food and Drug Administration.
 
§ In certain instances, bottled water is used in lieu of a community supply or by noncommunity systems.
 
Reported outbreaks associated with contaminated drinking 
water; commercially bottled water, ice, or beverages made with 
contaminated water; and water contaminated by malfunctions 
in equipment/devices in which water is used or distributed 
(e.g., beverages contaminated by plumbing failures in drink 
mix/soda machines) are classified as WBDOs. Tabulation of 
WBDOs is based on location of water exposure, not on state 
of residence of the ill persons. WBDOs associated with cruise 
ships are not summarized in this report. 
Of the approximately 155,693 public water systems in the 
United States, 52,110 (33.5%) are community systems and 
103,583 (66.5%) are noncommunity systems, including 
84,744 transient systems and 18,839 nontransient systems. 
Community systems serve 286.5 million persons, and only 
8% of these systems provide water to 82% of the U.S. popu­
lation through large municipal water systems (32). Noncom­
munity, nontransient systems provide water to 6.3 million 
persons, and noncommunity, transient systems provide water 
to 13.8 million persons (by definition, these populations also 
use another type of water system at their residences, except for 
the limited number of permanent residents of nontransient sys­
tems) (32). Although the majority of public water systems (91%) 
are supplied by ground water, more persons (68%) are supplied 
year-round by community water systems that use surface water 
(32). Approximately 15.0% of the U.S. population relies on 
individual water systems that are privately owned (33). 
WBDOs associated with commercially bottled water are 
classified separately from the water systems described in this 
Surveillance Summary. Separating piped from nonpiped water 
distinguishes between drinking water systems regulated by EPA 
(community and noncommunity) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) (bottled). 
The purpose of WBDOSS is not only to evaluate the rela­
tion between water and reported disease outbreaks and cases, 
but also to identify system breakdowns, operator errors, other 
engineering-related activities, and environmental situations 
that lead to outbreaks. To understand the circumstances and 
system breakdowns that lead to illness, each WBDO is classi­
fied as having one or more deficiencies (Table 2). 
Waterborne Disease and Outbreak 
Strength of Evidence Classification 
All WBDOs reported to the surveillance system have been 
classified according to the strength of the evidence implicat­
ing water as the vehicle of transmission (Table 3). The classi­
fication scheme (i.e., Classes I–IV) is based on the 
epidemiologic and water-quality data provided with WBDO 
report form. Although WBDOs without water-quality data 
were included in this report, reports that lacked epidemio­
logic data, linking the outbreak to water, have been excluded. 
A classification of I indicates that adequate epidemiologic 
and water-quality data were reported. However, this classifi­
cation does not necessarily imply that the investigation was 
conducted optimally nor does a classification of II, III, or IV 
imply that the investigation was inadequate or incomplete. 
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TABLE 2. Deficiency classification for drinking water, water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water), and water of 
unknown intent 
Deficiency 
Contamination of water at/in the water source, treatment facility, or distribution system (SWTD)* 
1: Untreated surface water intended for drinking 
2: Untreated ground water intended for drinking 
3: Treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, inadequate or no filtration) 
4: Distribution system deficiency, including storage (e.g., cross-connection, backflow, contamination of water mains during construction or repair) 
13: Current treatment processes not expected to remove a chemical contaminant (e.g., pesticide contamination of groundwater treated with disinfection only) 
A: Surface water 
B: Ground water 
Contamination of water at points not under the jurisdiction of a water utility or at the point of use (NWU/POU)† 
5: Legionella spp. in water system 
A: Water intended for drinking 
B: Water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water) 
C:Water of unknown intent 
6: Plumbing system deficiency after the water meter or property line (e.g., cross-connection, backflow, corrosion products) 
7: Deficiency in building/home-specific water treatment after the water meter or property line 
8: Deficiency or contamination of equipment using or distributing water (e.g., drink-mix machines) 
9: Contamination or treatment deficiency during commercial bottling 
10: Contamination during shipping, hauling, or storage 
A: Water intended for drinking – Tap water 
B: Water intended for drinking – Commercially bottled water 
11: Contamination at point-of-use 
A: Tap 
B: Hose 
C:Commercially bottled water 
D:Container, bottle, or pitcher 
E: Unknown 
12: Drinking or contact with water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water) 
Unknown/Insufficient Information 
99: Unknown/Insufficient information 
A: Water intended for drinking – Tap water 
B: Water intended for drinking – Commercially bottled water 
C:Water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water) 
D:Water of unknown intent 
* Contamination of water and deficiencies occurring in the drinking water system at/in the water source, treatment facility, or distribution system of pipes 
and storage facilities. For a community water system, the distribution system refers to the pipes and storage infrastructure under the jurisdiction of the 
water utility before the water meter or property line (if the system is not metered). For noncommunity and nonpublic individual water systems, the 
distribution system refers to the pipes and storage infrastructure before entry into a building or house (e.g., in a service line leading to a house or 
building). 
†Contamination of drinking water and deficiencies occurring in plumbing and pipes that are not part of the distribution system or at other points outside 
the jurisdiction of a water utility. For community systems, this means after the water meter or property line (if the system is not metered), and for 
noncommunity and nonpublic systems, this means within the building or house (e.g., in the plumbing inside a house or building). This category also 
includes contamination during shipping or hauling, during storage other than in the distribution system, and at point-of-use). 
WBDOs and their resulting investigations occur under dif- Deficiencies 
ferent circumstances, and not all WBDOs can be rigorously One deficiency, 13, has been added to the deficiency classifi­
investigated. In addition, WBDOs that affect few persons are cation table (Table 2). This deficiency will allow for the classifi­
more likely to receive a classification of III or IV because of cation of chemical contamination of source water when the 
the limited sample size available for epidemiologic analysis. existing treatment provided for the system is not designed to 
remove that chemical contamination. WBDOs associated with 
Changes in the 2005–2006 Surveillance chemical contamination of untreated source water will 
Summary continue to be reported under deficiencies 1 or 2 as appropriate. 
Definitions and deficiencies in this report have been modified to Definition 
better reflect the epidemiology of WBDOs and capture the scope The definition of a waterborne disease outbreak (WBDO) 
of water-related disease. This section highlights those changes. has been modified to include only water exposure in which 
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TABLE 3. Classification of investigations of waterborne disease and outbreaks based on strength of evidence implicating water 
as a vehicle of transmission — United States, 2005–2006 
Class Epidemiologic data Water-quality data 
I Adequate Provided and adequate 
Data provided concerning exposed and unexposed persons, Laboratory data or historical information (e.g., reports of a 
with relative risk or odds ratio >2 or p<0.05 chlorinator malfunction, a water main break, no detectable 
free-chlorine residual, or the presence of coliforms in the water) 
II Adequate Not provided or inadequate (e.g., laboratory testing of water not
 conducted and no historical information) 
III Provided but limited Provided and adequate 
Epidemiologic data provided that did not meet the criteria for 
Class I, or claim made that ill persons had no exposures in 
common besides water but no data provided 
IV Provided but limited Not provided or inadequate 
illnesses caused by exposure to chemically-contaminated 
water will continue to be included in WBDOSS but will not 
be classified or analyzed as outbreaks. This change will pro­
vide a consistent outbreak definition of two or more persons 
epidemiologically linked by location of exposure to water, and 
by time, and characteristics of illness. 
Results 
During 2005–2006, a total of 14 states reported 28 WBDOs 
(i.e., 13 for 2005 and 15 for 2006). These WBDOs were 
associated with drinking water (n = 20), WNID (n = six), and 
WUI (n = two) and are tabulated by year and state (Tables 
4–6). Four previously unreported WBDOs that occurred dur­
ing 1979–2002 also were reported (Table 7). 
Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks 
Associated with Drinking Water 
The 20 drinking water-associated WBDOs (i.e., eight in 
2005 and 12 in 2006) were reported by 11 states (Figure 2). 
Multiple etiologic agents were implicated (Figure 3), and 
WBDOs occurred throughout the year (Figure 4). Selected 
descriptions of WBDOs are presented (Appendix B). 
The 20 drinking water-associated WBDOs reported dur­
ing 2005–2006 caused illness among at least 612 persons and 
resulted in four deaths. The median number of persons 
affected in a WBDO was 10 (range: two–148). One WBDO 
was associated with hepatitis A. The remaining WBDOs were 
associated with either acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI) or 
acute respiratory illness (ARI). All ARI outbreaks were associ­
ated with exposure to Legionella spp. (Figure 5). 
Four (20.0%) of the 20 drinking water-associated WBDOs 
were given a strength of evidence Class I ranking on the basis 
of epidemiologic and water-quality data; two (10.0%) were 
ranked as Class II; 13 (65.0%) were ranked as Class III; 
and one (5.0%) was ranked as Class IV. Drinking water-
associated WBDOs are tabulated by etiologic agent and type 
of water system (Table 8), etiologic agent and type of water 
source (Table 9), type of deficiency and type of water system 
(Table 10), type of deficiency and type of water source 
(Table 11), predominant illness and type of water system 
(Table 12), and predominant illness and type of water source 
(Table 13). WBDOs were included (Tables 8–13) only if the 
type of deficiency might be relevant in the cause of WBDO 
(e.g., understanding the source of raw untreated water is 
unlikely to be important for a legionellosis outbreak associ­
ated with a building plumbing system). 
Etiologic Agents 
Of the 20 drinking water-associated WBDOs, 12 (60.0%) 
were caused by bacteria, three (15.0%) were caused by 
viruses, two (10.0%) were caused by parasites, and one (5.0%) 
was caused by more than one etiologic agent type. Two (10.0%) 
were of unknown etiology (Figure 6). 
Bacteria. Twelve WBDOs affecting 135 persons were 
attributed to bacterial infections: 10 outbreaks caused by 
Legionella; one outbreak caused by Campylobacter; and one 
outbreak (Oregon, 2005) in which persons had multiple stool 
specimens that tested positive for C. jejuni, Escherichia 
O157:H7, and E. coli O145. Illnesses from these 12 WBDOs 
resulted in four deaths, all of which were associated with 
Legionella spp. 
Viruses. Three WBDOs affecting 212 persons were attrib­
uted to viral infections: two outbreaks caused by norovirus 
G1, and one outbreak caused by hepatitis A. No deaths were 
reported. 
Parasites. Two WBDOs affecting 51 persons were attrib­
uted to parasites: one outbreak caused by Giardia intestinalis 
and one outbreak caused by Cryptosporidium. No deaths were 
reported. 
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TABLE 4. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water (n = eight), by state — United States, 2005 
State Month Class Etiologic agent 
Predominant 
illness* 
No. of cases 
(deaths)† 
(n = 180) 
Type of 
system§  Deficiency¶ 
Water 




























L. pneumophila serogroup 6 
L. pneumophila serogroup 6 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
Unidentified§§ 
Escherichia coli O157:H7 
Campylobacter jejuni, 
and E. coli O145*** 



















































* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and ARI: acute respiratory illness. 
† Deaths are indicated in parentheses if they occurred. 
§ Com: community; and Ncom: noncommunity. Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 service connec­
tions or serve an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or 
mobile home park. A noncommunity water system serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient or transient. 
Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas transient 
systems provide water to places in which persons do not remain for long periods (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Individual water 
systems are small systems not owned or operated by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
¶ Deficiency classification for drinking water, water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water), and water of unknown intent (see Table 2). 
** Senior Housing center is served by a community system with a ground water source; however, case-patients traveled together to other cities where 
exposure might have occurred. 
†† Transmission of Legionella thought to be a result of building-specific factors and not related to water source. 
§§ Etiology unidentified; norovirus suspected based upon incubation period, symptoms, and duration of illness. 
¶¶ Private residence was licensed to serve food. 
*** Nine persons had stool specimens that tested positive for E. coli O157:H7, three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for C. jejuni, two 
persons had stool specimens that tested positive for E. coli O145, and three persons had stool specimens that tested positive for both E. coli O157:H7 
and C. jejuni. 
Mixed agent types. One WBDO was attributed to more 
than one type of etiologic agent; no deaths were reported. 
This outbreak affected 139 persons and involved two viruses 
(norovirus G1 and norovirus G2) and one bacterium 
(C. jejuni) (34). 
Unidentified etiologic agents. Two WBDOs involving AGI 
of unidentified etiology affected 75 persons; no deaths were 
reported. No viral testing was attempted in one of the out-
breaks (Ohio 2005). In the other outbreak (New York 2006), 
norovirus, enterovirus, and rotavirus were isolated from 
water samples. In both of the outbreaks, norovirus was the 
suspected etiology on the basis of incubation period, symp­
toms, and duration of illness. 
Deficiencies 
Twenty-three deficiencies were cited in the 20 drinking 
water-associated WBDOs. Ten (43.5%) deficiencies involved 
the source water, treatment facility, or distribution system 
(SWTD) and 12 (52.2%) deficiencies occurred at points not 
under the jurisdiction of a water utility or at the point-of-use 
(NWU/POU). One WBDO (4.3%) had an unknown defi­
ciency (Figure 7; Table 14). 
Deficiencies 1–4 and 13: Contamination 
of Water at/in the Water Source, Treatment 
Facility, or Distribution System 
Eight WBDOs were given a deficiency classification of 
1–4. Three (37.5%) of these WBDOs were associated with 
viruses, two (25.0%) were associated with bacteria, two 
(25.0%) were associated with unidentified etiologic agents, 
and one (12.5%) was associated with mixed agent types. 
Water-quality data. All eight WBDOs with a deficiency 
classification of 1–4 had water-quality data (e.g., laboratory 
data regarding the presence of coliform bacteria, pathogens, 
or chemical/toxin contaminants; or historical data [e.g., lev-
els of disinfectants]). Positive total or fecal coliform results 
from the implicated water were reported for four (66.7%) of 
the six WBDOs with confirmed infectious etiologies. In two 
WBDOs caused by norovirus G1 and hepatitis A virus, the 
implicated pathogens were isolated from water in addition to 
fecal coliforms and E. coli.
Water systems. Five (62.5%) of eight WBDOs with defi­
ciencies 1–4 involved noncommunity water systems, two
(25.0%) involved individual water systems, and one (12.5%) 
involved a community water system (Tables 8, 10, and 12; 
Figure 6). Among the five outbreaks involving noncommu­
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TABLE 5. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water (n = 12), by state — United States, 2006 
State Month Class Etiologic agent 
Predominant 
illness* 
No. of cases 
(deaths)† 














































L. pneumophila serogroup 3 
Cryptosporidium 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
Norovirus G1 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
L. pneumophila†† 











































































* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; and Hep: viral hepatitis. 
† Deaths are indicated in parentheses if they occurred. 
§ Com: community; Ncom: noncommunity; and Ind: individual. Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 
service connections or serve an average of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, 
subdivision, or mobile home park. A noncommunity water system serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient 
or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas 
transient systems provide water to places in which persons do not remain for long periods (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Indi­
vidual water systems are small systems not owned or operated by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
¶ Deficiency classification for drinking water, water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water), and water of unknown intent (see Table 2). 
** Etiology unidentified; norovirus suspected based upon incubation period, symptoms, and duration of illness. Norovirus, enterovirus, and rotavirus were 
isolated from the well. 
†† Environmental testing detected L. pneumophila serogroup 1, L. pneumophila other than serogroup 1, and non-pneumophila Legionella species.
 
§§ Transmission of Legionella thought to be as a result of building-specific factors and not related to water source.
 
¶¶ Eight persons had stool specimens that tested positive for norovirus G1, six persons had stool specimens that tested positive for C. jejuni, and three
 
persons had stool specimens that tested positive for norovirus G2. Source: CDC. Gastroenteritis among attendees at a summer camp—Wyoming, 
June–July 2006. MMWR 2007;56:368–70. 
TABLE 6. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with water not intended for drinking (WNID) (excluding recreational water) 





Year Class Etiologic agent 
Predominant 
illness* 
No. of cases 
(deaths)† 







































 serogroup 1 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1¶ 











































* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and ARI: acute respiratory illness. 
† Deaths are indicated in parentheses if they occurred.
 
§ Deficiency classification for drinking water, water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water), and water of unknown intent (see Table 2).
 
¶ Source: O’Loughlin RE, Kightlinger L, Werpy MC, et al. Restaurant outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease associated with a decorative fountain: an
 
environmental and case control study. BMC Infect Dis 2007; 7:93. 
** Illnesses were associated with attendance at a tennis camp and swimming in an outdoor pool at the camp. Fecal contamination was detected in 
nonpotable well water delivered to outdoor faucets located at multiple locations around the tennis courts. Faucets were intended for irrigation, but no 
signs were posted to warn the public about nonpotable water. 
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TABLE 7. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water (DW) and water not intended for drinking (WNID) that 
were not included in previous Surveillance Summaries (n = four), by state— United States, 1979–2002 
No. of cases 
Water Month/ Predominant (deaths)† Type of Water 
State type Year Class Etiologic agent illness* (n = 126) system§ Deficiency¶ source Setting 
Louisiana WNID May 2002 III Pseudomonas aeruginosa** Skin 27 Not applicable 12 Unknown Factory 
Minnesota DW Jun 1979 IV Detergent AGI 2 Unknown 11D Unknown Golf course 
Tennessee DW Oct 1988 III Unidentified AGI 89 Ncom 3 Creek Restaurant 
Tennessee DW Sep 1995 III Hepatitis A Hep 8 Ind 2 Well, spring Private 
residences 
* Skin: illness, condition, or symptom related to skin; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and Hep: viral hepatitis.
† Deaths are indicated in parentheses if they occurred. 
§ Ncom: noncommunity. Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 service connections or serve an average 
of >25 residents for >60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park. A 
noncommunity water system serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems 
serve >25 of the same persons for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas transient systems provide water to 
places in which persons do not remain for long periods of time (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Individual water systems are small 
systems not owned or operated by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
¶ Deficiency classification for drinking water, water not intended for drinking (excluding recreational water), and water of unknown intent (see Table 2). 
** Source: Hewitt DJ, Weeks DA, Millner GC, Huss RG. Industrial Pseudomonas folliculitis. Am J Ind Med 2006;49:895–9. 
FIGURE 2. Number* of waterborne-disease outbreaks 










* n = 20; numbers are dependent on reporting and surveillance activities 
in individual states and do not necessarily indicate that more outbreaks 
occurred in a given state. 
nity water systems, two (40.0%) were associated with untreated 
ground water, two (40.0%) were associated with a treatment 
deficiency, and one (20.0%) was associated with both a treat­
ment deficiency and a distribution system deficiency. Among 
the two outbreaks involving individual water systems, both 
were associated with contaminated, untreated ground water. 
The one outbreak involving a community water system was 
associated with both a treatment deficiency and a distribution 
system deficiency (Table 10). 
Water sources. Seven (87.5%) of the eight WBDOs with 
deficiencies 1–3 were associated with ground water sources 
involving wells, and one (12.5%) WBDO was associated with 
surface water derived from a river (Table 9). Among the seven 
outbreaks related to ground water sources, four (57.1%) were 
associated with treatment deficiencies, either inadequate or 
interrupted chlorination as the only treatment provided, and 
three (42.9%) were associated with consumption of untreated, 
contaminated ground water, (Tables 9, 11, and 13; Figure 6). 
The surface water outbreak occurred during a period of heavy 
rainfall in a noncommunity system that provided inadequate 
filtration and disinfection. 
Deficiencies 5A, 6–11: Contamination of Water 
at Points Not Under the Jurisdiction of a 
Water Utility or at the Point-of-Use 
Twelve WBDOs were given a deficiency classification of 5A 
or 6–11. Ten (83.3%) of these WBDOs were associated with 
Legionella spp., one (8.3%) was associated with Giardia, and 
one (8.3%) was associated with norovirus G1 (Tables 4 and 5). 
Water-quality data. Water-quality data indicating a prob­
lem with the drinking water were available for 10 (83.3%) of 
the 12 WBDOs with an NWU/POU deficiency. Legionella 
spp. were isolated from the implicated water sampled in nine 
(90.0%) of 10 legionellosis outbreaks. Water testing in the 
norovirus outbreak detected norovirus in the storage tank 
(Maryland, 2006). No water was tested in the giardiasis out­
break; the outbreak was confirmed by clinical testing results. 
Deficiency 5A: Legionella in drinking water. All 10 of the 
drinking water-associated legionellosis WBDOs occurred in 
residential buildings, hotels, or in institutional settings and 
were related to the multiplication of Legionella spp. in the 
building plumbing systems. The majority of cases of 
legionellosis were diagnosed by urinary antigen testing, which 
is specific for L. pneumophila serogroup 1 (35). 
Deficiencies 6–11. Two WBDOs were associated with de­
ficiencies 6–11. In one outbreak (California, July 2005), per­
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sons ill with giardiasis had used a water 
dispenser at a gym. The water dispenser 
had been removed at the time of the 
public health investigation and could 
not be tested; however, point-of-use 
contamination of the dispenser spout 
seemed the most likely cause of the out­
break. The second outbreak with a 
POU deficiency (Maryland, 2006) also 
had SWTD deficiencies 3 and 4. 
Deficiency 99A–B: Unknown/ 
Insufficient Information 
Concerning Contamination 
of Tap Water 
The deficiency involved in one 
(5.0%) of the 20 WBDOs could not 
be identified because the cause of con­
tamination was unknown. Persons at a 
church served by a community water 
system became ill with cryptosporidiosis (Ohio, 2005). No 
communitywide outbreak was detected and no water-
quality violations were detected, suggesting that the contami­
nation might have occurred outside the jurisdiction of the 
water utility. Investigators noted antiquated and piecemeal 
water plumbing and sewage lines. However, because it was 
unclear that this outbreak was caused by premise plumbing 
contamination, this WBDO is not included in the analysis of 
the SWTD or NWU/POU deficiencies. 
Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks 
Associated with Water Not Intended for 
Drinking and Water of Unknown Intent 
Eight WBDOs were associated with either WNID (n = six) 
or WUI (n = two) (Table 6). The eight WNID/WUI outbreaks 
caused illness among at least 96 persons and resulted in seven 
deaths. All deaths were associated with legionellosis. Five 
(62.5%) WNID/WUI outbreaks involved ARI, and three 
(37.5%) involved AGI. One (12.5%) of the eight WNID/WUI 
outbreaks was categorized as a strength of evidence Class I rank­
ing, two (25.0%) were ranked as Class II, three (37.5%) were 
ranked as Class III, and two (25.0%) were ranked as Class IV. 
Etiologic Agents 
Five (62.5%) of the eight WNID/WUI outbreaks were 
attributed to L. pneumophila serogroup 1; these five outbreaks 
affected 73 persons and resulted in seven deaths. Two of the 
WNID/WUI outbreaks were attributed to Giardia intestinalis 
and one outbreak was attributed to E. coli O157:H7 (Table 6). 
FIGURE 3. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water 



















* Single cases of disease related to drinking water (n = 16) have been removed from this figure; 
therefore, it is not comparable to figures in previous Surveillance Summaries. 
† Beginning in 2003, mixed agents of more than one etiologic agent type were included in the 
surveillance system. However, the first observation is a previously unreported outbreak in 2002.
§ Beginning in 2001, Legionnaires’ disease was added to the surveillance system, and Legionella
species were classified separately in this figure. 
FIGURE 4. Number* of waterborne-disease outbreaks 
associated with drinking water, by etiologic agent and month 
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* n = 20. 
† Unidentified etiology includes suspected etiologies not confirmed during 
the outbreak investigation. 
Deficiencies 5B, 5C, 12, and 99D 
Each of the eight WNID/WUI outbreaks had one known 
deficiency: five (62.5%) involved Legionella spp. in the water 
system (deficiencies 5B and 5C), two (25.0%) involved WNID 
unrelated to Legionella (deficiency 12), and one (12.5%) 
involved WUI (deficiency 99D). Four (80.0%) of the five 
legionellosis outbreaks involved WNID (deficiency 5B). In 
three of these outbreaks, the aerosolized water from cooling 
towers was tested and identified as the source of Legionella 
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FIGURE 5. Percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with 
drinking water, by illness and etiology — United States, 2005–2006 


















* AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; ARI: acute respiratory illness; Hep: viral hepatitis. 
† All acute respiratory illness was attributed to Legionella spp.
 
§ Norovirus suspected based upon incubation period, symptoms, and duration of illness.
 
¶ Including one outbreak that involved multiple bacterial agents. 
** One outbreak that involved bacterial and viral agents. 
spp. In the fourth outbreak, epidemiologic and environmen­
tal testing implicated a decorative fountain in a restaurant (36). 
One legionellosis outbreak (20.0%) involved WUI (deficiency 
5C). In this outbreak (Pennsylvania, July 2005), environmental 
water testing failed to determine the source of Legionella spp. 
Among the three (37.5%) outbreaks unrelated to Legionella, 
two involved G. intestinalis, and one was caused by E. coli 
O157:H7. In the first giardiasis out­
break (California, July 2005), house­
hold members became ill while using 
canal water that had been piped into 
their home for washing and bathing. In 
the second giardiasis outbreak (Colo­
rado 2006), hikers became ill after 
drinking water from a stream. The out­
break investigation revealed a greater 
risk for becoming ill among those hik­
ers who were less rigorous in their 
water-treatment practices (i.e., boiling, 
filtering, or use of chemicals). One out­
break at a sports camp involving 14 per­
sons was caused by E. coli O157:H7 
(Tennessee 2005). Whereas the environ­
mental investigation did not identify this 
organism in the water, nonpotable 
water contaminated with coliforms was leaking onto the pool 
deck and the tennis courts (Table 6). 
Previously Unreported Outbreaks 
Reports of four previously unreported WBDOs associated 
with drinking water and WNID that occurred during 1979– 
2002 were received for this surveillance period (Table 7). 
TABLE 8. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by etiologic agent and 
type of water system — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of water system† 
 Total Community Noncommunity Individual§ Mixed system 
Etiologic agent WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases 
Bacteria 
Campylobacter spp.  
Escherichia coli O157, C. jejuni,  








































































































































* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–4 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water treatment deficiency, distribution system 
contamination, and untreated chemical contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
† Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 service connections or serve an average of >25 residents for >60 
days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park. A noncommunity water system 
serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same persons 
for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas transient systems provide water to places in which persons do not 
remain for long periods of time (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Individual water systems are small systems not owned or operated 
by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
§ Excludes commercially bottled water and water not intended for drinking, therefore, not comparable to Surveillance Summaries before 2003–2004. 
¶ Multiple etiologic agent types (bacteria, parasite, virus, and/or chemical/toxin) identified. 
** Norovirus suspected based on incubation period, symptoms, and duration of illness. 
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TABLE 9. Number of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by etiologic agent and 
water source — United States, 2005–2006 
Water source 
Total Ground water Surface water Unknown Mixed source 
Etiologic agent WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases WBDOs Cases 
Bacteria 
Campylobacter spp.  
Escherichia coli O157, C. jejuni 




Mixed agent type† 



































































































































* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–3 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water treatment deficiency, and untreated chemical 
contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
†Multiple etiologic agent types (bacteria, parasite, virus, and/or chemical/toxin) identified. 
§Norovirus suspected based on incubation period, symptoms, and duration of illness. 
 
TABLE 10. Number and percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by 
type of deficiency (n = 10)† and type of water system — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of water system§ 
 Total Community Noncommunity Individual¶ Mixed system 
Type of deficiency No. (%) No. (%) No.  (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
1: Untreated surface water intended for drinking 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
2: Untreated ground water intended for drinking 0 0.0 2 33.3 2 100.0 0 0.0 4 40.0 
3: Treatment deficiency 1 50.0 3 50.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 40.0 
4: Distribution system deficiency, including storage 1 50.0 1 16.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 20.0 
Total 2 100.0 6 100.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 10 100.0 
* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–4 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water treatment deficiency, distribution system 
contamination, and untreated chemical contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
†Certain WBDOs have multiple deficiencies that are tabulated separately. This table reports 10 deficiencies from eight WBDOs. 
§Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 service connections or serve an average of >25 residents for 
>60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park. A noncommunity water 
system serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same 
persons for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas transient systems provide water to places in which persons 
do not remain for long periods (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Individual water systems are small systems not owned or operated 
by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
¶ Excludes commercially bottled water and water not intended for drinking, therefore, not comparable to Surveillance Summaries before 2003–2004. 
 
TABLE 11. Number and percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by 
type of deficiency (n = eight) and source of water — United States, 2005–2006 
Water source 
Total Ground water Surface water Unknown Mixed source 
Type of deficiency No. (%) No. (%) No.  (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
1: Untreated surface water intended for drinking 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
2: Untreated ground water intended for drinking 4 57.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 50.0 
3: Treatment deficiency 3 42.9 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 50.0 
Total 7 100.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 8 100.0 
* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–3 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water treatment deficiency, and untreated 
chemical contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
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TABLE 12. Number and percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by 
predominant illness and type of water system — United States, 2005–2006 
Type of water system§ 
 Total Community Noncommunity Individual¶  Mixed system
Predominant illness† WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) 
ARI 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 
AGI 1 32 (100.0) 5 454 (100.0) 1 16 (50.0) 0 0 (0.0) 7 502 (96.9) 
Hep 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 1 16 (50.0) 0 0 (0.0) 1  16  (3.1)
Total 1 32 (100.0) 5 454 (100.0) 2 32 (100.0) 0 0 (0.0) 8 518 (100.0) 
 
* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–4 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water-treatment deficiency, distribution system 
contamination, and untreated chemical contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
†ARI: acute respiratory illness; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and Hep: viral hepatitis. 
§Community and noncommunity water systems are public water systems that have >15 service connections or serve an average of >25 residents for 
>60 days/year. A community water system serves year-round residents of a community, subdivision, or mobile home park. A noncommunity water 
system serves an institution, industry, camp, park, hotel, or business and can be nontransient or transient. Nontransient systems serve >25 of the same 
persons for >6 months of the year but not year-round (e.g., factories and schools), whereas transient systems provide water to places in which persons 
do not remain for long periods of time (e.g., restaurants, highway rest stations, and parks). Individual water systems are small systems not owned or 
operated by a water utility that have <15 connections or serve <25 persons. 
¶ Excludes commercially bottled water and water not intended for drinking, therefore, not comparable to Surveillance Summaries before 2003–2004. 
TABLE 13. Number and percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with drinking water (n = eight),* by 
predominant illness and water source — United States, 2005–2006 
Water source 
 Total Ground water Surface water Unknown  Mixed source
Predominant illness† WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) WBDOs Cases  (%) 
ARI 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 
AGI 6 442 (96.5) 1 60 (100.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 7 502 (96.9) 
Hep 1 16 (3.5) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 1 16 (3.1) 
Total 7 458 (100.0) 1 60 (100.0) 0 0 (0.0) 0 0 (0.0) 8 518 (100.0) 
* WBDOs with deficiencies 1–3 and 13 (i.e., surface water contamination, ground water contamination, water treatment deficiency, and untreated chemical 
contamination of source water) were used for analysis. 
†ARI: acute respiratory illness; AGI: acute gastrointestinal illness; and Hep: viral hepatitis. 
An outbreak of gastroenteritis occurred among two patrons 
at a golf course (Minnesota, 1979). Acute illness occurred 
within minutes of consuming water from a water cooler 
located next to the golf course. The water dispenser had 
become contaminated after a bucket with detergent residues 
was used to fill the water container. 
During September–November 1995, a hepatitis A outbreak 
involved eight persons in a community (Tennessee, 1995). 
All ill persons reported consuming untreated drinking water 
from ground water sources. Water testing revealed fecal con­
tamination in multiple wells from this community. 
One outbreak of gastroenteritis (Tennessee, October 1988) 
involved an unidentified etiologic agent. The outbreak report 
implicated water and ice served at a restaurant as the cause of 
gastroenteritis in 89 persons. Filtered and chlorinated stream 
water was used for drinking water and ice. Three days before 
the onset of illnesses, the sewage system at an upstream camp­
ground overflowed, which presumably overwhelmed the 
restaurant’s water-treatment system. 
One outbreak of Pseudomonas folliculitis among 27 persons 
occurred in an industrial facility (Louisiana, 2002) and was 
linked with the use of recycled water in the manufacturing 
process (37). Although this closed water system was chemi­
cally treated, substantially high concentrations of P. aeruginosa 
were detected in multiple water samples at the facility. 
Surveillance Reports Not Classified 
as Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks 
Nine surveillance reports potentially implicating drinking 
water or WNID were submitted during 2005–2006 but had 
insufficient epidemiologic and water-quality data to warrant 
inclusion in this report as WBDOs. For three reports of 
legionellosis clusters, common-point sources of transmission 
were not implicated. Three additional outbreak reports 
described gastroenteritis within minutes of ingesting drinks 
at restaurants. Apparently, each of these drinking sources had 
been contaminated with a cleaning product. Because it was 
unclear whether the water was contaminated before it was 
mixed into drinks, these outbreaks were classified as foodborne 
outbreaks. In 2006, members of three families became ill with 
giardiasis. Subsequent investigations failed to determine 
whether private wells serving these families were contaminated. 
An AGI outbreak among rafting company employees was 
52 MMWR September 12, 2008 
caused by Campylobacter jejuni, and the drinking water sys­
tem was suspected to be contaminated. However, despite a 
thorough investigation, other potential locations of exposure 
could not be ruled out. Finally, four persons became ill with 
gastroenteritis, and Aeromonas hydrophila was isolated from 
one person. Because no evidence of ground water contamina­
tion was detected and the role of Aeromonas in causing water­
borne disease has not been definitively established, these cases 
were not included as an outbreak. 
Discussion 
Drinking water outbreaks reported to WBDOSS provide 
important data concerning the etiology and trends of water­
borne disease. Analysis of these data can provide insight into 
the effectiveness of EPA regulations, public health oversight, 
treatment methods, and risk factors for nonpublic systems 
and water contaminated outside the jurisdiction of public sys­
tems. However, because of incomplete detection, investiga­
tion, and reporting of these outbreaks and because the level of 
surveillance and reporting activity varies in different locali­
ties, these data are limited in representing the actual occur­
rence of waterborne-disease outbreaks. In addition, WBDOSS 
only captures single, nonoutbreak cases of waterborne disease 
caused by a limited number of agents (e.g., Naegleria fowleri 
and chemicals demonstrated in water); single cases caused by 
other waterborne agents are not captured. These factors con­
tribute to the WBDOSS underestimating the burden of 
endemic waterborne disease related to drinking water. 
Multiple factors contribute to the ability of state and local 
public health agencies to recognize, investigate, and report 
waterborne-disease outbreaks. These agencies must recognize 
and link cases of illness to a common water source, which 
requires appropriate laboratory, epidemiologic, and environ­
mental capacity to conduct appropriate investigations. Out­
breaks often are recognized through either case investigations 
of laboratory-confirmed notifiable diseases or complaints of 
illness from citizens. This process requires ongoing commu­
nication and collaboration between the laboratory, epidemi­
ology and environmental sections of public health agencies. 
Outbreak reporting might increase as waterborne disease 
becomes better recognized, water system deficiencies are iden­
tified, and state surveillance activities and laboratory 
capabilities increase (38–40). Consequently, recommendations 
for improving WBDO investigations 
FIGURE 6. Percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with 
drinking water, by etiologic agent, water system, and water source — United States, 
2005–2006 






















include enhancing surveillance activi­
ties, increasing laboratory support for 
clinical specimen and water sample test­
ing, and assessing sources of potential
bias (41–43). 
The identification of WBDO etio-
logic agents depends on multiple fac-
tors. Investigators must recognize the 
WBDO in a timely manner so that
appropriate clinical specimens and
environmental samples can be collected. 
Subsequently, the laboratories involved 
must have the ability to test for the 
organism, chemical, or toxin in the 
clinical and water specimens.
WBDOSS data suggest that these 
capabilities are improving, given the 
reduction in the proportion of reported 
WBDOs with an unidentified etiology. 
During 1971–1996, the etiologic agent 
was unknown in 51% (338/668) of 
outbreaks; however, during 1997– 
2006, the etiologic agent was unidenti­
* Each WBDO involves more than one etiologic agent. 
† Other than Legionella spp. 
§ Deficiencies 1–4. See Table 10. 
¶ Does not include commercially bottled water, therefore, not comparable to summaries before 
2003–2004. 
** Deficiencies 1–3. See Table 11. 
fied in 24% (35/146) of outbreaks 
(Figure 3). Reasons for improved etio­
logic attribution might include
increased testing for viral agents in clini­
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cal and water specimens and refinement in water sampling 
and testing methods. In previous years, stool specimens were 
tested routinely for enteric bacterial pathogens and parasites, 
but testing for viral agents was rarely conducted. Identifica-
tion of water contamination (by coliform bacteria that might 
indicate fecal contamination) can provide important infor-
mation to the epidemiologic investigation and should be 
attempted when the investigation is conducted in a timely 
matter. However, collection of water samples also depends on 
local and state statutory requirements and the availability of 
investigators who know how to collect the samples. Analyses 
of specific pathogens and indicators of water contamination 
depend upon the availability of certified or approved labora-
tories. Many laboratories are certified to conduct standard 
analyses for fecal indicators and chemicals, but few laborato-
ries have capabilities for identifying waterborne pathogens, 
and these tests might be expensive. Collecting water samples 
for pathogen identification might require sampling large quan-
tities of water or filtering large volumes of water through spe-
cial membranes. Methods for concentrating large volumes of 
water for testing are being developed and disseminated to mul-
tiple sites in the United States as standard protocols (44). 
Reporting and surveillance bias might 
occur because certain local and state 
public health agencies have enhanced 
capacity to investigate outbreaks. In 
addition, determining whether an 
increase or decrease in reporting reflects 
either an actual change in the incidence 
of outbreaks or reflects a change in the 
sensitivity of surveillance practices is 
unknown. For example, in states that 
collaborate with CDC in the Environ-
mental Health Specialist Network’s 
waterborne-disease project (EHS-Net 
Water), the funding of waterborne dis­
ease coordinators improved waterborne 
disease surveillance and interagency 
communication, leading to the report-
ing of previously unreported WBDOs 
(Table 7) (31).  In addition, EHS-Net 
Water states are also beginning to 
report more new outbreaks than they 
have in previous surveillance periods. 
Increased reporting likely is attributable 
to better communication, detection, 
investigation, and reporting and not as
 
a result of more outbreaks occurring. 
Another key limitation of the data 
collected by WBDOSS is that, for the 
most part, the information pertains only to outbreaks of water-
borne illness and not to endemic waterborne illness, includ­
ing both acute and chronic health effects. The epidemiologic 
trends and water-quality concerns observed in outbreaks might 
not necessarily reflect or correspond with trends associated 
with endemic waterborne illness. In response to the Congres­
sional SDWA Amendments of 1996, EPA and CDC com­
pleted and reviewed a series of epidemiologic studies and 
convened a national workshop in 2005 to assess the magni­
tude of endemic waterborne AGI associated with consump­
tion of public drinking water. A joint report on the results of 
these studies is available at http://www.epa.gov/nheerl/articles/ 
2006/waterborne_disease.html. The report includes multiple 
documents that discuss various methods for estimating the 
annual number of endemic waterborne-AGI cases associated 
with public drinking water systems in the United States. Two 
different but overlapping estimates of the number of endemic 
AGI cases in the United States were derived: 1) 4.3–11.7 mil­
lion cases (45) and 2) 16.4 million cases associated with pub­
lic drinking water systems (confidence interval: 5.5–32.8) (46). 
These estimates, however, only describe a portion of the 
annual incidence of endemic waterborne-disease cases. To fully 
FIGURE 7. Percentage of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) associated with 
drinking water, by deficiency* — United States, 2005–2006
All deficiencies (n = 23)* 
Unknown 
4.3% (1)† 
Source water, treatment No water utility 
facility, or distribution jurisdiction or at 
§system (SWTD) point-of-use 









Distribution in drinking 




* A total of 20 WBDOs but 23 deficiencies.
 
†Deficiency 99A. See Table 14.
§Deficiencies 1–4. See Table 14. 
¶ Deficiencies 5A, 6–11, 99B. See Table 14. 
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TABLE 14. Waterborne-disease outbreaks associated with drinking water (n = 20), by deficiencies (n = 23)* — United States, 
2005–2006 
Deficiency No. of deficiencies 
Contamination of water at/in the water source, treatment facility, or distribution system (SWTD)† 
1: Untreated surface water intended for drinking 
2: Untreated ground water intended for drinking 
3: Treatment deficiency (e.g. temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, 
or inadequate, or no filtration) 
4: Distribution system deficiency, including storage (e.g. cross-connection, backflow, and contamination of 
water mains during construction or repair) 
13: Current treatment processes not expected to remove a chemical contaminant (e.g., pesticide contamination 
of groundwater treated with disinfection only) 
A: Surface water 
B: Ground water 
Contamination of water at points not under the jurisdiction of a water utility or at the point-of-use (NWU/POU)§ 
5: Legionella spp. in water system 
A: Water intended for drinking 
6: Plumbing system deficiency after the water meter or property line (e.g. cross-connection, backflow, 
and corrosion products) 
7: Deficiency in building/home-specific water treatment after the water meter or property line 
8: Deficiency or contamination of equipment using or distributing water (e.g. drink-mix machines) 
9: Contamination during commercial bottling 
10: Contamination during shipping, hauling, or storage 
A: Water intended for drinking – Tap water 
B: Water intended for drinking – Commercially bottled water 
11: Contamination at point-of-use 
A: Tap 
B: Hose 
C: Commercially bottled water 
D: Container, bottle, or pitcher 
E: Unknown 
Unknown/Insufficient Information 
99: Unknown/Insufficient information 
A: Water intended for drinking – Tap water 
B: Water intended for drinking – Commercially bottled water 

























* More than one deficiency might have been identified during the investigation of a single waterborne-disease case or outbreak or case. 
†Contamination of water and deficiencies occurring in the drinking water system at/in the water source, treatment facility, or distribution system of pipes 
and storage facilities. For a community water system, the distribution system refers to the pipes and storage infrastructure under the jurisdiction of the 
water utility before the water meter or property line (if the system is not metered). For noncommunity and nonpublic water systems, the distribution 
system refers to the pipes and storage infrastructure before entry into a building or house (e.g., in a service line leading to a house or building). 
§Contamination of drinking water and deficiencies occurring in plumbing and pipes that are not part of the distribution system or at other points outside 
the jurisdiction of a water utility as previously defined. For community systems, this means that after the water meter or property line (if the system is not 
metered) and for noncommunity and nonpublic systems, this means within the building or house (e.g., in the plumbing inside a house or building) during 
shipping or hauling, during storage other than in the distribution system, and at the point-of-use). 
describe the overall incidence of waterborne disease, estimates WBDOs Associated with Drinking Water 
also need to include the number of cases of waterborne dis-
Etiologic Agentsease other than AGI and the number of cases associated with 
nonpublic drinking water systems, commercially bottled Since its addition to WBDOSS in 2001, Legionella has been 
water, recreational water, WNID, and WUI. If these other the single most commonly reported pathogen associated with 
types and sources of waterborne disease were considered, the drinking water outbreaks. During 2005–2006, a total of 10 
estimated number of cases of endemic waterborne disease (50.0%) of the 20 reported drinking water-associated WBDOs 
would be higher than the existing estimates of 4–33 million involved Legionella spp, which is the first time that the num­
annual cases (45,46). ber of reported WBDOs associated with ARI has surpassed 
those associated with AGI in any surveillance period. These 
WBDOs all occurred as a result of Legionella colonization of 
plumbing and pipes that are not under the jurisdiction of a 
water utility and are not specifically subject to EPA regula­
tions. As the predominant drinking water-related pathogen 
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in WBDOSS, increased attention must be focused on 
Legionella to understand its biology, ecology, and inactivation 
in parts of the water system not addressed by federal regula­
tion so that appropriate public health action to prevent fur­
ther WBDOs can be taken. 
During the 2005–2006 surveillance period, two drinking 
water-associated WBDOs involved only bacteria (excluding 
Legionella spp.), compared with five during the 2003–2004 
and three during the 2001–2002 surveillance periods. The 
ongoing occurrence of bacterial WBDOs, despite available 
and efficacious treatment practices, underscores the continu­
ing need for protection and treatment of drinking water (47). 
In addition, one mixed-agent type outbreak occurred during 
the 2005–2006 surveillance period, which included bacteria 
(C. jejuni) and viruses (norovirus G1 and G2). The occurrence 
of mixed-agent type and multiple agent outbreaks emphasizes 
the importance of considering more than one etiologic agent in 
outbreak investigations, collecting appropriate specimens for 
each agent type, and requesting appropriate diagnostic testing 
for each agent type. In addition, this outbreak was associated 
with sewage contamination of a well, underscoring the impor­
tance of proper waste management and proper drinking water 
system and waste water system designs. 
Three WBDOs involving only viruses were reported for the 
2005–2006 surveillance period. Two involved norovirus G1, 
and one involved hepatitis A. Based on incubation period, 
symptoms, and duration of illness, norovirus was also sus­
pected in the two WBDOs where the etiologic agent was uni­
dentified. All of these WBDOs involved contaminated ground 
water that was either untreated or improperly treated (inad­
equate or interrupted chlorination as the only treatment pro­
vided). EPA’s GWR is designed to address vulnerable public 
ground water systems. However, two of these viral outbreaks 
occurred in individual nonpublic water systems, and the GWR 
does not apply to these water systems. 
Parasites were identified in two WBDOs during the 2005– 
2006 surveillance period. The giardiasis outbreak (California, 
August 2005) was associated with point-of-use contamina­
tion. The reason for contamination could not be determined 
for the Cryptosporidium outbreak; however, investigators noted 
antiquated and piecemeal water plumbing and sewage lines, 
suggesting that contamination might have entered through 
water plumbing (Ohio, September 2006). No parasitic out­
breaks were associated with contaminated surface water in this 
surveillance period. Both public surface water systems and 
public ground water systems under the influence of surface 
water are regulated under SWTR to protect the public against 
exposure to Giardia and Cryptosporidium, among other patho­
gens. The last parasitic disease outbreak associated with sur­
face water and reported to CDC occurred in 2002 in Palau in 
an untreated noncommunity system supplied by a river. The 
dramatic decrease in the number of outbreaks caused by para­
sites (Figure 3) might be attributable to enhanced EPA regu­
lation of surface water sources. 
The etiologic agents of two WBDOs could not be identi­
fied, although norovirus was suspected. These two outbreaks 
represent 10.0% of the 20 drinking water-associated WBDOs 
reported during 2005–2006 (Figure 6). These two WBDOs 
represent the lowest number and percentage of outbreaks 
caused by an unknown etiology in any surveillance period 
since the beginning of the surveillance system in 1971. This 
decrease might reflect improved diagnostic capabilities of labo­
ratories and better outbreak investigations, resulting in more 
rapid and more appropriate specimen collection. 
Deficiencies 1–4 and 13: Contamination 
of Water at/in the Water Source, Treatment 
Facility, or Distribution System 
Typically, EPA regulates the community drinking water sup­
plies from the source water up to the water meter (or up to 
the property line if the distribution system is not metered). 
This segment of the drinking water supply system is associ­
ated with deficiencies 1–4 and 13 (Table 2): 1) consumption 
of untreated surface water intended for drinking, 2) consump­
tion of untreated ground water intended for drinking, 3) treat­
ment deficiencies, 4) distribution system deficiencies, and 13) 
chemical contamination of source water not removed by 
existing treatment methods. Noncommunity and individual 
nonpublic systems also might have distribution system defi­
ciencies (i.e., deficiency 4) if problems occur in pipes or stor­
age infrastructure before entry into a building or house. During 
the 2005–2006 surveillance period, 40.0% of drinking 
water-related outbreaks (n = 8) and 43.5% of deficiencies 
(n = 10) involved deficiencies 1–4. A single WBDO can be 
associated with more than one deficiency. Deficiency 13 was 
not implicated in any outbreak during the 2005–2006 sur­
veillance period. 
Source water. Discussions regarding source water type only 
include those WBDOs with deficiencies 1–3 because distri­
bution system deficiencies (deficiency 4) are not necessarily 
dependent upon the source water type. Also excluded from 
the discussion involving source water types are drinking water-
associated WBDOs with unknown or insufficient informa­
tion (deficiencies 99A) and outbreaks associated with 
contamination at points not under the jurisdiction of a water 
utility or at the point-of -use (deficiencies 5A, 6–11, and 99B). 
Surface water. Only one (12.5%) of the eight outbreaks 
with deficiencies 1–3 was associated with consumption of 
inadequately-treated surface water. In this outbreak (Oregon, 
2005), chronically-inadequate chlorination and inadequate 
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filtration of the river water supplying the camp were cited as 
the underlying reasons for illness among camp attendees. Since 
the early 1990s, the percentage of reported WBDOs associ­
ated with inadequately treated surface water has been declin­
ing. This decrease is likely attributable to EPA regulations 
mandating treatment of surface water used by public water 
systems. However, this outbreak underscores that regulations 
alone do not prevent outbreaks and that attention to proper 
water system operation and maintenance is still required. 
Ground water. Seven (87.5%) of the eight outbreaks with 
deficiencies 1–3 were associated with consumption of con­
taminated ground water, either from wells or springs. Among 
these seven outbreaks, four (57.1%) involved consumption 
of untreated ground water (deficiency 2), and three (42.9%) 
involved treatment deficiencies associated with contaminated 
ground water (deficiency 3). These seven ground water-
associated outbreaks indicate that ground water contamina­
tion is a continuing problem. Wells and springs must be 
protected from contamination, even if disinfection is provided, 
because ground water can become contaminated with patho­
gens that are not easily disinfected, and source water condi­
tions might overwhelm the disinfection process (e.g., highly 
turbid water as a result of excessive rain fall). 
Five of the seven outbreaks associated with contaminated 
ground water during the 2005–2006 surveillance period 
occurred in noncommunity or community water systems that 
will be subject to EPA’s new GWR. Beginning in 2009, the 
GWR will apply to all public systems that use ground water 
as a source of drinking water. Although this new rule has not 
yet been fully implemented, it will establish a risk-based 
approach to target ground water systems that are vulnerable 
to fecal contamination. The risk-targeting approach includes 
four major components: 1) sanitary surveys, 2) source water 
monitoring to test for the presence of indicators of fecal con­
tamination in the ground water source, 3) corrective action, 
and 4) compliance-monitoring to ensure that the treatment 
technology installed to treat drinking water reliably achieves 
at least 99.99% (4-log) inactivation or removal of viruses. 
Operators of ground water systems that are identified as 
being at risk for fecal contamination must take corrective 
action to reduce the potential for illness from exposure to 
microbial pathogens. 
Because EPA regulations do not apply to individual, 
nonpublic water systems, WBDOs such as the two involving 
individual ground water systems reported during 2005–2006 
will not be subject to the GWR, which could potentially pre­
vent such outbreaks. The protections offered by the GWR 
will not extend to individual ground water systems unless they 
are regulated by state or local authorities. Approximately 17 
million persons in the United States rely on private house­
hold wells for drinking water each year, and more than 90,000 
new wells are drilled annually throughout the United States 
(48). To safeguard the quality of well water, homeowners 
should seek information on needed protective measures and 
implement recommended operation and maintenance guide­
lines for private well usage. Homeowners may also choose to 
protect their own health by purchasing appropriately designed 
point-of-use water-treatment devices and by following instruc­
tions for their proper operation and maintenance. Although 
EPA does not regulate individual water systems, EPA recom­
mendations for protecting private wells are available at 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pwells1.html. Additional efforts 
should be taken by public health officials to educate well own­
ers, users, drillers, and local and state drinking water person­
nel to encourage practices that best ensure safe drinking water 
for private well-users. 
Water treatment. During 2005–2006, five drinking water-
related WBDOs associated with water-treatment deficiencies 
were reported; all were associated with inadequate chlorina­
tion. One WBDO was associated with a malfunctioning chlo­
rine feeder (Indiana, 2006). Two outbreaks occurred because 
existing water treatment was overwhelmed. Heavy rain might 
have overwhelmed a camp surface water-treatment system in 
one outbreak (Oregon, 2005), and remnants of Hurricane 
Katrina might have created surface water runoff into a spring 
supplying drinking water to a restaurant in the other out­
break (Ohio, 2005). In addition, this small restaurant served 
a tour group that was substantially larger than was typically 
served, and the chlorination system could not keep up with 
the demand for water. The remaining two WBDOs had inad­
equate chlorination, but the causes were not specified in the 
reports. All five outbreaks indicate the need for proper equip­
ment maintenance, adequate capacity of treatment systems to 
provide potable water during occasional periods of high 
demand, and education of small water system operators and 
owners concerning the operation, routine monitoring, and 
capability of treatment systems under various conditions. 
Although treatment deficiencies (deficiency 3) made up the 
greatest proportion (50.0%) of SWTD deficiencies during 
the 2005–2006 surveillance period, the majority of (80.0%) 
of these treatment deficiencies were associated with failures to 
adequately treat contaminated ground water. When these 
deficiencies are considered with deficiency 2, contaminated 
ground water becomes the single largest contributing factor 
to SWTD-related outbreaks, underscoring the need for the 
GWR previously described. 
Distribution system. Distribution system deficiencies make 
up the smallest proportion of the SWTD deficiencies during 
this surveillance period. During 2005–2006, two drinking 
water-related WBDOs involving distribution system deficien­
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cies occurred. Before one outbreak (Indiana, 2006), a new 
water main was installed without a valid permit. The water 
main was pressure tested and was left under pressure with 
nonpotable water, resulting in a cross-contamination hazard. 
In the second outbreak, backflow prevention devices were 
absent on water distribution lines to toilet facilities in a camp 
(Maryland, 2006). Drinking water quality within the distri­
bution systems of public water supplies is regulated under EPA’s 
TCR, which is currently undergoing revisions to better pro­
tect public health. 
Water systems. Discussions regarding water system types 
(i.e., community, noncommunity, and individual) include 
drinking water-associated WBDOs with deficiencies 1–4 and 
13. Deficiencies in the distribution system are included in 
these discussions because distribution system problems might 
be dependent on the type of water system involved. Among 
the eight drinking water-associated WBDOs with a deficiency 
of 1–4, a total of five (62.5%) were associated with noncom­
munity water systems, two (25.0%) with individual water sys­
tems, and one (12.5%) with a community water system. The 
proportion (12.5%) of drinking water-related WBDOs asso­
ciated with community water systems represents the lowest 
proportion of outbreaks that occurred during the last four 
surveillance periods (i.e., 1999–2000, 2001–2002, 2003– 
2004, and 2005–2006). This decrease might reflect the suc­
cess of federal drinking water regulations protecting water 
quality in public supplies. 
Environmental investigation. To better understand the 
antecedent events resulting in drinking water-associated 
WBDOs, particularly deficiencies 1–4, a new outbreak inves­
tigation tool is being developed by EHS-Net, a collaborative 
forum of environmental health specialists. These environmen­
tal health specialists collaborate with epidemiologists and 
laboratorians to identify, investigate, and prevent environmen­
tal factors contributing to foodborne and waterborne illness 
and disease outbreaks. In 2000, EHS-Net Food was estab­
lished with funds from CDC’s National Center for Environ­
mental Health, Environmental Health Services Branch, and 
the FDA and has nine participating state sites that focus on 
the prevention of foodborne disease. In 2005, EHS-Net 
Water was piloted with CDC and EPA funds, which support 
one staff member in each of five states (California, Georgia, 
Minnesota, New York, and Tennessee) to focus specifically on 
waterborne-disease investigations. The environmental outbreak 
investigation tool developed by EHS-Net Water assists with 
outbreak investigations both by capturing environmental data 
that are not collected routinely (e.g., assessment of water sys­
tem operations) and by clarifying the environmental events and 
situations (e.g., recent precipitation events) that contributed to 
WBDOs in small ground water systems. This information will 
assist public health officials and water system operators and 
owners in addressing the potential sources of contamination 
that resulted in an outbreak of waterborne disease. 
Deficiencies 5A and 6–11: Contamination 
of Water at Points Not Under the Jurisdiction 
of a Water Utility or at the Point-of-Use 
A distinction can be made between deficiencies that occur 
at points NWU/POU and SWTD. During the 2005–2006 
surveillance period, more WBDOs were associated with 
NWU/POU (12 [52.2%]) than with SWTD (10 [43.5%]) 
(Figure 7). Similar proportions were noted in the 2003–2004 
surveillance period, which was the first time the distinction 
was made between NWU/POU and SWTD deficiencies. 
Deficiency 5A. Legionella in water intended for drinking. 
Legionellosis includes two clinically distinct syndromes: 
Legionnaires’ Disease (LD), characterized by severe pneumo­
nia, and Pontiac Fever (PF), a febrile, cough illness that does 
not progress to pneumonia. Legionellosis outbreaks accounted 
for 50% of all drinking water-associated WBDOs reported 
during 2005–2006 and 83.3% of all NWU/POU deficien­
cies, indicating that Legionella is a serious public health threat. 
When outbreaks of legionellosis occur in the setting of con­
taminated drinking water, they typically manifest as cases of 
LD rather than PF. Approximately 8,000–18,000 cases of LD 
occur each year in the United States (49). Regardless of the 
syndrome, the source of legionellosis outbreaks typically share 
common features (e.g., warm stagnant water, inadequate bio­
cide concentrations, and aerosolization, which provides the 
mechanism for inhalation). 
The outbreaks of legionellosis highlight the challenges 
related to its detection and prevention. LD is underdiagnosed 
because the majority of patients with community-acquired 
pneumonia are treated empirically with broad-spectrum anti­
biotics (50). However, because Legionella spp. are not trans­
mitted from person-to-person and are always acquired from 
an environmental source, even a single case of LD implies the 
presence of a contaminated aquatic source to which others 
can be exposed. Certain host factors (e.g., underlying lung 
disease and immunodeficiencies) influence the development 
and severity of legionellosis. Typically, the attack rate during 
documented LD outbreaks is quite low (i.e., <5%). Not 
everyone who is exposed in a Legionella-contaminated build­
ing is susceptible to symptomatic illness. Identification of two 
or more cases of LD in association with a potential source is 
adequate justification for an investigation. All of the 
legionellosis outbreaks described in this report involved ten 
or fewer cases. Nonetheless, in all instances except for one, 
the epidemiologic and laboratory data were compelling enough 
to implicate point sources that were subsequently remediated. 
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During 2005–2006, a total of eight (80%) of 10 legionellosis 
outbreaks associated with drinking water occurred in health-
care settings, demonstrating the propensity for Legionella spp. 
to colonize potable water systems and underscoring the 
importance of maintaining a high index of suspicion for 
legionellosis in health-care settings. Seven outbreaks occurred 
in acute-care hospitals and one in a long-term–care facility. 
Legionella spp. colonize the biofilm layer frequently found 
inside the large, complex plumbing systems of hospitals (51). 
This biofilm protects Legionella from biocides and allows the 
bacteria to amplify to levels sufficient to be transmitted and/ 
or cause disease. Patients in hospitals or long-term–care facili­
ties typically are older and have underlying illness factors that 
increase the risk for disease (e.g., chronic lung disease, diabe­
tes, and immunocompromising conditions). 
An outbreak of legionellosis in a health-care setting should 
prompt both an epidemiologic and environmental investiga­
tion. Additional cases might point to water exposures that 
contributed to the outbreak. Environmental sampling of the 
potable water system and other aerosolized water exposures 
(e.g., cooling towers) can confirm the source of the outbreak 
and lead to targeted interventions that prevent additional cases. 
Superheating and superchlorination are the traditional meth­
ods for remediation; however, Legionella might regrow in the 
distribution system (52). Other remediation options are 
under investigation. Monochloramine might be an effective 
biocide for Legionella control; hospitals supplied with drink­
ing water containing monochloramine were less likely to have 
a reported outbreak of LD than those that used water with free 
chlorine as a residual disinfectant (53). Each health-care facility 
should develop a plan for legionellosis prevention to address 
predisposing conditions for Legionella growth in the potable 
water supply. Guidelines for reducing the risk for legionellosis 
associated with building water systems are available (52). 
Deficiencies 6–11. Deficiencies involving drinking water 
that occur at points not under the jurisdiction of a water util­
ity or at the point-of-use have been presented (Table 2). Dur­
ing the 2005–2006 surveillance period, only two reported 
non-Legionella WBDOs involving deficiencies in this category 
were reported. Both WBDOs involved point-of-use contami­
nation. One outbreak of giardiasis was associated with con­
tamination of a 5-gallon drinking water ceramic crock 
dispenser at a gym (California, August 2005). Epidemiologic 
evidence linked all the cases to the dispenser, although the 
mechanism of contamination of the dispenser could not be 
determined. The dispenser had a hand-manipulated spigot 
and the water was typically replenished once a day, although 
the dispenser was not regularly cleaned during the suspected 
period of exposure. Investigators thought that either the em­
ployee who replenished the water (she was asymptomatic but 
her boyfriend was a laboratory-confirmed case) or an ill gym 
patron who used the spigot might have contaminated the water. 
An outbreak of norovirus G1 at a camp (Maryland 2006) 
involved water-treatment and distribution-system deficiencies 
in addition to contamination at the point-of-use. Garden hoses 
stored improperly on the ground were used to fill large water 
containers from which campers filled their cups and water 
bottles. These point-of-use contamination events illustrate the 
vulnerability of shared water containers and the importance 
of practicing good hygiene. 
Waterborne Disease and Outbreaks 
Associated with Water Not Intended 
for Drinking and Water of Unknown 
Intent 
During the 2005–2006 surveillance period, eight WBDOs 
occurred that were associated with WNID or WUI. Five of 
these outbreaks were associated with Legionella spp. Three of 
these outbreaks were in health-care settings and attributed to 
cooling towers. Although the building potable water system 
is more frequently implicated in health-care–associated out­
breaks, community sources should also be considered. Aero­
sols containing Legionella can travel great distances; an 
investigation of an outbreak among residents of a long-term 
care facility implicated a cooling tower that was 0.4 km from 
the facility (54). 
Legionellosis clusters might signal a wider community out­
break and should prompt an investigation. In addition, 
legionellosis outbreaks also can occur in the general popula­
tion outside the health-care setting, as demonstrated by a com­
munity outbreak in South Dakota in 2005. The epidemiologic 
investigation revealed that a restaurant was the common 
exposure among cases. Targeted environmental testing ulti­
mately confirmed the source as the decorative fountain inside 
the restaurant (36). The source of contaminated water could 
not be identified for the fifth legionellosis outbreak. 
The other three non-Legionella WNID/WUI outbreaks were 
associated with bacterial and parasitic diseases. An outbreak 
caused by E. coli O157:H7 occurred at a sports camp (Ten­
nessee 2005). The primary water exposure associated with ill­
ness could not be identified. Illness was associated with 
swimming in one of the outdoor pools, dining at pool picnic 
tables, and attending a tennis camp. Unlabeled irrigation fau­
cets drawing water from a nonpotable well were located at 
multiple points around the tennis courts. Sampling of this 
water system detected fecal contamination. The remaining two 
WBDOs involved cases of giardiasis that developed after 
exposure to WNID. One outbreak involved a family who had 
canal water piped into their home to use for bathing, dish 
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washing, house cleaning, and laundry (California, July 2005). 
The second outbreak involved a school trip to a state forest 
(Colorado 2006). Six of 26 campers became ill. The epide­
miologic data indicated that inadequate treatment of river 
water before consumption was a risk factor. Adding a sports 
drink powder to river water while concurrently adding iodine 
for disinfection was a statistically-significant risk factor for 
becoming ill. The relative risk for boiling water <3 minutes 
could not be defined because none of the persons who boiled 
water longer became ill. Both of these giardiasis outbreaks 
illustrate the risks associated with consuming untreated 
surface water, even water that might appear pristine. 
Backcountry travel (i.e., travel in wilderness environments) 
in the United States is an increasingly popular activity. In 2004, 
approximately 12% of Americans aged >16 years (approxi­
mately 26 million persons) went backpacking for one or more 
nights in backcountry areas during the previous 12 months 
(55). Limited information is available concerning the risk fac­
tors for illness in the backcountry and about the health out­
comes of visitors who use parks in backcountry areas. Several 
studies indicate that as many as 3.8%–56% of long-distance 
hikers and backpackers experience gastrointestinal illness dur­
ing their time in the backcountry (56–61). Given the increas­
ing popularity of backcountry use, this burden of illness could 
have significant medical and economic implications. Although 
the advice to universally filter and disinfect backcountry drink­
ing water to prevent disease has been debated (62), the health 
consequences of ignoring that standard water treatment 
advice have been documented in WBDOSS, although they 
have not been well-defined through research studies. 
Previously Unreported Outbreaks 
This report discusses information concerning four previ­
ously unreported WBDOs. Two of these outbreaks occurred 
in Tennessee, one in Minnesota, and one in Louisiana. The 
Tennessee and Minnesota state health departments are part­
ners in EHS-Net Water. Initial surveys by three of the five 
participating EHS-Net Water states have revealed at least 75 
outbreaks or health events previously unreported to CDC, 
including the three drinking water outbreaks reported in this 
Surveillance summary, nine drinking water outbreaks from New 
York State included in the previous Surveillance Summary (5), 
and 63 recreational water-related outbreaks or health events 
reported in the recreational water Surveillance Summary (30). 
In addition to reporting historical outbreaks, these states are 
working to improve the sensitivity of their current waterborne-
disease outbreak detection. Additional EHS-Net Water projects 
are underway to improve the practice of environmental health 
service programs; translate the findings into improved pre­
vention efforts; offer training opportunities to current and 
future environmental health specialists; and strengthen the 
collaboration among epidemiology, laboratory, and environ­
mental health programs. The EHS-Net Water activities 
indicate that increased effort and resources, specifically 
directed at waterborne-disease reporting, could result in the 
identification of previously unreported historical outbreaks. 
As EHS-Net Water refines the process for identifying and 
investigating current waterborne-disease incidents, these 
efforts might result in enhanced reporting of waterborne 
outbreaks from these and other states. 
Conclusion 
Data collected as part of the national WBDOSS are used to 
describe the epidemiology of waterborne-disease outbreaks in 
the United States. Trends regarding water systems and defi­
ciencies implicated in these WBDOs are used to assess whether 
regulations for water treatment and water-quality monitoring 
are adequate to protect public health. Trends regarding the 
etiologic agents responsible for these outbreaks are used to 
assess the need for different interventions and changes in poli­
cies and resource allocations. 
Two primary trends can be observed from the 2005–2006 
surveillance period data. Since it was first included in 
WBDOSS in 2001, Legionella has become the single most 
common cause of reported outbreaks in WBDOSS. This does 
not mean that Legionella is a more important cause of water­
borne disease than other agents (e.g. norovirus) nor does it 
mean than legionellosis outbreaks are increasing because they 
have only been included in the WBDOSS since 2001. There­
fore, there is a limited basis for historical comparison. How­
ever, outbreaks associated with other agents are not being 
reported as frequently as outbreaks caused by Legionella. 
Whether this is a result of barriers to laboratory confirmation 
of non-Legionella pathogens in clinical specimens and environ­
mental samples, lack of detection of non-Legionella pathogens 
as a result of different incubation periods or milder illness, use 
of adequate water-treatment technologies for non-Legionella 
pathogens, or other factors that might be responsible for fewer 
outbreaks associated with non-Legionella is not clear. 
The second major trend observed in the 2005–2006 sur­
veillance period is the high proportion of WBDOs associated 
with contaminated ground water, whether consumed untreated 
or with inadequate treatment. Until the GWR was finalized 
in 2006, federal drinking water regulations have concentrated 
on protecting consumers from contaminated surface water. 
These rules probably have contributed to the decrease in the 
number and proportion of reported WBDOs associated with 
contaminated surface water that have been observed during 
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the previous twenty years. Similar protections against the con­
sumption of contaminated ground water were absent until 
the development of the GWR, which was finalized in 2006. 
This rule, which is expected to be enacted in 2009, might 
result in a similar decline in the number of ground water– 
associated WBDOs. 
Surveillance for waterborne agents and WBDOs occurs pri­
marily at the local and state levels (including territories and 
FAS). Public health authorities at these levels are responsible 
for detecting and recognizing drinking water-associated 
WBDOs and implementing appropriate prevention and con­
trol measures (Box). Improved communication among local 
and state public health departments, regulatory agencies, and 
water utilities will aid in the detection and control of WBDOs. 
Routine reporting or sharing of water-quality data within the 
health and environmental health departments is recommended. 
Other means of improving surveillance at the local, state, and 
federal levels include additional review and follow up of infor­
mation gathered through other mechanisms (e.g., issuances of 
boil-water advisories or reports of illness associated with agents 
thought to be waterborne). 
A number of efforts have been initiated at the local, state, 
and national levels to improve the detetection, investigation, 
and reporting of WBDOs. CSTE passed a position statement 
at the 2006 annual meeting making WBDOs, as a unit of 
reporting, nationally notifiable and reportable to CDC start­
ing in 2007. Adoption of this CSTE recommendation at the 
state level through state-specific legislative action might 
improve reporting of WBDOs at the state and local levels. 
In addition, to improve timeliness and completeness of 
reporting, CDC and EPA are collaborating with public health 
jurisdictions to implement electronic reporting of WBDOs 
BOX. Organizations that provide assistance in investigations of waterborne disease and outbreaks (WBDOs) 
State and territorial health departments can request Telephone: 404-639-2215 
epidemiologic assistance and laboratory testing from Internet: http://www.cdc.gov/legionella 
CDC to investigate WBDOs. CDC and the U.S. Envi­ • Testing for Parasites 
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) can be consulted Division of Parasitic Diseases 
regarding engineering and environmental aspects of National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
drinking water treatment during and after outbreaks and Enteric Diseases 
collection of large-volume water samples to identify Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC 
pathogens that require special protocols for their recov- Telephone: 770-488-7775 
ery. EPA and the U.S. Geological Survey can be con­
sulted for assistance with hydrogeologic investigations • Testing for Viruses 
of outbreaks where untreated ground water is suspected. Division of Viral Diseases 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 
• Environmental Protection Agency Safe Drinking Diseases 
Water Hotline Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC 
Telephone: 800-426-4791 Telephone: 404-639-3607 
E-mail: hotline-sdwa@epa.gov 
Internet: http://www.epa.gov/safewater • State Reporting of Waterborne Disease and
    Outbreaks 
• Testing for Bacterial Enteric Organisms Division of Parasitic Diseases 
Division of Foodborne, Bacterial, and Mycotic National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
Diseases Enteric Diseases 
National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC 
Enteric Diseases Telephone: 770-488-7775 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC Fax: 770-488-7761 
Telephone: 404-639-1798 Note: All WBDOs at the local level should be 
reported to the state health department. •  Request for Information on Testing for Legionella 
Division of Bacterial Diseases • CDC Reporting Form CDC 52.12 (rev.01/2003) 
National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Internet: http://www.cdc.gov/healthyswimming/ 
Diseases downloads/cdc_5212_waterborne.pdf 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC 
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through the National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS). 
NORS is a more systematic data-collection tool and will pro­
vide public health agencies and waterborne-disease research­
ers with the evidence base they need to identify the causes of 
WBDOs and understand the environmental factors contrib­
uting to these outbreaks. 
EHS-Net Water, a collaborative project between EPA, CDC, 
and five state health departments, is an effort to improve 
WBDO identification, investigation, response, and reporting. 
EHS-Net Water sites initially focused on understanding their 
state-specific surveillance systems, which resulted in the iden­
tification and reporting of numerous previously unreported 
historical outbreaks to WBDOSS. Subsequent efforts are 
focusing on improving the environmental investigation of 
drinking water outbreaks, particularly in small groundwater 
systems. 
In May 2007, EPA and CDC convened a workshop to 
address improving the recognition, investigation, and report­
ing of waterborne-disease outbreaks. Participants included 
epidemiologists, environmental engineers, scientists, environ­
mental health specialists, other public health professionals, and 
water-industry professionals from 44 states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Workshop recommendations 
included 1) improving the communication and coordination 
between agencies investigating waterborne-disease outbreaks; 
2) conducting training for outbreak investigators, laboratory 
analysts, and water system operators; 3) focusing efforts on 
outbreak prevention; 4) enhancing surveillance; 5) strength­
ening outbreak investigations; and 6) improving outbreak 
reporting. 
Efforts to enhance awareness, training, resources, and com­
munication will improve the quality of the data in WBDOSS. 
These efforts should make public health activities related to 
waterborne disease more efficient and reduce the burden of 
WBDOs. 
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Appendix A 
Glossary of Definitions 
action level A specified concentration of a contaminant in water. If this concentration is reached or 
exceeded, certain actions (e.g., further treatment and monitoring) must be taken to comply 
with a drinking water regulation. 
agent See etiologic agent. 
aquifer A geologic formation or part of a formation (e.g., gravel, sand, or porous stone) that yields 
water to wells or springs. 
backflow A hydraulic condition caused by a difference in water pressure that causes nonpotable water 
or other liquid to enter the potable water system by either backpressure or backsiphonage. 
See cross-connection. 
backpressure A hydraulic condition that results when pressure from a customer’s water system (e.g., 
potentially nonpotable water) is higher than pressure in the public water system, resulting 
in backflow of water into the public water system. 
backsiphonage A hydraulic condition caused by negative or subatmospheric pressure within a water 
system, resulting in backflow. 
biofilm Microbial cells that adhere to a surface through a matrix of primarily polysaccharide mate­
rials in which they are encapsulated. Biofilms can grow on piping and surfaces of water 
systems and can be difficult to remove. They offer protection to microbes from disinfec­
tants (e.g., chlorine) in the water. 
boil-water advisory A statement to the public advising that tap water must be boiled before drinking. 
bottled water Commercially produced bottled water. 
class A categorization given to waterborne disease and outbreaks (WBDOs) indicating to the 
strength of the epidemiologic and water-quality data implicating water as the source of the 
disease or outbreak (see Table 3). 
coliforms All aerobic and facultative anaerobic, gram-negative, nonspore-forming, rod-shaped bacte­
ria that ferment lactose with gas formation within 48 hours at 95°F (35°C). Coliforms are 
mostly harmless bacteria that live in soil and water as well as the gut of humans and animals. 
community water system A public water system that has at least 15 service connections used by year-round residents 
or that regularly serves at least 25-year-round residents. The system might be owned by a 
private or public entity providing water to a community, subdivision, or mobile home park. 
cross-connection Any actual or potential connection between a drinking water supply and a possible source 
of contamination or pollution (i.e., nonpotable water). Under this condition, contami­
nated water might flow back into the drinking water system. See backflow. 
deficiency An antecedent event or situation contributing to the occurrence of a waterborne disease or 
outbreak. 
dermatitis Inflammation of the skin. In this report, the term dermatitis is used to denote a broad 
category of skin-related symptoms (e.g., folliculitis, cellulitis, chemical burns, or rash). 
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disinfection A treatment that kills microorganisms (e.g., bacteria, viruses, and protozoa); in water treat­
ment, a chemical (commonly chlorine, chloramine, or ozone) or physical process (e.g., 
ultraviolet light) may be used. 
disinfection by-products Chemicals formed in water by the reaction between organic matter and other waste prod­
ucts and disinfectants. 
distribution system Water pipes, storage reservoirs, tanks, and other means used to deliver drinking water to 
consumers or to store finished water before delivery to a customer. In community water 
systems, the distribution system is under the jurisdiction of a water utility and ends at the 
water meter or at the customer’s property line (if the system is not metered). In noncommu­
nity and nonpublic individual water systems, the distribution system ends at the point 
where water enters the building or house. See plumbing. 
etiologic agent The pathogen, chemical, or toxin causing a waterborne disease or outbreak. Infectious etio­
logic agents are bacteria, parasites, viruses, or fungi. 
fecal coliforms Coliform bacteria that grow and ferment lactose to produce gas at 112.1°F (44.5°C) in 
<24 hours. These bacteria are associated with human and animal wastes, and their presence 
in water might be an indication of recent sewage or animal waste contamination. 
filtration In water treatment, the process of passing water through one or more permeable mem­
branes or media of small diameter (e.g., sand, anthracite, and diatomaceous earth) to 
remove suspended particles from the water. Filters might be effective in removing patho­
gens, depending on the type and operation. 
finished water The water (e.g., drinking water) delivered to the distribution system after treatment, if any. 
free chlorine The chlorine in water that is not combined with other constituents, therefore, serving as an 
effective disinfectant (also referred to as free available chlorine and residual chlorine). 
ground water Water that is contained in interconnected pores in an aquifer. 
ground water system A system that uses water extracted from an aquifer (i.e., a well or spring) as its source. 
ground water under the direct As defined by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), any water beneath the 
influence of surface water surface of the ground with substantial occurrence of insects or other macrooganisms, algae, 
or large-diameter pathogens (e.g., Giardia intestinalis or Cryptosporidium), or substantial and 
relatively rapid shifts in water characteristics (e.g., turbidity, temperature, conductivity, or 
pH) that closely correlate with climatologic or surface water conditions. Direct influence must 
be determined for individual sources in accordance with criteria established by the state. 
individual water system A water system that does not meet the EPA definition for a public water system. The system 
might serve a single family or farm not having access to a public water system, or it might 
regularly serve as many as 24 persons or 14 connections. States are responsible for regulat­
ing these water systems. 
karst aquifer An aquifer characterized by water-soluble limestone and similar rocks in which fractures or 
cracks have been widened by the dissolution of the carbonate rocks by ground water; the 
aquifer might contain sinkholes, tunnels, or even caves. 
maximum contaminant level The maximum permissible concentration (i.e., level) of a contaminant in water supplied to 
any user of a public water system. 
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mixed-agent outbreak More than one type of etiologic agent is identified in clinical specimens from affected per­
sons, and each etiologic agent is found in more than 5% of positive clinical specimens (e.g., 
an outbreak with Giardia spp. [parasites] and Salmonella spp. [bacteria] with each agent 
identified in >5% of stool specimens). 
mixed-illness outbreak More than one type of illness is reported by more than 50% of patients in a single outbreak 
(e.g., a combination of gastroenteritis and dermatitis). 
mixed-source outbreak More than one type of source water is implicated in the outbreak (e.g., a combination of 
ground water and surface water). 
mixed-system outbreak More than one type of water system is implicated in the outbreak (e.g., a combination of 
noncommunity and individual water systems). 
noncommunity water system A public water system that is not a community system; it does not serve year-round resi­
dents. There are two types: transient and nontransient noncommunity systems. 
nontransient noncommunity A public water system that is not a community system and that regularly serves at least 25 of 
water system the same persons for more than 6 months per year but not year-round (e.g., a school, a 
factory, or a business with its own water supply). 
plumbing Water pipes, storage reservoirs, tanks, and other means used to deliver drinking water to 
consumers inside buildings or houses or to store drinking water inside buildings or houses 
before consumption. In community water systems, the plumbing begins after the water 
utility’s water meter or at the property line (if the distribution system is not metered). In 
noncommunity and nonpublic individual water systems, the plumbing begins at the point 
where water enters the building or house. See distribution system. 
predominant illness The category of illness reported by at least 50% of ill respondents (e.g., gastroenteritis, 
dermatitis, or acute respiratory illness). When more than one illness category is reported for 
a single WBDO, they are listed together as predominant illnesses. These mixed illness 
WBDOs are analyzed separately from WBDOs with single illnesses. 
primary water exposure For use in this report, a classification used for the source of contaminated water not 
intended for drinking or contaminated water of unknown intent. 
public water system A system, classified as either a community water system or a noncommunity water system, 
that provides piped water to the public for human consumption and is regulated under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act. Such a system must have at least 15 service connections or regu­
larly serve at least 25 persons daily for at least 60 days per year. 
raw water Surface water or ground water that has not been treated in any way. 
reservoir, impoundment An artificially maintained lake, created for the collection and storage of water. This body of 
water can be available as a source of raw water for drinking purposes and/or recreational 
use. In certain instances, a finished water storage facility in the distribution system might 
also be called a reservoir. 
setting Location where exposure to contaminated water occurred (e.g., restaurant, water park, or hotel). 
source water Untreated water (i.e., raw water) used to produce drinking water. 
surface water All water on the surface (e.g., lakes, rivers, reservoirs, ponds, and oceans) as distinguished 
from subsurface or ground water. 
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total coliforms Fecal and nonfecal coliforms that are detected by using a standard test. The extent to which 
total coliforms are present in water can indicate the general quality of that water and the 
likelihood that the water is fecally contaminated by animal and/or human sources. 
transient noncommunity A public water system that is not a community system and that does not regularly serve at 
water system least 25 of the same persons for more than 6 months per year. These systems provide water 
to places where persons do not remain for long periods (e.g., restaurants, campgrounds, 
highway rest stations, or parks with their own public water systems). 
untreated water Surface water or ground water that has not been treated in any way (i.e., raw water). 
water not intended for drinking Water that has not been treated for human consumption in conformance with EPA drink­
ing water standards and that is provided for uses other than for drinking. This might 
include water used in occupational settings; lakes, springs, and creeks used as drinking 
water by campers and boaters; irrigation water; and other nonpotable water sources with or 
without taps but does not include exposure to recreational water or flood water. 
water of unknown intent The information about the water is insufficient to determine for what purpose it is being 
provided or used and whether is has been treated for human consumption in conformance 
with EPA drinking water standards. 
water system A system for the provision of water for human consumption through pipes or other con­
structed conduits. This includes any collection, treatment, storage, and distribution facili­
ties used primarily in connection with such a system. 
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Appendix B 
Descriptions of Selected Waterborne Disease Outbreaks Associated
 
with Drinking Water, Water Not Intended for Drinking,
 
and Water of Unknown Intent
 
State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Bacteria 
February 2006 Indiana Campylobacter spp. 32	 Thirty-two county residents who developed gastrointestinal illness 
were included in a case-control study that implicated municipal water 
as the source of infection. Seven of nine people who provided stool 
specimens tested positive for Campylobacter species; and routine 
water samples from the treatment facility tested positive for total 
coliforms and Escherichia coli at the time of the outbreak. The 
investigation determined that a chlorinator had malfunctioned before 
the outbreak, resulting in inadequate chlorination of the water supply, 
and that cross-contamination also might have occurred when a new 
water main was pressure-tested with non-potable water. 
May 2005 Oregon Escherichia coli O157:H7, 60	 Attendees of an outdoor school program at a camp developed 
C. jejuni, and E. coli O145 gastrointestinal illness with a median duration of four days. Stool 
samples were collected from 57 cases. Nine persons tested positive 
for E. coli O157:H7, three persons tested positive for C. jejuni, two 
persons tested positive for E. coli O145; and three persons tested 
positive for both E. coli O157:H7 and C. jejuni. The camp was required 
to upgrade the surface water-treatment system, which was suspected 
of providing inadequate treatment after heavy rainfall conditions. Raw 
water tested positive for fecal coliforms and E. coli approximately 
1 week after the first case-patient became ill. 
May 2005 South Dakota Legionella pneumophila 18 (1) Eighteen confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease were reported 
serogroup 1 over a 5-month period in Rapid City, South Dakota. An investigation, 
including a case-control study and environmental sampling, was 
conducted. A small, decorative fountain lacking obvious aerosol-
generating capacity was implicated. Clinical and environmental 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 Benidorm isolates had identical 
sequence-based typing (SBT) patterns. (Source: O’Loughlin RE, 
Kightlinger L, Werpy, M, et al. Restaurant outbreak of Legionnaires’ 
disease associated with a decorative fountain: an environmental 
and case control study. BMC Infect Dis 2007;7:93). 
April 2006 Texas L. pneumophila serogroup 1 10 (3)	 Ten confirmed cases of Legionnaires’ disease, diagnosed by urine 
antigen and culture, were reported during spring 2005 after exposure 
to a hospital in San Antonio, Texas. The potable hot water supply of 
the newly constructed and recently opened inpatient building was 
determined to be the most likely source of the outbreak. Multiple 
L. pneumophila serogroup 1 strains were identified from environmental 
isolates taken from the hospital building; one previously unreported 
environmental strain matched a case-patient isolate. 
May 2002 Louisiana Pseudomonas aeruginosa 27	 Thirty-eight employees at a cardboard box manufacturing facility were 
surveyed regarding recent dermatologic symptoms. Twenty-seven 
employees reported rashes that were suspected to be work-related and 
were consistent with P. aeruginosa infection. The facility had recently 
switched to a closed-water system. Water used in manufacturing 
processes and cleaning was treated and re-used as plant process 
water. Water samples from multiple sites using this water contained 
high concentrations of P. aeruginosa. Contributing factors noted from 
the water samples included elevated water temperatures, high organic 
content, elevated pH levels and varying disinfectant levels. The 
observation was made that certain areas of the water system were 
accessed substantially less frequently than others and that the ability of 
Pseudomonas to produce biofilms in hoses or pipes might have limited 
the effectiveness of the treatment methods. (Source: Hewitt DJ., et al. 
Industrial Pseudomonas folliculitis. Am J Ind Med 2006; 49:895–9). 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Viruses 
July 2006 North Carolina Hepatitis A 16 Private property owners allowed travelers to stay on their property and 
provided drinking water for public use. The drinking water source for 
the house and the camping area and the water supply for a limited 
amount of fruits and vegetables was a spring that the owner had 
excavated. Water was directed into a plastic reservoir above the 
spring. Untreated water was pumped to the house through a series of 
pipes and delivered to the downhill camping area through an overflow 
hose. Water from a spigot from outside the house tested positive for 
fecal coliforms, E. coli, and hepatitis A. The septic tank located directly 
upstream from the spring was considered a possible source of water 
contamination. 
July 2006 Maryland Norovirus G1 148 Attendees of a camp developed gastrointestinal illness. Participants 
were from England, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and the United States 
(i.e., California, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Illinois, Massachu­
setts, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
Ten persons submitted stool samples, eight of which tested positive 
for norovirus G1. General concerns included toilet facilities with 
plumbing deficiencies and limited handwashing stations throughout 
the camp. The water distribution system did not contain a detectable 
level of chlorine. Nine of ten water samples from garden hoses used to 
provide drinking water contained total coliforms and E. coli. Well 
construction deficiencies were noted (e.g., absence of backflow­
prevention devices on the pool bath house water heaters and on water 
distribution lines to the latrines). The well storage tank and latrine 
wastewater samples contained Norovirus G1; tracer dye added to 
latrines was detected in the well. 
Parasites 
August 2005 California Giardia intestinalis 3 A child’s condition was diagnosed as laboratory-confirmed giardiasis, 
and a sibling and parent had clinically compatible symptoms. Canal 
water was piped into a private residence and used for bathing, 
dishwashing, housecleaning and laundry. Accidental ingestion of 
contaminated canal water was suspected. 
May 2006 Colorado G. intestinalis 6 Participants in a school trip to a state park became ill with gastrointes­
tinal symptoms after consuming inadequately treated river water that 
was not intended for drinking. Treatment methods included the 
addition of iodine; filtration; and boiling. No one treatment method was 
used by the entire group (n=26) and variations in practice were 
observed among individuals who used each treatment method. 
Mixed Agents 
June 2006 Wyoming Norovirus G1, Norovirus G2, 139 Attendees of four week-long camps at a seasonal camp site experienced 
C. jejuni gastrointestinal illness. Investigators concluded that the camp’s two 
wells, which were drilled into fractured rock aquifers, may have been 
contaminated by raw sewage released from the main septic system. 
Water from the wells repeatedly tested positive for fecal and total 
coliforms; a septic tank sample tested positive for Norovirus G1 and 
G2. The main tank was documented as poorly located, at capacity and 
not meeting the state’s recommended standards for size or type of 
construction at the time of the outbreak. Well water was not filtered or 
chlorinated prior to consumption. (Source: CDC, Gastroenteritis 
among attendees at a summer camp—Wyoming, June-July 2006. 
MMWR 2007;56(15):368-370) 
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State in No. of 
which WBDO cases 
Date occurred Etiologic agent (deaths) Description of WBDO 
Unidentified 
August 2006 New York Norovirus suspected 16	 Visitors to a bed and breakfast, the owner and his daughter, devel­
oped gastrointestinal illness. The incubation period and duration of 
illness and symptoms were consistent with norovirus infection. The 
bed and breakfast had its own well and onsite wastewater disposal 
system, which were located in close proximity. A well water sample 
was positive for E. coli and might have been contaminated from a 
poorly maintained, leaking sewage system used by nearby cottages. 
Year-round residents used onsite septic systems or alternate disposal 
methods for wastewater when the seasonal system was turned off. 
The geology of the area was primarily fractured bedrock; contamina­
tion of the well likely resulted from waste that was released by the 
leaking seasonal sewage system or onsite wastewater systems, which 
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